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Abstract 
Trade secrets have become an important aspect of competitive advantage for new and 
established businesses in the new digital economy. This is particularly true in corporate 
venturing, where most corporates rely on new entrepreneurial ventures with creative ideas to 
drive innovation and fuel growth. In this manner, these corporates run corporate venturing 
units such as corporate accelerators to support entrepreneurs creating new ventures. During 
the accelerated pace of venturing, trade secrets become the core intangible asset that requires 
protection for any new venture. Yet, people remain the weakest link in the cyber security chain 
and that requires more understanding to enhance cyber security protection. 
A new approach was suggested in this study to explore the protection of trade secrets through 
the confidentiality of information, the ownership of intellectual property and the secrecy of 
commercial secrets. This study developed a conceptual model to explore cyber security 
behaviour for trade secret protection within corporate accelerators. Well-established theories 
were adopted to develop the research conceptual model for trade secret protection, 
integrating the protection motivation theory (PMT), social bond theory (SBT) and the concept 
of psychological ownership. 
This study began with a comprehensive up-to-date systematic literature review in the field of 
cyber security behavioural intentions over the past decade. The top 10 journals in the field of 
cyber security behaviour were reviewed and 46 publications that used 35 behaviour theories 
were identified. A concept matrix based on a concept-centric approach was applied to present 
the behavioural theories used in the relevant literature. By analysing the relevant literature 
results, the key cyber security behaviour elements were identified and illustrated via a concept 
map and matrix. Based on the output of the literature review analysis, valuable findings and 
insights were presented. 
xiii 
 
security behavioural intentions to protect trade 
secrets in agile dynamic corporate environments. The research design adopted a hypothetico-
deductive approach using a quantitative survey for empirical data collection. To evaluate the 
conceptual model, a partial least squares method of structural equation modelling (PLS-SEM) 
analysis was used. This involved validity and reliability assessments, in addition to hypotheses 
testing. The research results found statistically significant relationships for severity, 
vulnerability, response efficacy, response cost, involvement and personal norms in relation to 
cyber security behavioural intentions to protect trade secrets.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Due to the rapid technology change and disruption facing most corporates today in 
different industries, open innovation and corporate venturing are used as new 
approaches for corporate survival and growth. Large corporates have started to adopt 
new venturing models to innovate and build new ventures. In particular, corporate 
accelerators have become the new innovation machines for most corporates, and 
therefore, require more attention in regards to cyber security threats. 
Trade secrets, also known as confidential business information, are today considered 
one of the most valuable and yet vulnerable assets of new ventures. Trade secrets are 
a type of intellectual property that businesses rely on to maintain competitive 
advantage. Moreover, trade secrets are becoming the most preferable IP mechanism 
for new ventures because of the complexity of other types of IP (e.g. patents) that take 
a long time to be granted.  In addition, with advances in technology and growing 
competition in all industries, maintaining secrets has become a significant issue for 
entrepreneurs.  
An example to illustrate how dangerous this can be is easily drawn from a recent news 
article that shows the death of a new start-up before it was even born. The news article 
talks about an entrepreneur that launched a crowd funding campaign on 
Kickstarter.com for an innovative smartphone case that unfolds into a selfie stick. 
However, one week after posting the product on the crowd funding website he found 
2 
 
that his invention was available for sale online at Alibaba.com (Horwitz, 2016). This 
incident shows the importance of protecting trade secrets at the creation phase of a 
new venture.  
For this reason, and because of the importance of behavioural aspects in cyber security 
and protecting confidential information, this research focuses on cyber security 
behaviour for trader secret protection. This research will investigate the impact of 
behavioural intentions for trade secrets protection. In 
addition, the research suggests a new approach to protect trade secrets using well 
established theories in the field of cyber security behaviour. The research will look into 
the impact of protection motivation, social bonding and psychological ownership on 
entrepreneurs to perform protective cyber security actions when faced with cyber 
behavioural intentions in protecting trade secrets within the context of corporate 
venturing.  
The chapter aims to describe the research problem, defines the research questions and 
then identifies the research value.  
1.1. Research Problem: Innovation vs. Security 
Cyber security breaches result in data loss or leakage, intellectual property theft, legal 
issues and reputational damage. In a recent information security breaches survey 2015 
conducted by PwC (2015), such breaches have increased since last year to 90% in large 
companies, and 74% in small businesses.  
One of the key security challenges facing corporate innovation is leakage of IP that 
results in damaging competitiveness and innovation, and leads to commercial losses 
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(Warren, 2015).  According to a report by Akerman et al. from McAfee (2009), hackers 
have moved beyond traditional cyber theft of credit card details to intellectual 
property theft. In addition, Pooley (2015) argues that trade secrets are the most 
valuable assets of modern business.  Hence, the economic value of trade secrets makes 
it a tempting target for those that are willing to steal them.  
In a report issued by Detica (2011) in partnership with Office of Cyber Security and 
Information Assurance ate the Cabinet Office, stated that the cost of cybercrime to 
the UK comes from the significant theft of IP at an estimated cost of £9 billion (See 
Figure 1.1). In addition, a more recent report published by HM Government and Marsh 
(2015) notes as one of its key findings that IP theft has the highest severity of impact 
on UK businesses.  
 
Figure 1.1: Cost of different types of cybercrime to the UK economy (based on Detica, 2011) 
In a TV interview on CNN in 2015, Brian Burch VP, of Global Consumer and Small 
-ups are incredibly 
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explained in one way by the attention that venture capitalists (VCs) give to start-
intellectual property assets during the evaluation of new start-ups for investments.  
(Block et al., 2014).  Therefore, for entrepreneurs starting new ventures, protection of 
their sensitive business information is usually required to innovate and grow in the 
market. Hence, new start-ups depend heavily on the intangible assets that they won 
during the early stage of the venturing process.   
According to Weiblen and Chesbrough (2015) when corporates usually engages with a 
start-up in a corporate venturing programme, managing intellectual property becomes 
a concern. Corporate venturing units usually use different approaches to manage 
intellectual property rights. For example, the AT&T Foundry which was established in 
the US in 2011, requires everybody involved in the unit to sign a non-disclosure 
agreement. However, other accelerators do not give any attention to intellectual 
property, and are unlikely even to sign a NDA, such as Y-Combinitor, Techstars and 
Microsoft Ventures. This shows that there is an issue in the legal protection of 
 
Along with the acceleration of new ventures in a dynamic agile environment comes 
stolen. 
According to the UTSA, for information to be considered as trade secrets, a reasonable 
effort must be made to maintain the confidentiality of information (Uniform Law 
Commission, 1985). When a large company needs to disclose trade secrets to others 
such as suppliers, consultants, manufactures, etc., it requires them to sign a NDA so 
that information confidentiality can be enforced. However, in the case of 
entrepreneurs engaging in a cooperate accelerator, companies refuse to sign an NDA 
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to protect entrepreneurs IP for legal purposes to avoid getting into any law suits. This 
includes all people during the programme that will be engaging with entrepreneurs, 
such as mentors, experts, investors, etc. Moreover, the agile methodology in an 
accelerator does not make IP protection a priority or a concern at the start-up 
validation stage.   
In addition, large corporates have been able to design and maintain cyber security 
mechanisms to protect their core businesses to their best of their ability. However, it 
is clearly noted that exploration environments such as new innovation business units 
require different management, operation and strategy approaches from traditional 
business methods. This includes all business functions; therefore, for cyber security 
measures in a dynamic agile environment, traditional security methods might not be 
suitable. For an example, an entrepreneur uses cloud storage such as Dropbox.com to 
store his electronic documents for easy access and sharing, where, most large 
businesses would not allow such an activity for cyber risk concerns. Although 
corporates cannot guide or manage entrepreneurs in terms of complying with 
corporate information security procedures they should still be obligated to offer 
entrepreneurs a secure environment that does not conflict with the way they operate.  
Despite the large amounts of money invested in technology, security threats remain a 
significant concern. According to Mancuso et al. (2014) cyber security research has 
focused more on technology applications; however, recently, research on the human 
factor part of cyber security has been growing. In addition, recent cyber security issues 
that have been overlooked in academia and industry have been focusing on the 
technological issue of cyber threats. People remain the weakest link in the cyber 
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security chain. Moreover, entrepreneurs and the impact that they make through their 
new creative ideas and innovative services /products, fall apart when someone else 
has stolen their secrets and is first in the market. The fast-growing discipline of cyber 
security has expanded to include different types of information assets, such as 
intellectual property. 
Although entrepreneurs are within corporate accelerators for a specific period, 
corporates should have an obligatio
confidential business information. The reason for this is that when entrepreneurs 
interact with different people during the accelerator programme and share their ideas 
and plans, they have different attitudes towards cyber security and ownership of IP.   
Moreover, entrepreneurs adopt new agile methods such as lean start-up methodology; 
therefore, their focus is on failing fast to learn and iterate quicker (Reis, 2011). This type 
of an approach that is based on experimentation requires entrepreneurs to focus on 
getting the product-market-fit through a minimal viable product (MVP). This 
prototyping of an MVP involves developing the product/service with the minimum 
features possible to test it in the market and validate its viability. This in return means 
that entrepreneurs might not consider any security countermeasures to protect their 
trade secrets.  
There is a considerable volume of research that states that to protect trade secrets, 
individuals with access and knowledge of these secrets should not disclose them. 
However, previous research in security behaviour lacks an explanation of how 
entrepreneurs may protect trade secrets in a dynamic agile environment such as 
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corporate accelerators. Most companies state that they would not ask for 
same time, they expose them and their ideas to a variety of people during the 
accelerator programme. Moreover, most corporate accelerators do not sign an NDA, 
and at the same time, state that they respect confidentiality. In addition, corporates 
do not offer entrepreneurs security training or awareness programmes to help them 
protect their trade secrets which are their most valuable intangible asset. The research 
argues that this is a huge problem for the following reasons: 
Cyber-attacks, including IP theft and social engineering are becoming more 
sophisticated. 
Start-ups as large corporates are being targeted by cyber criminals. 
Emerging start-ups are growing fast and are disrupting multiple industries.  
Trade secrets are increasing in value, thus becoming a target for cyber criminals.  
Corporates have no con
accelerators. 
Start-ups at the venturing stage are usually not able to afford a Chief Security Officer 
(CSO).  
Dynamic agile environments require different cyber security countermeasures.  
New start-up methodologies and approaches differ from traditional corporate R&D 
methods, therefore, incorporate different types of cyber risks.  
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characteristics. 
Bos et al. (2015) state that during the innovation process of development and 
commercialisation, trade secrets require protection to prevent the secrets from 
leaking. Additionally, Row (2016) argue that for large companies to have an effective 
security, they must integrate people within the security function. Hence, to support 
the protection of intangible assets within a corporate venturing process, there is an 
implicit need to explore cyber security behaviour. This is because to date, people 
remain the weakest link in the cyber security chain.   
Therefore, the security paradox that is facing corporate venturing today is that the 
confidentiality of information remains an important aspect of protecting business 
information (i.e. trade secrets); however, open innovation requires exploration inside 
and outside the organisation for the pursuit of new opportunities. The issue of 
protecting trade secrets within corporate accelerators is not only a technology issue, 
nor a security management issue. It is rather more a people issue that is concerned 
with the threats facing entrepreneurs and the required security behaviours to protect 
trade secrets against cyber risks.   
To illustrate the risks that involve cyber theft of trade secrets facing entrepreneurs, 
Figure 1.2 shows a cyber-risk assessment for trade secrets. The assessment assumes 
that people (i.e. entrepreneurs) are the main vulnerability and trade secrets are the 
target asset in this case. Therefore, the impact of an IP cyber theft incident could result 
in the risk of venture losing its competitive edge during the venturing process.  
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Figure 1.2: IP cyber-risk assessment 
The reasoning behind this focus of research is that entrepreneurs should maintain the 
protection of their trade secrets by performing an effective cyber security behaviour 
for trade secret protection. However, due to the dynamic environment of a corporate 
accelerator and the nature of exploration within an accelerator, entrepreneurs may 
not have a positive cyber security-based behaviour towards protecting trade secrets. 
This requires an understanding of what drives entrepreneurs to perform protective 
cyber security actions to protect trade secrets. This research argues that there is great 
as one component of corporates security countermeasures to manage cyber security 
threats in an agile dynamic environment.   
1.2. Research Proposal  
This research proposes a novel approach to exploring the intangible nature of trade 
secret protection. This approached is built on the intangible fundamental principles 
underlying the bases of trade secrets. Trade secrets as illustrated in Figure 1.3 are based 
on three dimensions: information, intellectual property and secrets.  
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Figure 1.3: The dimensions of trade secrets  
Generally, as an intangible item, information may be considered as secrets but might 
not necessarily be considered as an intellectual property.  Similarly, intellectual 
property could be considered a type of information but might not necessarily be 
considered as secrets. The same is true for secrets, they could be considered as 
information but they might not necessarily be considered as intellectual property. On 
the contrary, trade secrets as intangible items, is defined as information, intellectual 
property and secrets at the same time. Therefore, this research aims to explore trade 
secret protection based on its three unique dimensions.  
All three trade secret dimensions in a business context require some type of 
protection.  However, since every dimension is viewed in different way their protection 
is required for three different protection purposes, for: confidentiality, ownership and 
secrecy. Therefore, this research assumes that the best way to protect trade secrets is 
by considering the different dimensions of trade secrets. This research aims to develop 
a conceptual model that explores the protection trade secrets by focusing on the 
protection of the three dimensions through three protection lenses. Thus, trade secret 
protection consists of confidentiality, ownership and secrecy.  
Furthermore, the research proposes the integration of three theories, each focusing 
on one purpose of protection to provide a comprehensive approach for exploring the 
research problem.  Therefore, as illustrated in Figure 1.4 the research explores trade 
secrets as information through the protective motivation theory; as an intellectual 
11 
 
property through the theory of psychological ownership; and as secrets through the 
social bonding theory.  
 
Figure 1.4: The viewed types of trade secrets   
As illustrated in Figure 1.4 above, the research explores trade secrets using protective 
motivation theory based on the purpose of confidentiality, psychological ownership 
based on the purpose of ownership; and social bonding theory based on the purpose 
of secrecy.  
Protection motivation is a well-defined theory that has been used in the field of 
information security. Moreover, the underlying theory of protection motivation is 
based on evaluating threats and the coping ability of taking actions to prevent an 
incident.  Therefore, protection motivation will be used for confidentiality to protect 
trade secrets.   
Additionally, ownership is a legal aspect of protecting intellectual property. However, 
trade secrets do not offer clear legal ownership of trade secrets, although trade secrets 
are considered proprietary information. Therefore, psychological ownership was used 
for ownership to protect trade secrets.   
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Generally, secrets are kept between two or more people. Therefore, for an individual 
to keep a secret within a group, having strong ties between the group members is 
necessary. Therefore, social bonding will be used for secrecy to protect trade secrets.   
A new contribution is achieved in this research by seeking to understand what 
in
corporations can design and implement effective cyber security countermeasures. 
There are a number of theories and models in the literature that have been used to 
understand emp
corporate dynamic agile experimental environment that is based on open innovation.  
This research explores the protection of trade secrets, focusing on the three 
dimensions of trade secrets and the three defined protection aspects. This involves 
investigating the impact of protection motivation on confidentiality protection, 
psychological ownership on ownership protection and social bonding on secrecy 
protection. 
1.3. Research Questions and Objectives 
Research Question:  cyber security behavioural 
intentions impact trade secret protection within agile dynamic environments? 
This research question is divided into three sub-research questions. 
• RQ1: What are the significant protection motivation factors that influence 
within a corporate venturing unit? 
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• RQ2: What impact does psychological ownership have  security 
behaviour to protect trade secrets within a corporate venturing unit? 
• RQ3: What impact does the significant social bonding factors have on 
 secrets within a 
corporate venturing unit? 
To answer these questions and address the research problem, the following 
objectives need to be achieved: 
1. Conduct a systematic literature review in the field of cyber security behaviour 
theories. 
2. Define the research constructs and develop the research conceptual model and 
hypotheses. 
3. Design a research methodology to collect and analyse the empirical research 
data. 
4. Develop the research data collection instrument and assess its validity and 
reliability. 
5. Assess and prepare the collected quantitative data for multivariate analysis. 
6.  
7.  
8. Examine l capabilities and test hypotheses. 
9.  
10. Report and discuss the research findings and draw conclusion and future 
research.  
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1.4. Design/Methodology 
The research adopts a hypothetico-deductive approach that involves the design of a 
theory and developing determinates of assumptions. The deductive approach will be 
used to test the developed theory and confirm or reject the research hypotheses as 
illustrated in Figure 1.5.  
 
Figure 1.5: Deductive approach (adopted from Trochim (2001)) 
The research uses a quantitative research approach by developing a survey instrument. 
Therefore, an online questionnaire will be used for data collection purposes (See 
Appendix A). The questionnaire items are adapted from previous research in the field 
of cyber security behaviour. Therefore, this research instrument adopts measures from 
the previous literature, and modifies them to make them relevant to the research 
context and reflects the research needs. Participants will be asked to indicate the level 
of agreement or disagreement with the items in each construct of the conceptual 
model. 
The collected data from the survey will be analysed using SPSS and SmartPLS. In 
addition, in order to achieve research objectives, the following data analysis methods 
will be used: 
• Descriptive analysis of demographic variables. 
• Cronbach Reliability Analysis (Reliability testing). 
• Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) (Reliability and validity testing). 
• Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) (Hypothesis testing). 
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1.5. Research Scope 
context (i.e. corporate venturing units). Although entrepreneurs within such a unit 
operate within a corporation function, they have their own characteristics that differ 
from corporate employees (Engle, Mah, & Sadri, 1997). Therefore, the research looks 
 
From a business perspective, trade secrets are an important asset in maintaining a 
competitive advantage for new ventures. In addition, cyber security is not limited to 
technology only, and covers the wider area of security methods, information assets 
and people involvement. Therefore, the present research focuses o
cyber security behaviour in regards to their most valuable and vulnerable intangible 
asset when joining a corporate accelerator, namely their business trade secrets (e.g. 
processes, algorithms, methods, etc.).   
Given the research interest 
corporate accelerators in London chosen as the research target population. This is due 
to the fact that the UK has the largest number of corporate accelerators in Europe, 
with the vast majority of them in London (Future Asia Ventures, 2016). Thus, the scope 
of this research has been explained to clarify the research focus and boundaries and 
help to set the research direction. 
1.6. Research Value  
 cyber security behaviour towards 
trade secrets can be enhanced, the theft and leakage of trade secrets can be lessened, 
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and competitive advantage of start-ups during a corporate accelerator programme 
may be maintained. Therefore, the outcomes of this research will be of considerable 
value to different corporations, especially those interested in enhancing 
cyber security behaviours to protect trade secrets within corporate 
accelerator programmes. 
In particular, this research will be of value to: 
• Large corporations, in designing countermeasures, procedures and initiatives to 
enhance the protection of trade secrets in corporate venturing units. 
• Those in management positions within corporations such as corporate venturing 
cyber security 
behaviours, which can enhance the protection of new ventures competitive 
advantages. 
• Government agencies that are concerned with the protection of Intellectual 
Property (IP) for new ventures by understanding the importance of cyber security 
behaviour and the factors that have an impact on protecting trade secrets in 
dynamic agile environments. 
• Researchers that are interested in understanding the factors that influence cyber 
security behaviour in new ventures, to conduct further research in the field. 
 
In addition, the research will contribute to current knowledge in the field of cyber 
security behavioural intentions. The significant research contribution will be presented 
in the final chapter after conducting the research analysis and evaluation. 
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1.7. Thesis Outline 
The following outline illustrates the structure of the thesis and provides a summery 
for each chapter.  
 
 
 
18 
 
Chapter 2 
2. Background 
 
2.1. Introduction 
companies to grow and survive. Corporates are focusing on sustainable innovation to 
improve current products and retain competitive edge. Meanwhile, significant 
changes in the start-up ecosystem in the last decade are allowing start-ups to compete 
with large corporates by bringing their ideas to the market in a faster, more agile way, 
and in a more affordable manner than was the case in the early 2000s. Furthermore, 
access to capital through angel investors and venture capitalists, in addition to the 
access to business incubators and accelerators, all serve to support the 
growth potential of start-ups. This has forced corporates to reconsider their strategies 
and practices by adopting new models of corporate venturing programmes (Battistini 
et al., 2013; Engel, 2011). Weiblen and Chesbrough (2015) argue that start-ups could be 
a vital source of innovation and growth for large companies.  
Corporate Venturing (CV) has emerged as a driving force behind corporate disruptive 
innovation (Kuiper and Ommen, 2015). In addition, Intellectual Property (IP) has 
venturing and i ies 
to transform the way corporates innovate and create a competitive advantage. 
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This chapter offers a background about cyber security, corporate venturing and 
intellectual property in relation to entrepreneurial activity and innovation within a 
company. The aim of this background is to introduce the concepts that are used as a 
foundation for this research.  
2.2. Cyber Security Essentials 
the preservation of confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of information
different forms: a digital form (e.g. data files on a system), a physical form (e.g. on 
paper) and in the form of knowledge (e.g. know-how). According to Hult and Sivanesan 
(2013) cyber security involves the protection of IT systems and information security. In 
Cybersecurity goes beyond 
information security in that it is not limited to the protection of information assets 
and the preservation of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information. 
Information security, on the other hand, goes beyond cybersecurity in that it is not 
limited only to threats that arise via a cyberspace 15). 
In this regard, the ISO/IEC 27001 (2013) defines the requirements for information 
security. These involve three key aspects of information security, often described as 
the CIA triad: confidentiality, integrity and availability. Confidentiality involves the 
to protect the confidentiality of information they need to be kept secret. Pfleeger and 
Pfleeger (2006) state that confidentiality is also referred to secrecy.  
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According to Bos et al (2015), secrecy is a protection mechanism that offers a great 
protection for companies that depend on knowledge to perform innovation activities 
as a source of competitive advantage. Secrecy has been an important social aspect 
that was first studied by Simmel (1906) in the early twentieth century. Simmel (1906) 
stated that preserving the confidentiality of information in an organisation can be 
achieved through applying two approaches, either by restricting access to confidential 
information or encrypting confidential information.  
However, information in general is exposed to three main elements: technology, 
people and processes (Posthumus & Solms, 2004). Information in an organisation is 
defined as intangible assets that require protection. In the information systems 
research field, the term information security has been used interchangeably with the 
term cyber security. In this research, the term cyber security will be used, given its 
broader application for security. 
2.3. Corporate Venturing 
2.3.1. Review of Corporate Venturing  
The significance of corporate venturing is best expressed by its fostering of innovation 
and amazing economic growth. Corporate venturing is an important element of 
corporates are adopting entrepreneurial activities to survive in this rapidly changing 
environment. 
Corporate venturing is a term that describes entrepreneurial activities used to start a 
new venture within a large corporate organisation (Kuiper and Van Ommen 2015; 
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, 2012; MacMillan et al., 1986). There have been other different terms used 
in the literature to describe these entrepreneurial activities within established 
companies, such as corporate entrepreneurship (Burgelman, 1983, 1985), 
intrapreneurship (Antoncic and Hisrich, 2001; Pinchot, 1985) and corporate venture 
capital (CVC) (Lerner, 2013). Scholars have also called this new business creation and 
corporate innovation (Garvin, 2004).  
Morris et al. (2010) noted that the term corporate entrepreneurship and corporate 
venturing have often been used interchangeably in the literature to describe the new 
business creation phenomena. In addition, the concept of corporate venturing has 
suffered during the last four decades, in that there has not been an agreed definition 
for the concept.  Where there have been different definitions and classifications of 
corporate venturing. Some scholars limit the definition of corporate venturing to 
activities of corporate venture funding (Lerner, 2013), while others (Wolcott and 
Lippitz, 2007) differentiate between corporate entrepreneurship and corporate 
venture capital. Other researchers have conceptualized corporate venturing as being 
part of a bigger umbrella of corporate entrepreneurship (Phan et al., 2009). Kuratko 
and Audretsch (2013) state that the concept has evolved during the last couple of 
decades, and at the same time, definitions have varied greatly.  
Corporate Entrepreneurship (CE) the process 
whereby an individual or a group of individuals, in association with an existing 
organization, create a new organization or instigate renewal or innovation within that 
organization. . More recently Wolcott and Lippitz (2007) defined corporate 
s by which teams within an established company 
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conceive, foster, launch, and manage a new business that is distinct from the parent 
resources A simple understanding of corporate entrepreneurship is used in 
this research, as described by Guth and Ginsberg (1990), namely that CE describes the 
creation process of new ventures from within an existing company. 
Moreover, Kuiper and Van Ommen (2015) have discussed the issue of defining 
corporate venturing, and different views in regards to this. A different view looks at 
corporate venturing as an external fund activity limited to a corporate venture fund. 
On the other hand, there is a second view that looks at corporate venturing as 
constituting all entrepreneurial activates that aim to create a new venture in co-
operation with a large corporation. Moreover, there is a large amount of literature that 
limits the concept of corporate venturing to corporate venturing capital. The reason 
for the later view is that the four previous waves were confined to one specific model, 
namely the corporate venture funding model. More recently, in the last couple of 
years, a new wave of corporate venturing models has emerged on the surface. 
There have been five waves of corporate venturing development since the appearance 
of corporate venturing activities in the 1960s. In the first four waves, corporates 
focused on corporate venturing capital as the main activity to create new ventures. 
Moreover, in the 1980s and 1990s, the vast majority of new ventures were created by 
large corporations. This developed and changed dramatically since the financial crisis 
in 2008, which initiated the fifth wave of corporate venturing (Kuiper and Van Ommen, 
2015). Corporates are thus no longer only offering capital in exchange for equity, but 
are becoming more collaborative by offering different corporate resources. 
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By reviewing the literature, it is also clear that there are different classifications and 
models of corporate venturing. Some authors have classified corporate venturing on 
the basis of financial equity into equity models and non-equity models (Weiblen and 
Chesbrough, 2015). Equity models (e.g. corporate venture capital) are the more mature 
and established ones that have been in existence for a number of years. In contrast, 
the non-equity models (e.g. corporate accelerators) are new models that aim to enable 
corporations to engage with a larger number of start-ups in a fast agile way. Others 
argue that corporate venturing is divided into two key activities: internal corporate 
venturing activities and external corporate venturing activities (Sharma and Chrisman, 
2007). 
Despite the different definitions and classifications of corporate venturing, they all aim 
to support the creation of new ventures by offering entrepreneurs different corporate 
resources (i.e. expertise, mentoring, financial capital, technology, intellectual property, 
work space, etc.). The importance of corporate venturing has arisen due to its 
remarkable growth across industry, and across academia as a field of research (Fayolle 
and Wright, 2014; Kuratko et al., 2015). For decades, corporations have been investing 
in R&D units to create new revenue streams. The flexibility of corporate venturing 
today helps companies implement change more quickly and cheaply in regards to 
technology and business models than traditional R&D (Lerner, 2013).  Henry and 
Treanor (2013) describe R&D as a closed innovation model that has become 
unsustainable, and therefore, corporations have been moving to open innovation 
models for growth and sustainability. Open innovation is a term used by Chesbrough 
(2012) that involves businesses that preform collaboration with others to innovate and 
24 
 
survive. As described by Poo
 
(Dushnitsky, 2015).  Thus, companies today not only depend on internal R&D, but are 
increasingly engaging with external partners via open innovation (Dushnitsky, 2015). 
According to Hayton (2005b) an organisation can accumulate intellectual property 
using two sources, through internal development (i.e. R&D) or through an external 
knowledge source (i.e. corporate venturing). Corporate venturing is a concept that has 
been pursued by many corporations around the globe and has certainly emerged as 
one of the corporate buzz words that goes beyond the traditional corporate R&D and 
business development. Companies are adopting entrepreneurial activities via 
corporate venturing to survive in this rapidly changing environment. 
A significant change in the perception of the importance of corporate venturing for 
large corporations has taken place in the last five years. This change has made 
corporations redefine their practices in innovation and investment. According to 
Mawson (2011) the activities of corporate venturing have been growing since 2011 and 
are described as the golden age. Today, corporations are adopting newer corporate 
venture models that offer entrepreneurs working space, technology, intellectual 
property, business support and mentorship (Kuiper and Ommen, 2015; Weiblen & 
Chesbrough, 2015). These new models are adopting an open innovation approach that 
is based on collaboration with start-ups in order to exploit new opportunities. 
According to Kuiper and Van Ommen (2015) corporate venturing is expanding beyond 
its traditional models to include new models that are not only limited to corporate 
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venturing capital. Corporates used to focus on investment in late stage start-ups; 
however,  they have now started to focus on early stage start-ups. This new focus has 
made corporates adopt the accelerator model that provides start-ups with the 
resources required to accelerate the growth and success of their new business ideas.  
When comparing new corporate venturing models to traditional 30 year CVC models, 
the new models are still less mature.  This is because corporations have been focusing 
on equity models in the past 30 years, which offer start-up capital in exchange for 
equity. 
2.3.2. Corporate Accelerators  
Accelerators emerged in the mid-2000s as a new generation of incubators, due to the 
shortcoming of traditional incubators (Pauwels et al., 2016).  Y-Combinator (YC) is the 
first accelerator to be established in 2005 in Cambridge, Massachusetts, to accelerate 
early stage start-ups. There have been a number of successful companies that 
graduated from YC, such as Reddit, DropBox, and Airbnb. Today, there are more than 
235 accelerator programmes worldwide that have supported 5,693 ventures, with more 
than 12 billion dollars of funding (Christiansen, 2013). Thus, accelerators have played a 
critical role in the start-up ecosystem, and are worth billions of dollars. Table 2.1 shows 
the key differences between accelerators and incubators.  
Table 2.1: Key difference between incubators and accelerators (Cohen and Hochberg, 2014) 
 Incubators Accelerators 
Programme Duration 1 to 5 years 3 to 6 months 
Cohorts No Yes 
Business Model Rest Investment 
Selection Non-competitive Competitive 
Venture Stage Early or late Early 
26 
 
Mentorship Minimal Intense 
Location On site On site 
rganization which aims to accelerate new venture 
creation by providing education and mentoring to cohorts of ventures during a limited 
Pauwels et al., 2016, p.2). Historically, corporate venturing depended on offering 
traditional financial capital funding to start-ups in exchange for equity. Corporates 
have recently adopted the accelerator model, where most of the corporate 
accelerators were established after 2010 (Kuiper and Van Ommen 2015). According to 
a recent report by Future Asia Ventures (2016), there are 131 corporate accelerators 
worldwide. Figure 2.1 illustrates the growth of accelerators at a rate of 73% in 2015.  
 
Figure 2.1: Corporate accelerators annual growth (FAV, 2016; The Corporate Accelerator DB, 
2016) 
 The difference between a seed accelerator (i.e. YC) and a corporate accelerator is that 
the latter has more resources in terms of technology, intellectual property, expertise 
and funding. Therefore, these new corporate accelerator programmes have emerged 
to offer more valuable resources to start-ups. 
-supported programs of limited 
duration that support cohorts of start-ups during the new venture process via 
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mentoring, education, and company-specific resource
Accelerators generally share the following features (Kohler, 2016): 
• A competitive open application; 
• A focus on teams not individuals; 
• A limited time programme; 
• A cohort-based programme.  
For example, the Wayra accelerator was established by Telefónica Telecommunication 
Company in 2011. This accelerator is a 6-month programme that offers start-ups seed 
funding investment, acceleration services, mentors and access to Telefónica resources. 
Moreover, start-ups have received $24.2 million from the accelerator, and in addition, 
received more than $126 million from other investors. In addition, the corporate 
accelerator model has been adopted by different industry corporations, such as 
insurance (Allianz), automotive (BMW), entertainment (Disney), media (BBC), banks 
(Barclays) and other industries.  
Boston Consultancy Group (BCG), in a recent report, analysed the development of 
accelerators and incubators in large companies in comparison with other venturing 
tools (i.e. CVC and innovation labs) between the years 2010 and 2015. The report states 
that the number of accelerators/incubators in the largest 30 companies across seven 
industries (i.e. media, telecommunications, technology, financial services, chemicals, 
automotive and consumer goods) increased from 2% in 2010 to 44% in 2015 exceeding 
the number of CVCs and innovation labs in these companies. This shows that 
accelerators are becoming the main innovation vehicle in large companies.  
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One of the main features of accelerators in general is to provide access to the start-up 
ecosystem network. This usually exposes entrepreneurs to mentors, investors, other 
entrepreneurs, corporate executives and venture capitalists (Hochberg, 2015).   
2.4. Intellectual Property 
Intellectual Property (IP) has played a major role in the innovation and 
competitiveness 
protected rights co
Moberly (2014) identifies IP as one form of intangible asset in businesses. The key 
benefit of obtaining IP rights is that it grants a company the ability to exclude others 
from using their intellectual property. In addition, IP as a protection tool gives 
companies the right to take legal action against any competitors invading their 
intellectual property rights. The different types of IP (WIPO, 2004) are described as 
follows: 
• Patents: are obtained by receiving a document issued by a government office that 
gives exclusive ownership of an invention to a company or individual for a period 
of time, usually 20 years. 
• Copyright: is granted to protect the creativity work of an individual or a company, 
such as music, books, drawings and other original creations.  
• Trademarks: are an exclusive right given to a company to use special identities for 
their services and products, which may be a combination of letters, words and 
numbers, or symbols.    
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• Trade Secrets: are any business information that is not disclosed to the public and 
gives a company a competitive advantage in the marketplace. 
According to Alkaersig et al. (2015) different forms of intellectual property are used as 
a company may patent part of an invention and keep another part as a trade secret, 
which makes it difficult for its competitors to work around the invention. This shows 
that companies need different types of IP tools to protect their intangible assets.  
With regard to intellectual property tools, trade secrets provide the foundation for 
intellectual asset protection for most companies. During the early stage of creating a 
new venture, trade secrets are usually used as the main tool to protect the by-product 
of any new ventures. This emphasises the importance of trade secrets in the current 
competitive market. According to Pooley (2013), secrecy of information is an essential 
part of the innovation process. In the case of obtaining a patent, for example, secrecy 
of information regarding the invention must be retained until the filling day of the 
patent application.  
Boldrin and Levine (2008) argue that Google, YouTube and Skype did not use patent 
protection to gain a competitive advantage in the market. While this may be true, other 
forms of intellectual property have been used for intellectual protection. For example, 
Goog
Google a competitive edge in the digital era (Halt et al., 2014).  
2.4.1. Trade Secrets as a Competitive Advantage 
The importance of trade secrets has arisen due to the phenomenal growth of 
intangible assets market value and the sophisticated cyber theft of corporate 
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intellectual property. A recent report by PwC estimates that the annual loss of trade 
PwC, 2014). Trade secrets are becoming a key source of competitive advantage, and at 
the same time, the most vulnerable type of intellectual property (Robertson et al., 2015; 
Villasenor, 2015).  The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) defines a trade secret as 
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, 
technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, 
from not being generally known, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means 
by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is 
the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its 
sec  
Trade secrets can be in different forms. The World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO, 2004) identified the following as trade secrets: 
• Production methods 
• Chemical formulae 
• Blueprints or prototypes 
• Sales methods 
• Distribution methods 
• Contract forms 
• Business schedules 
• Details of price agreements 
• Consumer profiles 
• Advertising strategies 
• Lists of suppliers or clients 
However, WIPO have also stated that the information that is considered to be a trade 
secret varies from one case to another. For instance, in Japan and the US, a trade secret 
is referred to as any information on manufacture, business and technology that is not 
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available to the public, and is considered to provide a competitive advantage in the 
marketplace.  
In a report issued by the European Commission (COM (2013) 0402, final) entitled 
it is stated that trade secrets have received little atention in the past years, compared 
to patents and copyright. Yet the report states that the value of trade secrets has been 
growing, and that economists are not focusing on trade secrets as enablers of 
innovation.  
The economic impact of disclosing trade secrets can to some extent affect the success 
of some companies (Hemphill, 2004). For example, the disclosure of the Coca-Cola 
formula, which is one of the most famous trade secrets, could result in economic 
damage to the company (Bloom, 2006). Additionally, in recent research, by Crittenden 
et al. (2015) which investigates the strategic objectives of various company trades 
secrets, they noted that trade secrets range from food products (i.e. Krispy Kreme) to 
advanced technologies (i.e. Tesla Motors Inc.). Therefore, trade secrets have been used 
in different industries to protect different types of information. This illustrates the fact 
that companies are relying comprehensively on trade secrets to develop their 
competitive advantage. 
There are a number of advantages of trade secrets as an intellectual property tool in 
contrast to patents. Trade secrets have no time limit, whereas patents are granted for 
about 20 years, and then become free for public use. In addition, trade secrets involve 
no registration process, whereas a patent application takes about 18 months before 
the patent is granted. Moreover, one of the main advantages of trade secrets is that 
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no information disclosure is required, whereas obtaining a patent involves full 
disclosure of information and publishing to be available to the general public.   
According to Almeling (2012), 
economy, for the following reasons: 
1. New technologies make it easier to steal information; 
2. The increasing number of employees changing workplace; 
3. The increasing value of trade secrets as intangible assets; 
4. Trade secrets law is growing and gaining more attention; 
5. The scope of information regarded as trade secret is expanding; 
6. The increase of international threat of cyber security IP theft; 
7. The overlapping of trade secrets with patent protection. 
Furthermore, in the early stages of starting new ventures, entrepreneurs usually take 
time to validate their business idea, going through a number of iterations until they 
find a viable business model.  Therefore, filing a patent might not be the best decision 
before validating a business idea. Thus, trade secrets offer the first layer of protection 
for the intangible assets of new ventures.  
In the last four decades, there ha
assets.  Although it is difficult to accurately value intangible assets, economists have 
(Almeling, 2012). As illustrated in Figure 2.2, the intangible asset value of S&P 500 
7% in 2015 (Ocean Tomo, 
2015). Also, research conducted by Forrester Research estimates that the value of trade 
secrets is two-thirds of the total intangible assets in most companies (Forrester 
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tangible assets are dominated by intangible assets. Phillips (2015) stated that 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Intangible assets vs. tangible assets based on Ocean Tomo (2015, p.22) 
The value of trade secrets is becoming an important aspect 
advantage. This requires companies to adopt more security countermeasures to 
protect its value. Therefore, the protection of trade secrets is becoming a necessity for 
most new ventures in the knowledge-based economy.  
2.4.2. How Are Trade Secrets Protected?  
The basic concept of trade secrets is the requirement for confidentiality of 
information. The protection of trade secrets relies on efforts to keep the critical 
business information confidential and not to disclose it to public.  Compliance in 
regards to secrecy of information is required by many legal laws in different countries 
to consider any information as trade secret.   
According to Pooley (2013) the most frequent form of IP used by companies to protect 
their competitive advantage is secrecy. Yet, it is the most vulnerable IP tool (Robertson 
et al., 2015; Villasenor, 2015). In a report submitted by the European Commission to the 
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European Parliament (COM (2013) 0402, final), the report noted that trade secrets are 
one of the most common IP protection forms used by companies to protect their 
intangible assets. However, at the same time, trade secrets enjoy the least legal IP 
protection in regards to potential disclosure. This is because trade secret laws are the 
newest among the four types of intellectual property (Almeling, 2012), and in 
comparison with other IP laws (i.e. patent law) they have not yet been as fully 
developed. According to Gollin (2008) start-ups depend strongly on trade secrets as 
an intellectual property strategy to protect its intellectual assets. In addition, in an 
early stage venture, Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDAs) and employment agreements 
are considered to be IP protection 
confidential or trade secret infor
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Chapter 3 
3. Literature Review 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the research problem was identified: that is, there is a need to 
protect trade secrets for new ventures within a corporate venturing unit in order to 
protect competitive advantage. In other words, it is important to understand the 
 be able to design the 
appropriate security countermeasures for the protection of trade secrets in an agile 
dynamic environment. Therefore, the objective of this chapter is to provide a review 
of the existing academic literature in the field of cyber security behaviour. This 
objective is achieved by conducting a systematic literature review of cyber security 
behaviour in the information systems (IS) security literature.  
The literature review in this research focuses on the information systems domain. This 
is because research in information security behaviour is more associated with research 
in the information systems domain. In addition, most information security behaviour 
literature review in this research will focus on information security behaviour in the 
information systems domain. However, other information security literature that is 
relevant to the research topic in information security literature will not be neglected.   
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A quick review of the literature showed that there is a massive literature available in 
both journals and conferences. Therefore, this research focuses on top journals due to 
the large existing body of literature and the limitation of time. The focus on reviewing 
top journals in one research domain would have some limitations were there could be 
some relevant research in conference papers and in other research domains. However, 
by adopting a systematic literature approach that documents the whole process this 
would make the output of the reviewed literature sufficient for this research topic. 
In IS security research, scholars have conducted literature reviews to provide a 
theoretical basis for further research (Lebek, 2014). For example, Mishra and Dhillon 
(2005) conducted a review of behaviour theories in IS security to introduce a new 
theory to the research field. Likewise, Aurigemma and Panko (2012) conducted a 
structured literature review for behavioural theories in IS security to develop a model 
for behavioural compliance with IS security policies.  
This chapter aims to present a systematic review of the cyber security behaviour 
literature by identifying the latest publications and main theories in the cyber security 
behaviour domain. In addition, this chapter provides an understanding of the applied 
behaviour theories in the context of cyber security. Finally, analysing and synthesizing 
the identified relevant cyber security behaviour literature and presenting the key 
findings and insights.   
3.2. Review Methodology  
According to Baker (2000), conducting a literature review is the first step and 
foundation in research. In addition, Levy and Ellis (2006) define a literature review 
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and evaluate quality literature in order to provide a firm foundation to a topic and 
literature reviews that 
adhere closely to a set of scientific methods that explicitly aim to limit systematic error 
(bias), mainly by attempting to identify, appraise and synthesize all relevant studies (of 
whatever design) in order to answer a particular question (or set of questions)
(Petticrew and Roberts, 2008, p.9). 
In this study, the systematic literature review consists of two phases. First, a structured 
search process is conducted as illustrated in Figure 3.1 to identify the relevant literature 
in the cyber security behaviour research field. Second, the identified cyber security 
behaviour literature is analysed for findings and insights.  
 
Figure 3.1: Literature search process 
3.2.1. Literature Search Process 
According to vom Brocke et al. (2009), the search process conducted determines the 
quality of a literature review. Moreover, the process of a literature search involves the 
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identification of the relevant literature and then the evaluation of their applicability to 
the research topic (Levy and Ellis, 2006). This literature search is conducted 
ach for the 
identification process of relevant literature and also the guidelines of Vom Brocke et 
al. (2009) on rigorous literature. 
Vom Brocket et al. (2009) states that a rigorous literature review search consists of 
two evaluation criteria: the validity and reliability of the search process. Validity refers 
al. (2014), the validity of a literature search is achieved through the type of publication 
selected, covered period, the keywords used, and the process of forward and backward 
process, hence, making it substantial for any review article to comprehensively 
achieved by documenting the literature search process comprehensively (vom Brocke 
et al., 2009; Lebek et al., 2014). 
To achieve the validity requirement for a rigorous literature review, and to produce an 
efficient literature review, this study focuses only on leading journals and selected 
conference proceedings (i.e. peer reviewed) as recommended by Webster and Watson 
(2002) and vom Brocke et al. (2009). In addition, following the guidelines of vom 
Brocket et al. (2009), the study will review the top 10 ranked peer-reviewed journals 
based on the AIS MIS journal ranking list (AIS, 2016) and the top 10 ranked IS 
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conferences (Levy and Ellis, 2006). This will help avoid the pitfall of garbage-
in/garbage-out, which can produce an inefficient literature review.  
This review did not include journals that are not peer reviewed (i.e. Harvard Business 
Review), are unrelated to the study subject (i.e. Artificial Intelligence and AI Magazine), 
and include publications of different quality and relevance (i.e. IEEE Transactions). 
Therefore, we have only taken into account the top 10 IS journals that contain relevant 
publications in the security behaviour domain as illustrated in Table 3.1.  
According to Webster and Watson (2002), IS is an interdisciplinary field, therefore, 
researchers must consider journals from outside the IS literature. By searching the top 
10 journals in s
that 
most of the top 10 security journals are specialised security journals in specific security 
suggestion, where they found that two IS security journals included numerous 
publications in the field of security behaviour. Hence, these two IS security journals 
have been included in the literature search process.  
The literature search has been conducted through eight databases: ACM Digital 
Library, IEEE Xplore Digital Library, Elsevier Science Direct, Springer LINK, Emerald, 
JSTOR, ProQuest (ABI/Inform) and EBSCOhost. The querying of databases used the 
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Table 3.1: The considered journals for the search process 
 Journal Database 
IS Journals 
MIS Quarterly ProQuest (ABI/Inform) 
Information Systems Research EBSCOhost 
Communications of the ACM ACM Digital Library 
Management Science JSTOR 
Journal of MIS ProQuest (ABI/Inform) 
Decision Sciences ProQuest (ABI/Inform) 
European Journal of IS ProQuest (ABI/Inform) 
Decision Support Systems Elsevier Science Direct 
IEEE Software IEEE Xplore Digital Library 
Information & Management Elsevier Science Direct 
IS Security 
Journals 
Computers & Security Elsevier 
Information Management & Computer 
Security 
Emerald 
 
The search process started with a database search using search terms to identify the 
potential relevant publications. This initial search resulted in 175 potentially relevant 
publications. Afterwards, a forward and backward search was conducted to identify 
any additional relevant publications. The backward search was conducted manually by 
identified publications resulting from the keyword search. The forward search was 
conducted using Web of Science (www.webofscience.com). Thus, the forward and 
backward search resulted in identifying 41 additional publications, making a total of 
216 potential relevant publications. 
The first evaluation of the potential publications was based on the evaluation of the 
-depth evaluation 
was conducted on the full-text of the publications to identify the relevant publications 
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for the literature analysis. Although the focus of this review is on the organisational 
context, the review included other studies involved in different contexts to obtain 
more valuable insights on the topic. In addition, in order to select relevant and up-to-
date literature, the literature search process only took into account publications since 
2005. Figure 3.2 shows the steps for identifying the relevant publications through the 
literature search process.  
 
Figure 3.2: The numbers of the identified and evaluated publications from the search process 
3.2.2. Literature Analysis  
In this section, we first present an overview of the relevant studies in the behavioural 
security domain, which have been identified in the literature review search process 
(see Table 2.2). According to Webster and Watson (2002), tables should be more than 
lists of articles that should add value. 
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Table 3.2: Overview of behavioural cyber security relevant literature   
 
# Study Context (user) 
Theory 
applied 
Methodology 
Sample size 
(response rate) 
Country Related constructs Behaviour Type 
1 Anderson & Agarwal (2010) 
Home 
(ISP subscribers & 
undergraduate 
students) 
PMT 
Survey & 
Experiment 
594 US 
▪ Concern regarding security threats 
▪ Security behaviour self-efficacy 
▪ Perceived citizen efficacy 
▪ Subjective norm 
▪ Descriptive norm 
▪ Psychological ownership for the Internet 
▪ Psychological ownership for own computer 
▪ Attitude toward performing security-related behaviour 
▪ Intentions to perform security-related behaviour 
(Internet) 
▪ Intentions to perform security-related behaviour (own 
computer) 
intentions to 
protect their own 
computers & the 
internet at home 
2 Chen & Zahedi (2016) 
1.UG and PG 
students & others 
2.Socail networks 
PMT & 
TTAT 
Survey 
1.480 
2.333 
1.US 
2.China 
▪ Perceived threat 
▪ Perceived susceptibility 
▪ Perceived severity 
▪ Perceived security response efficacy 
▪ Perceived security self-efficacy 
▪ Protective actions 
▪ Avoidance 
▪ Seeking help 
Individual security 
behaviours & their 
antecedents in a 
cross-national 
context. 
3 Johnston & Warkentin (2010) 
University 
(faculty, staff and 
students at a large 
university) 
PMT Experiment 311 (40%) -- 
▪ Behavioural intent 
▪ Social influence 
▪ Response efficacy 
▪ Self-efficacy 
▪ Threat severity 
▪ Threat susceptibility 
intentions to 
comply with 
recommendations 
to protect their 
informational 
assets 
4 Siponen & Vance (2010) 
Organisation 
(employees from 
multiple 
organisations) 
NT & GDT 
Survey 
(scenario-based) 
395 (27%) Finland 
▪ Neutralization 
▪ Defense of Necessity 
▪ Appeal to Higher Loyalties 
▪ Condemn the Condemners 
▪ Metaphor of the Ledger 
▪ Denial of Injury 
▪ Denial of Responsibility 
▪ Formal Sanctions 
Intention to violate 
information 
systems security 
policy 
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▪ Informal Sanctions 
▪ Shame 
▪ Intention to Violate IS Security Policy 
5 
Johnston et al. (2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
Organisation 
(employees from 
multiple 
organisations) 
PMT Survey 559 (22.6%) Finland 
▪ Threat severity 
▪ Threat susceptibility 
▪ Self-efficacy 
▪ Response efficacy 
▪ Formal sanction severity 
▪ Informal sanction severity 
▪ Formal sanction certainty 
▪ Informal sanction certainty 
▪ Sanction celerity 
▪ Compliance intention 
intentions to 
information 
security policy 
compliance 
6 Boss et al. (2015) 
1.MBA students 
2. Undergraduate 
students 
PMT Experiment 
1.125 
2.327 
US 
▪ Perceived severity 
▪ Vulnerability 
▪ Fear 
▪ Response efficacy 
▪ Self-efficacy 
▪ Response cost 
▪ Intentions 
Make backup to 
protect computing 
resources 
2.increase use 
anti-malware 
software 
7 Bulgurcu et al. (2010) 
Organisation 
(employees from 
multiple 
organisations) 
TPB & RCT Survey 464 (42%) US 
▪ General ISA (subconstruct), 
▪ ISP Awareness (subconstruct) 
▪ Perceived Benefit of Compliance 
▪ Intrinsic Benefit 
▪ Safety of Resources 
▪ Rewards 
▪ Perceived Cost of Compliance 
▪ Work Impediment 
▪ Perceived Cost of Noncompliance 
▪ Intrinsic Cost 
▪ Vulnerability of Resources 
▪ Sanctions, Attitude 
▪ Normative Beliefs 
▪ Self-Efficacy to Comply 
▪ Intention to Comply 
intentions to 
comply with 
information 
security policy 
8 Steinbart et al. (2016) 
Organisation 
(UG students at a 
large private 
university) 
TTAT & CYT Experiment 568 US 
▪ Credential strength 
▪ Login failures 
▪ Mobile UI 
▪ Mobile UI practice 
▪ Coping behaviour 
intentions  to  
configure their 
mobile devices to 
require 
authentication 
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9 D'Arcy et al. (2009) 
Organisation 
(employees from 
multiple 
organisations) 
GDT Survey 269 (38%) US 
▪ Perceptions certainty 
▪ Perceptions severity 
▪ Moral commitment 
▪ IS misuse intention 
intentions to IS 
misuse  
 
 
10 Herath & Rao (2009) 
Organisation 
(employees) 
DTPB, TPB, 
OC & GDT 
Survey 312 US 
▪ Punishment severity 
▪ Security policy compliance intention 
▪ Detection certainty 
▪ Security policy attitude 
▪ Perceived probability of security breach 
▪ Self-efficacy 
▪ Perceived severity of security breach 
▪ Subjective norm 
▪ Security breach concern level 
▪ Descriptive norm 
▪ Response efficacy 
▪ Resource availability 
▪ Response cost 
▪ Organisational commitment 
intentions to 
security policy  
11 Warkentin et al. (2011) 
Organisations 
(healthcare 
professionals) 
SLT Survey 202 US 
▪ Self-efficacy 
▪ Behavioural intent 
▪ Situational support 
▪ Vicarious experience 
▪ Verbal persuasion 
Intention to 
comply with 
information privacy 
policies 
 
12 Myyry et al. (2009) 
Organisation 
(employees & part-
students) 
TCMD & 
TMTV 
Survey 132 Finland 
▪ Preconventional reasoning 
▪ Conventional reasoning 
▪ Postconventional reasoning 
▪ Values 
Employee 
adherence to 
information 
security policies 
13 Foth (2016) 
Organisation 
(employees) 
TPB & GDT Survey 557 Germany 
▪ Detection Certainty 
▪ Intention to comply with data protection 
▪ Punishment Severity 
▪ Attitude 
▪ Subjective Norm 
▪ Perceived Behavioural Control 
intention to 
comply with data 
protection 
regulations in 
hospitals 
14 Johnston et al. (2016) 
Organisation 
(employees) 
PMT & GDT  Survey 242 -- 
▪ Stability 
▪ Sanction severity 
▪ Sanction certainty 
▪ Threat vulnerability 
▪ Threat severity 
▪ Self-efficacy 
▪ Response efficacy 
intention to violate 
organisational 
information 
security polices 
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▪ Response costs 
15 Lee & Larsen (2009) 
Organisation 
(executives from 
multiple 
organisations) 
PMT Survey 239 US 
▪ Perceived severity 
▪ Perceived vulnerability 
▪ Response efficacy 
▪ Self-efficacy 
▪ Response cost 
▪ Social influence 
▪ Vendor support 
▪ IT budget 
▪ Firm size 
▪ Adoption intention 
anti-malware 
software adoption 
16 Boss et al. (2009) 
Organisation 
(employees) 
CT Survey 1698 US 
▪ Specification 
▪ Evaluation 
▪ Reward 
▪ Mandatoriness 
▪ Precautions taken 
▪ Computer Self Efficacy 
▪ Apathy 
security 
precaution-taking 
behaviour 
17 Guo et al. (2011) 
Organisation 
(employees) 
CBM & 
NMSV 
Survey 
306 
 
-- 
▪ Perceived identity match 
▪ Attitude toward security policy 
▪ Perceived security risk of NMSV 
▪ Relative advantage for job performance 
▪ Perceived sanctions 
▪ Workgroup norm 
▪ Attitude toward NMSV 
▪ NMSV intention 
End user 
tendencies to 
voluntarily engage 
in actions that 
violate the 
security policies 
 
18 Posey et al. (2015) 
Multiple 
organisations 
(employees- 
panellists) 
PMT Survey 380 US 
▪ Intrinsic maladaptive rewards 
▪ Extrinsic maladaptive rewards 
▪ Threat vulnerability 
▪ Threat severity 
▪ Fear 
▪ Response efficacy 
▪ Self-efficacy 
▪ Response costs 
▪ Protection motivation 
▪ Past protection-motivated behaviours 
▪ Affective organizational commitment 
▪ Job satisfaction 
▪ Financial incentives 
▪ Managerial support 
Insiders protecting 
their organisation 
from security 
threats 
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19 D'Arcy et al. (2014) 
Organisation 
(employees- 
panellists) 
COT & 
MDT 
Survey 539 -- 
▪ SRS overload 
▪ SRS complexity 
▪ SRS uncertainty 
▪ Reconstrue conduct 
▪ Obscure or distort 
▪ Devalue the target 
▪ Violation intention 
 
intention to 
stressful 
information 
security 
requirements 
20 Vance et al. (2013) 
Organisation 
(IS students) 
AT Survey 96 -- 
▪ Identifiability 
▪ Monitoring awareness 
▪ Evaluation awareness 
▪ Social presence awareness 
 
to commit access 
policy violation in 
information 
systems 
21 Hu et al. (2012) 
Organisation 
(Alumni of the MIS 
& MBA programs 
of a large public 
university) 
TPB, CVF & 
ITAS 
Survey 148 (17%) US 
▪ Behavioural intention 
▪ Attitudes towards behaviour 
▪ Subjective norm 
▪ Perceived behavioural control 
▪ Perceived goal orientation 
▪ Perceived rule orientation 
▪ Perceived top management participation 
Top management 
influence on 
intention to 
comply with 
information 
security polices 
22 Ng et al. (2009) 
Organisation (Part-
time students & IT 
employees) 
HBM Survey 134 (31%) US 
▪ Behaviour 
▪ Perceived susceptibility 
▪ Perceived severity 
▪  
▪ Perceived barriers 
▪ Cues to action 
▪ General security orientation 
▪ Self-  
▪ Technical controls 
▪ Security familiarity 
User's computer 
security behaviour 
 
23 Herath & Rao (2009) 
Organisations 
(employees from 
multiple 
organisations) 
GDT & AGT Survey 312 US 
▪ Perceived effectiveness 
▪ Severity of penalty 
▪ Certainty of detection 
▪ Normative beliefs 
▪ Peer behaviour 
▪ Policy compliance intentions 
compliance to 
information 
 
24 Li et al. (2010) 
Multiple 
organisations 
(employees) 
RCT Survey 246 -- 
▪ Detection probability 
▪ Sanction severity 
▪ Subjective norms 
▪ Perceived security risk 
▪  
intention to 
comply with  
Internet use police 
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▪ Personal norms 
▪ Organizational norms 
▪  
▪ Intent 
25 Ifinedo (2014) 
Multiple 
organisations 
(business managers 
and IS 
professionals) 
TPB, SCT & 
SBT 
Survey 124 Canada 
▪ Attachment 
▪ Commitment 
▪ Involvement 
▪ Personal norms 
▪ Attitude toward compliance with ISSP 
▪ Subjective norms 
▪ Locus of control 
▪ Self-efficacy 
▪ ISSP compliance behavioural intentions 
 
 
 
 
information 
systems security 
policy compliance 
 
 
 
 
 
26 Siponen et al. (2014) 
Multiple 
organisations 
(employees) 
PMT, TRA & 
CET 
Survey 669 Finland 
▪ Actual compliance 
▪ Intention to comply 
▪ Attitude 
▪ Severity 
▪ Vulnerability 
▪ Rewards 
▪ Normative beliefs 
▪  
▪ Self-  
security policies 
compliance 
27 Son (2011) 
Multiple 
organisations 
(employees) 
EMM & 
IMM 
Survey 602 (30.1%) US 
▪ Compliance 
▪ Perceived Deterrent certainty 
▪ Perceived Deterrent severity 
▪ Perceived Legitimacy 
▪ Perceived Value congruence 
motivation to 
comply with IS 
security policies 
28 Vance et al. (2012) 
Organisation 
(employees) 
HT & PMT Survey 210 (42%) Finland 
▪ Habit 
▪ Intention to comply with ISP 
▪ Perceived severity 
▪ Perceived vulnerability 
▪  
▪ Self-e  
▪ Perceived realism 
▪ Response cost 
▪ Rewards 
intention to 
comply with 
information 
security policies 
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29  
Organisation (MBA 
students & 
employees) 
GDT Survey 
US: 366 
Korea: 360 
US & 
Korea 
▪ Perceived certainty of sanctions 
▪ Perceived severity of sanctions 
▪ Moral belief 
▪ IS misuse intention 
▪ Procedural countermeasures 
▪ Technical countermeasures 
intention to 
intentional IS 
misuse 
30 Cheng et al. (2013) 
Organisations 
(employees) 
GDT & SBT Survey 185 (41%) China 
▪ Violation intention 
▪ Perceived certainty 
▪ Perceived severity 
▪ Attachment 
▪ Commitment 
▪ Involvement 
▪ Belief 
▪ Subjective Norm 
▪ Co-worker Behaviour 
violation intentions 
31 
Dang-Pham & 
Pittayachawan (2015) 
Students at 
Australian 
university 
 
PMT Survey 252 Australia 
▪ Intention to perform malware avoidance behaviours 
▪ Vulnerability 
▪ Severity 
▪ Rewards 
▪ Response efficacy 
▪ Self-efficacy 
▪ Response cost 
Intention avoid 
malware in BYOD 
context 
32 Flores et al. (2014) 
Multiple 
Organisations 
(information 
security 
executives) 
Behavioural 
Information 
Security 
Governanc
e Model 
 
Survey 82 (15.2%) 
US, 
Sweden, 
Finland & 
UK 
▪ Coordinating information security processes 
▪ Business-based information security management 
▪ Organizational structure 
▪ Formal organizational structure 
▪ Coordinating organizational structure 
▪ Security knowledge sharing 
▪ Formal knowledge sharing arrangements 
▪ Support for knowledge transfer 
The influence of 
behavioural 
information 
security 
governance on 
security knowledge 
sharing in 
organisations 
 
33 Flores & Ekstedt (2016) 
Multiple 
organizations (IT 
users) 
Social 
Engineering 
Resistance 
Model 
Survey 1583 (37%) Sweden 
▪ Transformational leadership 
▪ Information security culture 
▪ Information security awareness 
▪ Self-efficacy 
▪ Attitude 
▪ Normative beliefs 
intention to resist 
social engineering 
34 Ifinedo  (2012) 
Multiple 
organisations (non-
IS managers 
& IS professionals) 
TPB & PMT Survey 124 -- 
▪ Perceived vulnerability 
▪ Perceived severity 
▪ Response efficacy 
▪ Response cost 
Information 
systems security 
policy (ISSP) 
compliance 
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▪ Self-efficacy 
▪ Attitude toward compliance with ISSP 
▪ Subjective norms 
▪ ISSP compliance behavioural intention 
 
35 Rhee et al. (2009) 
Organisation 
(graduate students) 
SCT Survey 415 -- 
▪ Computer/Internet experience 
▪ Security breach incidents 
▪ General controllability 
▪ Self-efficacy in information security 
▪ Security practice-technology usage 
▪ Security practice-security conscious care behaviour 
▪ Intention to strengthen the efforts 
information 
security promoting 
behaviour 
36 Safa et al. (2015) 
Organisation 
(Information 
Security Experts & 
IT Professionals) 
PMT & TPB Survey 212 Malaysia 
▪ Information security awareness 
▪ Information security organizational policy 
▪ Information security experience and involvement 
▪ Attitude toward performing information security 
conscious care behaviour 
▪ Subjective norms 
▪ Perceived behavioural control 
▪ Threat appraisal 
▪ Information security self-efficacy 
▪ Information security conscious care behaviour 
 
 
 
 
Information 
security conscious 
care behaviour 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 Safa et al. (2016) 
Organisation 
(employees from 
multiple 
companies) 
SBT & IVT Survey 302 Malaysia 
▪ Information security knowledge sharing 
▪ Information security collaboration 
▪ Information security intervention 
▪ Information security experience 
▪ Attachment 
▪ Commitment 
▪ Personal norms 
▪ Attitude towards compliance with ISOP 
▪ ISOP compliance behavioural intentions 
information 
security behaviour, 
in line with 
information 
security 
organizational 
policies and 
procedures (ISOP) 
 
38 Shropshire et al. (2015) 
Organisation 
(undergraduate 
students) 
TAM & 
BFM 
Experiment & 
Survey 
170 US 
▪ Perceived ease of use 
▪ Perceived usefulness 
▪ Perceived organizational support 
▪ Adoption intention 
▪ Conscientiousness 
▪ Agreeableness 
adoption intention 
and initial use of 
security software 
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39 Tsai et al. (2016) 
online security for 
home computer 
users 
 
PMT Survey 988 -- 
▪ Threat severity 
▪ Threat susceptibility 
▪ Prior experience with safety hazards 
▪ Coping self-efficacy 
▪ Response efficacy 
▪ Subjective norms 
▪ Response costs 
▪ Safety habit strength 
▪ Personal responsibility 
▪ Perceived security support 
security protection 
behaviour 
40 Al-Mukahal & Alshare (2015) 
Organisation 
(employees from 
multiple 
companies) 
GDT, NT & 
TPB 
Survey 234 Qatar 
▪ Awareness of information security policy 
▪ Trust 
▪ Impact of information security policy on work 
environment 
▪ Scope of information security policy 
▪ Uncertainty Avoidance 
▪ Individualism/Collectivism 
information 
security policy 
violations 
41 D'Arcy & Greene (2014) 
Organisation 
(industrial panel) 
security 
Culture & 
Organizatio
nal 
Behaviour 
Model 
Survey 127 US 
▪ Top management commitment 
▪ Security communication 
▪ Computer monitoring 
▪ Job satisfaction 
▪ Perceived organizational support 
▪ Security compliance intention 
security 
compliance 
42 Zhang et al. (2009) 
Organisation 
(online industrial 
panellists) 
TPB & RICT Survey 176 -- 
▪ Perceived security protection mechanism 
▪ Subjective norms 
▪ Perceived behavioural control 
▪ Attitude 
▪ Behavioural intention 
end-
intention to 
comply with 
security policies 
43 Sommestad et al. (2015) 
Organisation 
(employees in a 
research agency) 
TPB & PMT Survey 306 Sweden 
▪ Current behaviour 
▪ Intention 
▪ Attitude 
▪ Perceived norm 
▪ Perceived behaviour control 
▪ Anticipated regret 
▪ Vulnerability 
▪ Severity 
▪ Response efficacy 
▪ Response cost 
information 
security policy 
compliance 
44 Hu et al. (2011) 
Organisation 
(employees from 
GDT & RCT 
Survey 
(scenario-based) 
207 China 
▪ Low self-control 
▪ Moral beliefs 
▪ Perceived certainty of sanctions 
intention to violet 
information 
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multiple 
organisations) 
▪ Perceived severity of sanctions 
▪ Perceived celerity of sanctions 
▪ Perceived extrinsic benefits 
▪ Perceived intrinsic benefits 
▪ Perceived formal risk 
▪ Perceived informal risk 
▪ Perceived risk of shame 
▪ Intention to commit violation 
security police 
toward computer 
systems 
45 Gurung et al. (2009) 
Consumer 
(business 
undergraduate 
students) 
PMT 
Survey 
 
232 US 
▪ Perceived severity 
▪ Perceived vulnerability 
▪ Self-efficacy 
▪ Response efficacy 
▪ Response cost 
▪ Use of anti-spyware 
intention to adopt 
and use 
antispyware tools 
46 Lai et al (2012) 
(business 
undergraduate 
students) 
TTAT 
Survey 
 
117 (75.5%) US 
▪ Self-  
▪ Perceived effectiveness 
▪  
▪ Conventional coping 
▪ Technological coping 
▪ Identity theft 
intention to 
protect their 
identity from theft 
 
 
• General Deterrence Theory (GDT) • Social Learning Theory (SLT) • Accountability Theory (AT) • Social Bond Theory (SBT) 
• Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) • Theory of Cognitive Moral Development (TCMD) • Neutralization Theory (NT) • Cognitive Evaluation Theory (CET) 
• Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) • Theory of Motivational Types of Values (TMTV) • Big Five Model (BFM) • Extrinsic motivation model (EMM) 
• Decomposed Theory of Planned Behaviour (DTPB) • Control Theory (CT) • Rational Choice Theory (RCT) • Intrinsic Motivation Model (IMM) 
• Agency theory (AGT) • Nonmalicious Security Violation Model (NMSV);   • IT Assimilation Model (ITAS) • Habit Theory (HT) 
• Moral Disengagement Theory (MDT) • Organisational Commitment (OC) • Social Cognitive Theory (SCT) • Technology Threat Avoidance Theory (TTAT) 
• Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) • Technology Acceptance Model (TAM); • Involvement Theory (IVT) • Competing Values Framework (CVF) 
• Risk Compensation Theory (RCT) • Health Belief Model (HBM) • Coping Theory (COT) • Composite Behaviour Model (CBM) 
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In order to analyse the accumulated knowledge from a literature search, Webster and 
Watson (2002) discussed two structural approaches for literature analysis: an author-
centric approach and a concept-centric approach. According to Bem (1995), the author-
centric approach usually produces lists of citations and findings, which he describes as 
ok  
Additionally, the author-centric approach fails to provide a synthesised literature 
review analysis (Webster and Watson, 2002). In contrast, the concept-centric approach 
helps to analyse and synthesise the accumulated knowledge from the literature search 
by organising the review based on the concepts of the research topic instead of 
categorising it based on authors. 
This research adopts the concept-
method to systematically analyse the search results. Moreover, according to Webster 
and Watson (2002), the concepts are used as building blocks of the structured 
framework of a review. Hence, by analysing the relevant literature, the determined 
applied theories are used as concepts in this analysis and synthesis.  
The relevant studies identified in Table 2.2 include different types of theories used to 
investigate IS behaviours across various technologies in both work and non-work 
contexts. According 
interrelated constructs (concepts), definitions, and propositions that present a 
systematic view of phenomena by specifying relationships among variables, with the 
purpose of explaining and predic
in 46 studies to explain IS behaviour. Additionally, the relevant studies identified have 
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adopted theories from crim
information security-related behaviours. These theories were used to investigate 
cyber security 
behaviour.  
Most of the theories identified were used in one or two studies. Nonetheless, only 
eight theories were used frequently more than once in the relevant identified studies 
identified. The primary theories used are listed in Figure 3.3, along with the frequency 
of use. 
 
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) Neutralisation Theory (NT) Social Cognitive Theory (SCT) Technology Threat Avoidance Theory (TTAT) 
General Deterrence Theory (GDT) Social Bond Theory (SBT) Rational Choice Theory (RCT) Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) 
 
Figure 3.3: The frequency of each theory in the cyber security behaviour systematic review 
As stated previously, the systematic review will adopt a concept-centric approach. This 
is achieved through the identified theories as concepts that will be used as the building 
blocks of the structured base for this review. Table 2.3 of the concept matrix lists the 
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studies in the left column of the matrix, while the other columns represent the 
concepts (i.e. theories) that were identified from the reviewed literature on cyber 
security behaviour. The structure of the literature review is based on the identified 
theories used in the cyber security behavioural domain. Therefore, in the remaining 
part of the chapter, an in-depth analysis of the eight identified applied behavioural 
theories will be conducted to provide valuable insight in the research field of cyber 
security behaviour.  
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Table 3.3: A concept matrix illustrating the theories in the cyber security behaviour  
 
          Study GDT PMT TPB RCT SCT SBT NT TTAT 
1 Anderson & Agarwal (2010)  X       
2 Chen & Zahedi (2016)  X      X 
3 
Johnston & Warkentin 
(2010)  X       
4 Siponen & Vance (2010) X      X  
5 Johnston et al. (2015)  X       
6 Boss et al. (2015)  X       
7 Bulgurcu et al. (2010)   X X     
8 Steinbart et al. (2016)        X 
9 D'Arcy et al. (2009) X        
10 Herath & Rao (2009) X X       
11 Foth (2016) X  X      
12 Johnston et al. (2016) X X       
13 Lee & Larsen (2009)  X       
14 Posey et al. (2015)  X       
15 Hu et al. (2012)   X      
16 Herath & Rao (2009) X        
17 Li et al. (2010)    X     
18 Ifinedo (2014)   X  X X   
19 Siponen et al. (2014)  X       
20 Vance et al. (2012)  X       
21  X        
22 Cheng et al. (2013) X     X   
23 
Dang-Pham & 
Pittayachawan (2015)  X       
24 Ifinedo  (2012)  X X      
25 Rhee et al. (2009)     X    
26 Safa et al. (2015)  X X      
27 Safa et al. (2016)      X   
28 Tsai et al. (2016)  X       
29 
Al-Mukahal & Alshare 
(2015) X  X    X  
30 Zhang et al. (2009)   X      
31 Sommestad et al. (2015)  X X      
32 Hu et al. (2011) X   X     
33 Gurung et al. (2009)  X       
34 Lai et al. (2012)        X 
Frequency 10 17 9 3 2 3 2 3 
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3.3. Behavioural Theories in Cyber Security Behaviour  
In the cyber security literature, the science of behavioural security has frequently used 
multidisciplinary theories (e.g. criminology and psychology). This section aims to 
analyse and synthesise the most frequently used theories in the field of security 
behaviour from the systematic literature review.  
3.3.1. Theory of Planned Behaviour 
Theory of planned behaviour (TPB) is one of the most widely used behavioural theories 
TPB from the theory of reasoned action (TRA) (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein and 
Ajzen, 1975) to include perceived behavioural control overcoming the lack of social 
factors (1991). Thus, TPB states 
manner can be influenced by the following determinants:  
• Attitude towards behaviour 
of favourability toward performing a specific behaviour.  
• Subjective norm 
performing a specific behaviour.  
• Perceived behavioural control 
specific behaviour. 
 
Figure 3.4: Theory of planned behaviour (TPB) 
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According to Ajzen and Fishbein (2005), the science of attitude has been the base of 
social psychology studies since the early days (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1918; Watson, 
1925) because attitude was the basis for understanding human behaviour. In addition, 
Ajzen (2012) states that people producing a certain behaviour is usually based on a 
number of behavioural beliefs that they hold, which will produce a particular outcome. 
Beliefs are based on a wi
2005). Thus, behavioural, normative, and control beliefs provide the accessibility to 
attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural control, respectively. 
Furthermore, Ajzen (2012) argue
norms, and perceptions of control, and, therefore, influence their intentions to 
produce a course of behavioural action.  
3.3.2. General Deterrence Theory 
Originally a criminology theory, general deterrence theory (GDT) has been applied to 
different research fields. Deterrence theory can be traced back to the sixteenth century 
as Thomas Hobbes (1588 1678), Cesare Beccaria (1738 1794), and Jeremy Bentham 
(1748 1832) shaped the foundation of deterrence and punishment theory in 
criminology (Onwudiwe et al., 2005).  
 
 
• Severity (PS) of sanctions refers to the degree of punishment associated with an 
individual committing a specific action.  
• Certainty (PC) of sanctions refers to the probability of an individual facing 
punishment for committing a specific action.  
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Furthermore, this theory states that if punishment is severe and certain, an individual 
will balance the benefits and costs before committing any action that may result in 
punishment (Lebek et al., 2014; Onwudiwe et al., 2005). However, few studies have 
shown that deterrence has an effect on security behaviour. Herath and Rao (2009b) 
found that severity of punishment in organisations had no significant impact on 
security behaviour intentions to comply with information security policies. In addition, 
Foth (2016) noted that deterrence had no significant impact on intention to comply 
with security regulations within an organisation.  
3.3.3.Protection Motivation Theory 
Rogers developed protection motivation theory (PMT) in 1975 as an extension of the 
expectancy-value theory to provide a more understandable explanation of the effect 
of fear appeals on human attitudes and behaviours (Rogers, 1975). Moreover, PMT has 
been used for disease prevention and health promotion for several decades (Floyd et 
al., 2000). 
describing the terrible things that will happen to them if they do not do what the 
mess
of fear appeals in motivating individuals towards a desired behaviour was by Hovland 
-as-acquired-
drives individuals to adopt a specific behaviour to reduce or mitigate the fear. 
Nonetheless, according to Tunner et al. (1991), the intention of using fear appeals is 
not merely to make people frighten, but to motivate them to preform protective 
behaviours. 
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In addition, there has been a large amount of research in various areas using PMT in 
protective behaviours has crossed different areas of research, such as prevention of 
heart disease (Plotnikoff and Higginbotham, 1998), food safety (Schafer et al., 1993), 
environmental hazards (Vaughn, 1993), and prevention of nuclear war (Axelrod and 
Newton, 1991). Floyd et al. (2000) state that PMT is one of the most powerful theories 
i  
Based on the review of the PMT literature, Rogers (1975) identified two cognitive 
processes: threat appraisal and coping appraisal. Threat appraisal involves an 
 impact, the probability of threats occurring 
(likelihood), and the benefits of not taking a protective action. On the other hand, 
threats and the resources available for coping, as well as the cost of not taking a 
protective action. The threat appraisal involves two constructs:  
• Vulnerability refers to the probability of a threat occurring if not taking a 
protective action.  
• Severity refers to the potential impact and consequences of a threat occurring.  
The coping appraisal involves two constructs:  
• Response efficacy 
will mitigate a threat. 
• Response cost refers to the costs (e.g. financial, personal) associated with the 
protective action.  
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PMT has been enhanced and extended over the years in a number of publications. In 
the most recent version of PMT, Maddux and Rogers (1983) extended the theory by 
adding self-efficacy and reward to the original theory, as a coping and threat appraisal 
respectively. According to Bandura (1992), self-efficacy is considered as an important 
influencing component in motivational and cognitive processes in behaviour theory.  
• Self-efficacy ity to carry out a protective 
action. 
• Reward refers to the physical or psychological pleasure of starting or continuing 
taking unsecure behaviour 
 
Figure 3.5: The protection motivation theory (PMT) 
Rewards, in other words, may be understood when an individual faces a threat and the 
rewards (e.g. benefits of ignoring security procedures) of continuing or starting an 
unhealthy behaviour outweighs the risks associated to the threat, then the individual 
will not take a protective action.  
3.3.4. Rational Choice Theory 
criminal decision-making when faced with choices. The main purpose of the theory is 
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osts and benefits of a 
specific action.  
3.3.5. Social Cognitive Theory 
Social cognitive theory (SCT) is a learning theory that is an extension of social learning 
affect their motivation and action and cause behavioural change (Bandura, 1977). SCT 
encompasses two key elements: locus of control (Rotter, 1966) and self-
(Bandura, 1977). Locus of control refers to a generalised expectancy that predicts 
r across situations, depending on whether they view an outcome 
Workman et al., 2008). Self-
a specific action.  
3.3.6. Social Bond Theory 
Hirschi proposed social bond theory (SBT), also called social control theory, in 1969. 
This theory describes the bounding ties that an individual has with his or her group. In 
addition, it has been used in many criminal behaviour studies (Cheng et al., 2013). The 
theory states that when individuals build bonds, their desire to yield to antisocial 
behaviours is reduced. Moreover, Hirschi identifies four key elements of social bond: 
attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief. 
3.3.7. Neutralisation Theory 
Sykes and Matza introduced neutralisation theory (NT) in 1957. NT states that people 
are aware of their moral obligations to abide the law and also aware of their moral 
obligations to avoid any criminal acts. In addition, the theory contains five main 
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elements: denial of responsibility, denial of injury, denial of the victim, condemnation 
of the condemners, and appeal to higher loyalties. Nevertheless, other additional 
elements were added during the years (i.e. the metaphor of the ledger by Klockars 
(1974) and the defence of necessity by Minor (1981)). 
3.3.8. Technology Threat Avoidance Theory 
qualitatively different; therefore, they have developed technology threat avoidance 
threat of malicious IT. TTAT is a constant dynamic and positive feedback loop that aims 
ed on PMT, and also 
draws on cybernetic and coping theory. 
3.4. Cyber Security Behaviour Elements  
According to Fishbein and Ajzen (2011) human behaviour is composed of four 
elements: an action to be performed; a target to be performed toward; a context to be 
performed within; and a specific time to be performed at. Based on the analysis of the 
systematic literature review, a concept map of was developed to visualise the elements 
of cyber security behaviour. The analysis of cyber security behaviours is built upon the 
basis of three human behavior elements: action, target and context. The fourth 
element of behaviour time ber 
security behaviour. Figure 3.6 visualises the cyber security behvaiour elements using 
concept mapping.  
This visualisation provides a holistic overview of cyber security behvaiour elements, 
with an understanding of the cyber security actions performed, the assets targeted 
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and the context that the behaviour is performed within. Additionally, Table 3.4 shows 
a concept matrix illustrating the cyber security behavior elements for the identified 
review. 
The output of the literature analysis shows that eight theories identify cyber security 
behavioural intentions in regards to different security actions, assets and context as 
illustrated in Figure 3.6. Therefore, these theories are grouped together because they 
can identify cyber security behavioural intentions to take action on an asset within a 
specific context.  
 
Figure 3.6: A concept map visualisation of cyber security behaviour elements  
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Table 3.4: A concept matrix illustrating the cyber security behaviour elements 
  Behaviour Elements 
  Action Target Context 
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1 
Anderson & Agarwal 
(2010) 
X     X X      X 
2 Chen & Zahedi (2016) X     X      X  
3 
Johnston & Warkentin 
(2010) 
    X      X X  
4 Siponen & Vance (2010)   X     X    X  
5 Johnston et al. (2015)  X      X    X  
6 Boss et al. (2015) X        X   X  
7 Bulgurcu et al. (2010)  X      X    X  
8 D'Arcy et al. (2009)    X      X  X  
9 Herath & Rao (2009)  X      X    X  
10 Foth (2016)  X      X    X  
11 Johnston et al. (2016)   X     X    X  
12 Lee & Larsen (2009)     X      X X  
13 Posey et al. (2015) X        X   X  
14 Hu et al. (2012)  X      X    X  
15 Herath & Rao (2009)  X      X    X  
16 Ifinedo (2014)  X      X    X  
17 Siponen et al. (2014)  X      X    X  
18 Vance et al. (2012)  X      X    X  
19     X     X  X X  
20 Cheng et al. (2013)   X     X    X  
21 
Dang-Pham & 
Pittayachawan (2015) 
X        X    X 
22 Ifinedo  (2012)  X      X    X  
23 Safa et al. (2015)  X      X    X  
24 Tsai et al. (2016) X     X       X 
25 
Al-Mukahal & Alshare 
(2015) 
  X     X    X  
26 Zhang et al. (2009)  X      X    X  
27 Sommestad et al. (2015)  X      X    X  
28 Hu et al. (2011)   X     X    X  
29 Gurung et al. (2009)     X      X X  
Total 6 13 5 2 3 3 1 18 4 1 4 26 3 
Concept 
Study 
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This analysis 
shows that there are a set of cyber security actions that are considered essential for 
security behaviours. These actions are illustrated in Figure 3.6 as misuse, violate, 
protect, comply and adopt actions.  
However, only two studies involve information as a target for protection in an 
oragnisational context (Boss et al., 2015; Posey et al., 2015). Moreover, the study by 
Boss et al. (2015) was more a theoretical research focused on theory confirmation, 
rather than focusing on the security behavioural elements. This leaves us with only 
one study by Posey et al. (2015) that focuses on protection as a behavioural action to 
protect information in an organisation. This shows that there is a need for more 
research focusing on protecting information in general within organisations and more 
specifically protecting confidential information.    
Table 3.4 shows that the research context included both work and home context. The 
studies that were in a home context were included in the literature review since they 
were identified during the literature review process.  
3.5. Discussion  
The systematic review highlights the most common behavioural theories used in the 
field of cyber security behaviour over the last decade. In addition, the review showed 
that there is a lack in research on cyber security behaviour focusing on the factors that 
affect indi  
All of the theories reviewed in the literature have been integrated with one another to 
form a model for exploring the impact of cyber security behaviour. The vast majority 
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of studies have used surveys as a data collection method of 89%, while only 11% of 
studies used field experiments. 
The majority of studies focus on the security behaviour compliance of information 
security policies (ISP). On the other hand, only a few studies investigated security 
behaviour in regards to taking protective action by using or adopting security tools or 
methods. In addition, the human element in these studies depends on complying with 
 
However, in this section only the top three theories used will be discussed (i.e. PMT, 
TPB and GDT) as illustrated in Figure 3.7. These three theories were used in the 
majority (more than 85%) of the relevant studies obtained from the systematic 
literature review.  
 
Figure 3.7: An illustration of the top three used theories in ISS behaviour  
 
The systematic review showed that the most used theory in the field of security 
behaviour is that of protection motivation theory. This is because PMT is a 
motivational theory that explains the variables that underline decisions to carry out a 
protective behaviour against a specific threat. In addition, PMT differs from other 
theories due to the element of fear appeals that shows a significant effect on human 
behaviour and has been used in other disciplines especially in the field of health and 
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criminology. Furthermore, PMT focuses on the factors that cause the motivation to 
protect a specific asset.  
It has been noted that research results can be impacted by different targeted study 
subjects. For example, Larsen and Lee (2009) found in their study using PMT to 
understand the adoption of anti-malware software in SMEs, that IT experts are 
affected more by threat appraisal while non IT experts where affected by coping 
appraisal. This shows that people with different background and experience could have 
different intentions and behaviour in looking at security threats.   
The theory of planned behaviour, on the other hand, focuses on explaining the 
relationship between attitude, intention and behaviour. Moreover, TPB indicates the 
behavioural control. In addition, TPB has been widely used in the context of 
information security police compliance.  
Additionally, subjective norms showed a high significance in most studies through 
important aspect of motivating individuals and behaviour to perform protective 
security actions.  
Deterrence theory has also been used widely in IS security studies, especially in the 
field of IS misuse and police violation research. This may be because the theory is 
rooted in criminology, . In addition, GDT is 
built on the concept of deterrence and parchment to minimize IS misuse, abuse and 
security police violations. Therefore, this theory has been applied to the field of IS 
security using deterrent mechanisms to increase the perceived threat of punishment.  
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In summary, the three above discussed theories (i.e. PMT, TPB and GDT) are the most 
used theories in the cyber security behaviour domain for predicting human behaviour. 
Yet these theories differ in their core function where each theory has a specific focus.   
• The protection motivation theory gives more understandable explanation of the 
effect of threat and copying appraisal on human intentions and how people 
balance cost and benefit in response of a threat and perform protective actions. 
• The deterrence theory, on the other hand, is based on the concept of punishment 
and the assumption that employees are mandatorily expected to comply with 
organisational rules, policies and regulations.   
• The theory of planned behaviour is a general theory that provides a general 
understanding of an 
 
3.6. Summary 
The aim of this chapter has been to review the theories used in the field of cyber 
security behaviour, and identify the key applied theories in the context of cyber 
security. This was achieved by presenting a systematic literature review of the existing 
literature in cyber security behaviour. The systematic review identified 35 different 
theories that have been applied to 46 relevant studies in the field of cyber security 
behaviour. Nonetheless, only eight theories have been used more than twice in the 
relevant literature, and therefore have been included in the in the systematic analysis. 
Thus, the literature analysis produced a comprehensive overview of behavioural cyber 
security relevant literature (see Table 3.2). Additionally, a concept matrix approach was 
used to illustrate the theories based on a concept-centric approach (see Table 3.3).  
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Furthermore, 35 studies based on the main key theories (i.e. PMT, TPB and GDT) in the 
cyber security behaviour literature were systematically analysed to produce a concept 
map and matrix for cyber security behaviour elements (see Figure 3.6 and Table 3.4). A 
summary of findings from the systematic review analysis are as follows: 
• The need for security behaviour has been recognised by the cyber security 
community as an important aspect of security; however previous work has focused 
on two ma
information security policy compliance.  
• The reviewed literature shows an increase in focus on protection motivation 
theory rather than GDT and TPB. This could be because deterrence is based on 
control and TPB is based on general behaviour whereas PMT is more based on 
evaluating the threat and the coping ability for performing a protective behaviour.   
• The majority of studies in the domain of cyber security behaviour research focus 
on employees as target subjects. 
• Most of the studies assume a stable organisational context, where there are 
policies and regulations that require employees to comply with as a mandatory 
work activity. 
• rsonality 
characteristics on security intentions and behaviour.   
• Some studies have focused on specific security countermeasures or controls such 
as anti-malware software, e-mail authentication and data backup of critical data. 
In conclusion, there has generally been a lack of theorising in cyber security 
behaviour in the context of trade secret protection. In addition, no single study 
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discussed cyber security behaviour for trade secret protection. In addition, 
entrepreneurs are considered the fuel of the economy; however, there has been no 
attention given to entrepreneurs as study subjects and the factors that might have 
an impact on their cyber security behaviour. Therefore, there is a clear need for 
research to consider agile dynamic environments, where cyber security cannot be 
achieved through forcing compliance, and which require new ways of enhancing trade 
secrets protection during the venturing process. 
Therefore, the findings of the systematic literature review in this chapter confirm that 
further research is required in new areas that consist of new behavioural elements in 
the field of cyber security behaviour. Moreover, by visualising the data analysis of the 
systematic literature review using concept mapping and a concept matrix approach, it 
is clear that this research aims to fill in a research gap and add valuable knowledge to 
the research field of cyber security behaviour.
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Chapter 4 
4. Conceptual Model and Hypotheses 
Development  
 
4.1. Introduction  
In the previous chapter, a systematic literature review was conducted using a 
structural approach for identifying and reviewing relevant literature in the field of 
cyber security behaviour. The aim of reviewing the latest cyber security behaviour 
literature is to identify the main behavioural theories applied in the cyber security 
behaviour domain, and to understand their applications in cyber security behaviour.  
The review identified 46 relevant studies that used 35 theories from different research 
fields (e.g. criminology, sociology and psychology). Furthermore, the output of the 
literature review analysis identified eight behavioural theories that are recognised as 
the most dominant theories applied in the cyber security behaviour research domain. 
According to Saunders et al. (2009), understanding theories from other disciplines 
helps in the development of research conceptual models. 
The objective of this chapter is to develop the research conceptual model and 
hypotheses.  This starts by determining the research cyber security behavioural 
elements for trade secret protection. In addition, in this chapter the theoretical 
foundation of the conceptual model is introduced. This is achieved by defining the 
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model constructs and the hypothetical relationships of the conceptualised research 
model. In the following chapters, the conceptual model is analysed to explore 
 protection. 
4.2. The Research Behavioural Elements 
The systematic literature review in Chapter 2 confirms that further research is required 
in new areas that consist of new behavioural elements in the field of cyber security 
behaviour. Therefore, based on the key research gaps of trade secret protection in the 
cyber security literature and the lack of cyber security behavioural elements for trade 
secret protection, this research explores new elements of behaviour for trade secret 
protection as illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1: Cyber security behaviour elements for trade secret protection 
Therefore, this research focuses on trade secret protection through the following 
cyber security behaviour elements:  
• Action  The action is based on confidentiality, ownership and secrecy protection.  
• Target  
secrets. 
• Context  The context of behaviour action is within agile dynamic environments. 
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This shows that the emphasis in this research is on new cyber security behavioural 
protective actions toward trade secrets based on confidentiality protection of 
information; ownership protection of intellectual property and secrecy protection of 
commercial secrets. This action is within an agile dynamic environment (i.e. a 
corporate venturing unit) that is considered a new organisational context in cyber 
security behaviour research.   
4.3. Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses Development 
Figure 4.2 illustrates how the structured conceptualisation of the trade secret 
dimensions and protection aspects are mapped to the behavioural theories that are 
used as theoretical basis for the development of the research conceptual model. 
Additionally, this shows a theoretical explanation to support the logical existence of 
the cause and effect relationships developed in the research conceptual model below. 
 
Figure 4.2: The conceptualisation of the theoretical basis of the research conceptual model 
The mapping in Figure 4.2 shows how this research defines the theoretical formation 
of the research conceptual model for trade secret protection. Protection motivation is 
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used as the core theoretical foundation 
conceptual model. This involves the threat and coping appraisal to address 
confidentiality protection of trade secrets. Confidential information is defined by as 
information that is not publicly available and that confers a competitive advantage to 
the organizations that possess it
2015, p.382). Therefore, from a theoretical prospective of information, confidentiality 
is seen as an important aspect of protection. According to Floyd et al (2000), 
perform protective actions. In addition, it was clear from the systematic literature 
review in Chapter 3 that protection motivation is the most used theory in cyber 
security behaviour. Thus, protection motivation was used to develop the conceptual 
research model, so as to investigate 
confidentiality protection of trade secrets.   
The second theory used in forming the research conceptual model, that of 
psychological ownership, aims to address ownership protection of trade secret. Pooley 
describes the ownership of intellectual information as the ability to protect 
information by preventing others from obtaining it while keeping it as a secret (2015, 
p.40). Moreover, from the theoretical prospective of intellectual property, ownership 
is also believed to be an important aspect of protection. Thus, psychological ownership 
was used in the development of the research conceptual model for investigating 
secrets.   
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Finally, social bonding theory was used to form the last part the conceptual model to 
address secrecy protection of trade secrets. A secret is defined as a piece of 
information that is intentionally withheld by one or more social actor(s) from one or 
more social actor(s)" (Scheppele 1988, P.12). According to Vela-McConnell (2017) to 
maintain secrecy between a group of individuals within an organisation, strong social 
bonds are required. Therefore, from the theoretical perspective of prospective of 
secrets, secrecy is seen as an important aspect of protection. Thus, social bonding was 
used in the development of the research conceptual model for investigating 
 
The development of the conceptual model illustrated in Figure 4.3 was based on the 
foundation of the protective motivation theory, the social bond theory and the 
concept of psychological ownership. According to Hair et al. (2016a) research 
questions lead to the development of research hypotheses. Based on the research 
questions introduced in Chapter 1, the research hypotheses for this research were 
developed. Thus, the formulated conceptual model aims to answer the research 
questions by evaluating cyber security behavioural intentions to 
engage in protective cyber security actions, and hence protect trade secrets. 
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Figure 4.3: The developed research conceptual model 
The research conceptual model incorporates 12 constructs that will be tested through 
11 developed research hypotheses. Moreover, the model constructs and their 
relationships will be investigated through empirical data collection and multivariate 
analysis.  
The aim of this model is to understand the drivers of entrepreneu
perform cyber security behaviour. Although this research focuses on intentions rather 
than behaviour, this is because of the difficulties to assess actual behaviour in the 
security context (Anderson and Agarwal, 2010; Vroom and von Solms 2004). 
Moreover, previous research has shown that actual behaviour is determined by an 
behaviour. (Ajzen and Fishbein, 2005). 
 According to Fishbein and Ajzen (2011), behavioural intentions are the most important 
readiness to perform a specific behaviour (Fishbein and Ajzen, 2005). In the context of 
this research, cyber security behavioural intentions refer to the indications of an 
 cyber security behaviour. Therefore, cyber 
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security behavioural intention is incorporated in the research model to predict 
following sections of this chapter discuss the hypothesised relationships between the 
11 model constructs (i.e. independent variables) and cyber security behavioural 
intention (i.e. dependent variable). 
4.4. Hypothesis Development  
4.4.1. Protection Motivation  
According to Boss et al. (2015) threat and coping appraisal are the two key components 
of protection motivation that represent the foundation that forms protection 
intentions. In this research, the threat appraisal and coping appraisal are used in the 
formulated research conceptual model. Thus, in this section, the constructs of threat 
and coping appraisal are discussed, and the associate hypotheses are developed.  
4.4.1.1. Threat Appraisal Constructs 
Threat appraisal consists of three constructs: perceived severity, perceived 
vulnerability and reward. Perceived severity is defined as the potential impact and 
consequences of a threat occurrence. The severity of threat measures the perceived 
degree that an individual holds toward the significance of a security threat (Johnston 
& Warkentin, 2010). According to Workman et al. (2008) individuals will adjust their 
behaviour if they perceive high risk of threat. On the other hand, the opposite is true 
as well, namely that when individuals perceive lower risk of threat, they tend to behave 
in a less cautious manner.  
Perceived severity is considered as one of the effective predictors of behavioural 
intention to perform security behaviours (Lee and Larsen, 2009; Dang-Pham and 
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Pittayachawan, 2015). In a security policy compliance context, Herath and Rao (2009a), 
severity tends to be associated with their behavioural intentions to perform security 
actions (Pechmann et al., 2003).  
In the context of this research, an assumption is made 
perception of perceived severity of a threat will have a positive influence on their 
behavioural intention to protect trade secrets. Therefore, perceived severity is 
included in the research conceptual model as a direct determinant of cyber security 
behavioural intentions, and helps to predict intentions to take protective actions to 
protect trade secrets. Thus, the following hypothesis is formulated:  
security behavioural intentions to protect trade secrets. 
Vulnerability is defined as the probability of a threat occurring provided no protective 
security action is performed. The perception of vulnerability is associated with the 
likelihood of a threat occurring for not performing security actions. Thus, the likelihood 
of taking protective actions increases when an individual perceives high vulnerability 
of a threat incident (Lee and Larsen, 2009).  
Lee and Larsen (2009) found that vulnerability has a significant influence on 
the increase of perceived vulnerabilit
intention to behave in a cautious manner in regards to the compliance of information 
security policies.  
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perception of the perceived vulnerability of a threat occurring will have a positive 
influence on their behavioural intention to protect trade secrets. Therefore, perceived 
vulnerability is included in the research conceptual model as a direct determinant of 
cyber security behavioural intentions and helps to predicting intentions to take 
protective actions to protect trade secrets. Thus, the following hypothesis is 
formulated:  
security behavioural intentions to protect trade secrets. 
Reward is defined as the physical or psychological pleasure of starting or continuing 
to engage in secure behaviour. These benefits (i.e. rewards) can be perceived in 
different forms, as financial value, time saved or physical pleasure (Chou and Chou, 
2016).  
According to Boss et al (2016) an individual might decide to accept a threat and not 
perform any protective action if the rewards outweigh the threats. Moreover, high 
perceived rewards associated with threat appraisal might decrease the likelihood of 
performing protective actions (Lee and Larsen, 2009). 
In the context of this research, rewards represent the realised benefits by 
entrepreneurs of not protecting trade secrets to gain more time or save efforts. 
Moreover, positive perception of 
rewards increases the possibility of a threat occurrence.  
Therefore, rewards are included in the research conceptual model as a direct 
determinant of cyber security behavioural intentions and help predict intentions to 
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take protective actions to protect trade secrets. Thus, the following hypothesis is 
formulated:  
behavioural intentions to protect trade secrets. 
4.4.1.2. Coping Appraisal Constructs 
Coping appraisal consists of three constructs: response efficacy, self-efficacy and 
response costs. In the coping assessment, response efficacy is the belief that 
performing a protective cyber security action will be effective.  
According to Johnston and Warkentin (2010)
major role in behavioral intention. 
response efficacy 
on security behavioural intentions. This indicates that an individual with high response 
efficacy will perform a protective security behavioural intention.  
In the context of this research, an assumption is made that entrepreneurs that have 
high confidence in the effectiveness of cyber security response, are more likely to 
perform a protective action.  Moreover, an assumption is formulated that 
coping response. 
Response efficacy is included in the research conceptual model as a positive direct 
determinant of cyber security behavioural intentions and helps to predict intentions 
to take protective actions to protect trade secrets. Thus, the following hypothesis is 
formulated:  
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behavioural intentions to protect trade secrets. 
Self-efficacy was added to the original theory of protective motivation (Rogers, 1983; 
Maddux and Rogers, 1983) by 
Moreover, in a study related to security policy compliance, Herath and Rao (2009a) 
found that self-efficacy positively influenced behavioural intentions. Furthermore, 
self-efficacy has shown a significant 
information security policies (Siponen et al., 2014).  
The influence of self-efficacy on security behaviour has been established empirically 
(Herath and Rao 2009; LaRose et al. 2008; Workman et al. 2008). Lee and Larson 
(2009) found that self-
Moreover, self-efficacy has shown to be a strong influence on behavioural intentions 
to perform protective security actions (Milne et al, 2000; Lee and Larson, 2009). 
Echoing the prior literature, this research also anticipates that self-efficacy will 
 
In the context of this research, an assumption is formulated that entrepreneurs with 
high confidence that they have the ability to conduct a cyber security action, are more 
likely to perform a protective action.  Therefore, self-efficacy is included in the research 
conceptual model as a direct determinant of cyber security behavioural intentions, and 
aids in predicting intentions to take protective actions to protect trade secrets. Thus, 
the following hypothesis is formulated:  
H5: Self-
behavioural intentions to protect trade secrets. 
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According to Floyd et al. (2000) individuals perceive response costs as any personal 
costs (e.g. money, effort or time) that are associated with performing protective 
actions. These costs involve the costs of using cyber security protections (Tsai et al., 
2016). Posey et al. (2015) state that costs reduce the likelihood of an individual 
performing a response action.  
Workman et al. (2008) argue that individuals could adjust their coping behaviour 
based on the costs of damage that results from a threat. Moreover, Herath and Rao 
(2009) found that response cost has a negative influence on security behaviour to 
comply with security policies. Therefore, based on previous literature, this research 
rotection of 
trade secrets.  
In the context of this research, an assumption is formulated that entrepreneurs that 
perceive high cost to conduct a cyber security action are more likely to have negative 
behavioural intentions towards the protection of trade secrets.  Therefore, response 
cost is included in the research conceptual model as a direct determinant of cyber 
security behavioural intentions and helps to predict intentions to take protective 
actions to protect trade secrets. Thus, the following hypothesis is formulated:  
behavioural intentions to protect trade secrets. 
Six hypotheses have been formulated, based on threat appraisal and coping appraisal. 
An entrepreneur goes through the threat appraisal by assessing the severity, 
vulnerability and benefits of performing protective cyber security actions to protect 
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ability to cope with a potential threat and perform protective cyber security actions to 
protect trade secrets. In essence, the core premise of the threat and coping appraisals 
security behavioural intentions to protect the confidentiality of trade secrets in 
corporate venturing environment.   
4.4.2. Psychological Ownership Construct 
According to Pierce et al. (2003) psychological ownership is the state when an 
individual feels that he/she owns an object and that it belongs to him or her. Moreover, 
the core of psychological ownership is based on possession (Van Dyne and Pierce, 
2004). Furthermore, the sense of ownership can also be associated with nonphysical 
targets such as creative ideas (Isaacs, 1933, cited in Anderson and Agarwal, 2010, p.621).  
Additionally, Dawkins et al. (2017) state that targets of ownership could be tangible or 
intangible.  
Moreover, Anderson and Agarwal (2010) argue that an individual seeks to protect an 
object that he/she owns and values. This clearly indicates that the psychological 
ownership of trade secrets that are owned and valued by an entrepreneur could be a 
target for protection.  
Anderson and Agarwal (2010) investigate the impact of psychological ownership on 
computers and the Internet for home users in the context of security. The study 
showed that psychological ownership 
behavioural intentions.  
In the context of this research, it is anticipated that entrepreneurs who feel a strong 
sense of psychological ownership toward trade secrets will have a stronger behavioural 
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intention to perform appropriate protective cyber security actions to protect these 
trade secrets. Moreover, positive 
psychological ownership increases the possibility of a taking protective cyber security 
action. 
Therefore, psychological ownership is included in the research conceptual model as a 
positive direct determinant of cyber security behavioural intentions, and helps to 
predict intentions to take protective actions to protect trade secrets. Thus, the 
following hypothesis is formulated:  
H7: Psychological ownership of trade secrets will have a positive influence on 
tions to protect trade secrets. 
4.4.3. Social Bonding Constructs 
The theory of social bonding, also referred to as social control, was introduced by 
Hirschi (1969). Social bonding is a sociological concept that is considered as a type of 
social informal control that has been widely used in the field of criminology, but has 
been rarely used in the field of cyber security (Cheng et al., 2013).  
Hirschi (1969) identified four bonding components 
to a social action within a group: attachment, commitment, involvement and personal 
norms. The theory states that people with stronger social ties are less likely to engage 
in deviant behaviour. This can include any unaccepted behaviour that violates social 
or cultural norms.  
The systematic literature review in Chapter 2 showed that social bonding has been 
For 
example, Ifinedo (2014) examined the impact of social bonding on information security 
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compliance and found that the four components of bonding have influence 
 Moreover, Hirschi 
(1969) argues that an individual with a strong bond with a social group will more likely 
not violate the group rules. Therefore, since entrepreneurs within a team form a social 
group, social bonding is used as an informal social control to protect secrecy of 
commercial secrets within a venturing team.  
Thus, in this research, the social bond theory is used in the formulated research 
conceptual model. In addition, in this section, constructs of the social bonding are 
discussed and the associate hypotheses are developed.  
According to Cheng et al. (2013) people with strong attachment are less likely engage 
in unacceptable behaviour such as violation of security policies and perform a 
compliance action. Attachment in this research refers to the social attachment 
between an entrepreneur and his/her team members. Therefore, an entrepreneur with 
a strong attachment with his/her team will be more likely to perform a protective cyber 
security action to protect trade secrets. In contrast, an entrepreneur with weak 
attachments is assumed to be less protective to trade secrets and unconcerned with 
performing cyber security behaviour.  
In the context of this research, it is anticipated that the stronger the attachment 
between an entrepreneur and his/her team members, the stronger the cyber security 
behavioural intention to perform appropriate protective cyber security actions to 
protect trade secrets. 
behavioural intentions to protect trade secrets. 
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According to Safa et al (2016), commitment in security involves the commitment to 
safeguard information assets in an organisation. Commitment in this research refers 
Therefore, an entrepreneur with a strong commitment will be more likely to perform 
a protective cyber security action to protect trade secrets. In contrast, an entrepreneur 
with weak commitment is assumed to be less protective to trade secrets and 
unconcerned with performing cyber security behaviour.  
In the context of this research, it is anticipated that the stronger the commitment of 
an entrepreneur, the stronger the cyber security behavioural intention to perform 
appropriate protective cyber security actions to protect trade secrets. 
behavioural intentions to protect trade secrets. 
and participation in an activity. Involvement 
engagement efforts with team members to protect trade secrets. Therefore, an 
entrepreneur with strong involvement with his/her team members will be more likely 
to perform a protective cyber security action to protect trade secrets. In contrast, an 
entrepreneur with weak involvement is assumed to be less protective to trade secrets, 
and unconcerned with performing cyber security behaviour.  
In the context of this research, it is anticipated that the stronger the involvement of 
an entrepreneur, the stronger the cyber security behavioural intention to perform 
appropriate protective cyber security actions to protect trade secrets. 
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behavioural intentions to protect trade secrets. 
According to Lee et al (2004) personal norms represent the moral element of 
. Personal norms in this research refer to an 
entrepreneur with high personal norms will be more likely to perform a protective 
cyber security action to protect trade secrets. In contrast, an entrepreneur with low 
personal norms is assumed to be less protective to trade secrets and unconcerned with 
performing cyber security behaviour.  
In the context of this research, it is anticipated that the higher the personal norms of 
an entrepreneur, the stronger the cyber security behavioural intention to perform 
appropriate protective cyber security actions to protect trade secrets. 
H11: Personal norms will have a positive effect on entrepreneurs
behavioural intentions to protect trade secrets. 
4.5. Summary  
In this chapter, the research conceptual model was developed to explore 
trade secret protection. The model builds 
upon previous behavioural theories from the literature. The structured model consists 
of 12 constructs from three theories: protective motivation, psychological ownership 
and social bonding. Based on the theses theories, the model constructs were defined 
and 11 research hypotheses were developed. Table 4.1 presents the model constructs 
and the research hypotheses. In the following chapters, multivariate analysis is used 
to assess the reliability and validity of the research conceptual model.  
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Table 4.1: The research hypotheses 
Constructs Hypotheses Theory Source 
Perceived 
Severity 
H1: Perceived severity will 
have a positive influence on 
behavioural intentions to 
protect trade secrets. 
Protection 
Motivation 
Workman et al. 
(2008); Posey et al. 
(2015); Witte et al. 
(1996) 
Perceived 
Vulnerability 
H2: Perceived vulnerability 
will have a positive influence 
behavioural intentions to 
protect trade secrets. 
Protection 
Motivation 
Posey et al. (2015); 
Workman et al. 
(2008); Witte et al. 
(1996) 
Reward 
H3: Rewards will have a 
negative influence on 
behavioural intentions to 
protect trade secrets. 
Protection 
Motivation 
Boss et al., 2015; 
Myyry et al., 2009; 
Dang-Pham & 
Pittayachawan 
(2015) 
Response 
Efficacy 
H4 Response efficacy will 
have a positive influence on 
behavioural intentions to 
protect trade secrets. 
Protection 
Motivation 
Posey et al. (2015); 
Workman et al. 
(2008); Rippetoe 
and Rogers (1987); 
 
Self-Efficacy 
H5: Self-efficacy will have a 
positive influence on 
behavioural intentions to 
protect trade secrets. 
Protection 
Motivation 
Posey et al. (2015); 
Workman et al. 
(2008) 
Response Cost 
H6: Response cost will have a 
negative influence on 
behavioural intentions to 
protect trade secrets. 
Protection 
Motivation 
Boss et al., 2015; 
Woon et al., 2005 
Psychological 
Ownership 
H7: Psychological ownership 
of trade secrets will have a 
positive influence on 
entr
behavioural intentions to 
protect trade secrets. 
Psychological 
Ownership 
Dyne & Pierce, 
2004; Anderson & 
Agarwal, 2010 
Attachment 
H8: Attachment will have a 
positive effect on 
behavioural intentions to 
protect trade secrets. 
Social Bonding 
Ifinedo (2014); Lee 
et al. (2004) 
 
Commitment 
H9: Commitment will have a 
positive effect on Social Bonding 
Ifinedo (2014); 
Herath & Rao 
(2009), Lee et al., 
(2004) 
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behavioural intentions to 
protect trade secrets. 
 
Involvement 
H10: Involvement will have a 
positive effect on 
behavioural intentions to 
protect trade secrets. 
Social Bonding 
Ifinedo (2014); Lee 
et al. (2004) 
 
Personal norms 
H11: Personal norms will have 
a positive effect on 
behavioural intentions to 
protect trade secrets. 
Social Bonding 
Ifinedo (2014); Li et 
al. (2010) 
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Chapter 5 
5. Research Methodology 
5.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the research conceptual model was developed based on 
established behavioural theories. Moreover, the formation reasoning of the 
conceptual model was explained and the model constructs were defined. In addition, 
a set of hypotheses were developed to describe and examine the cause-and-effect of 
relationships between the model constructs.  
This chapter aims to introduce the research methodology used to conduct this 
research. Research methodology is defined as the systematic process of solving a 
research problem uces the research 
design including the process that results into answering the research questions. The 
research design encompasses the various steps followed in this research for data 
collection and analysis. The chapter starts with the research design justifying the 
chosen research philosophy and approach. In addition, the chapter discusses the 
sampling process and the development of the measurement instrument (i.e. 
questionnaire).  
5.2. Research Design  
According to Hair et al. (2016a) there are three types of research design: exploratory, 
descriptive or casual. An exploratory research design is usually used in studies that 
involve unclear research questions and lack available theories to support hypotheses 
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development. A descriptive research design, on the other hand, describes the 
characteristics of a specific research topic. In contrast, the explanatory research 
design, also called causal research, tests the hypothesised cause-and-effect 
relationship between constructs (Zikmund, 2003).  
This research adopted an exploratory and causal research design approach that aims 
to explore the research problem. This is based on the needs of the research to meet 
the research objectives and answer the research questions. The following sections 
describe the type of research philosophy and research method approach employed in 
this research design. 
5.3. Research Paradigm 
In the field of IS research different research methods and paradigms are used. 
Positivism is one of the most widely used research paradigms in IS research (Niehaves 
and Stahl. 2006). According to Gill and Johnson (2010) one of the main characteristics 
of positivist epistemology is that it tests theories that are hypothetic-deductive based.  
It has been noticed that this type of approach has been used in the relevant literature 
reviewed in Chapter 2 (e.g. Anderson and Agarwal, (2010); Herath and Rao, (2009); 
Posey et al., (2015); Ifinedo, (2014); Safa et al., 2015). In addition, since this research aims 
to test a conceptual model based on hypothesized relationships, the research adopts 
a positivism approach.  
5.4. Research Approach 
There are two analytical reasoning approaches: inductive and deductive (Hair et al., 
2016). The inductive reasoning involves a discovery approach that aims to develop a 
theory or conceptual framework from the collected data. Conversely, the deductive 
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reasoning approach aims to develop a theory or conceptual framework and 
hypotheses before data collection and analysis. Moreover, Wilson (2014) states that a 
deductive approach is concerned with hypotheses development based on existing 
theories and testing these hypotheses. Figure 5.1 illustrates the inductive and 
deductive approach.  
 
Figure 5.1: Deductive vs. inductive reasoning approach (Adopted from Trochim (2001)) 
Exploratory research design can adopt quantitative or qualitative methods (Hair et al., 
2016a). However, in this research, the exploratory research design adopts a 
quantitative research method based on a deductive reasoning approach.Moreover, the 
exploratory research approach is also supported by findings of the systematic 
literature review analyse (Chapter 2) that showed that the majority of relevant studies 
(89%) used quantitative approach based on a survey instrument to support the 
research hypotheses testing. This shows that in the field of information security 
behaviour science, quantitative research is generally the main research approach. 
Therefore, the quantitative research approach for data collection adopted in this 
research is consistent with other research designs from similar studies in the literature 
of information security behaviour.  
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5.5. Sample  
One of the main steps of a quantitative research approach is the sampling procedure. 
For the data to be collected and hypothesised relationships tested, a subset (i.e. 
sample) of a representative population is required. This sample is determined through 
a probability procedure that is usually used in quantitative research. According to Hair 
et al. (2016) the probability procedure consists of a sample selection of a representative 
sample from a specific population in a random procedure that guarantees the 
objectivity of the sampling data. On the other hand, nonprobability sampling is 
ate 
sample size. Thus, this type of sampling procedure lacks accuracy in regards to the 
generalisation of the research findings. Therefore, in this research, and based on the 
research needs, a nonprobability sample design is used to determine the sample size. 
Hair et al. (2016a) defined a sampling process for obtaining representative samples. 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the sampling process used in this research. 
 
Figure 5.2: The research sampling process 
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The research population is the first element in the sampling process that needs to be 
determined. In this research, the population consists of entrepreneurs starting their 
new ventures within a corporate accelerator in London. However, since there is no 
formal data available that shows the number of entrepreneurs in corporate venturing 
units (i.e. accelerators) in London, the population is determined based on a bigger 
population that consists of all entrepreneurs that are starting their new venture in 
London. The selection of this population ensures that the research sample size is 
accurate, and minimises the possibility of errors in the sampling process. Moreover, 
the choice of all entrepreneurs that started new ventures in London guarantees that 
the sample represents the population it is drawn from.  According to a recent report 
by the Office for National Statistics (2016) the number of business births in London in 
2015 totalled 101,000. The sample size (n=384) was determined using Krejcie and 
specifying a five percent margin of error.  
Since this is the only known number of entrepreneurs in London the research target 
sample was taken based on this, to determine the sample size. Figure 5.3 illustrates 
how the target population are entrepreneurs in corporate accelerators in London.  
 
Figure 5.3: The research population and target sample  
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Hair et al. defined the sampling frame as a comprehensive list of the elements from 
which the sample is drawn. he research determined sampling frame is 
based on a dataset of 24 accelerators in London. This data list of the corporate 
accelerators in London has been identified by the researcher based on different 
resources. These include journal articles, online databases and corporate reports.   
The sampling method was based on a judgment design, with 24 corporate accelerators 
as the primary sampling unit targeting entrepreneurs within these accelerators. Non-
probability sampling across accelerators was employed because the total population 
is distributed over several accelerators. This method was found to be the most 
appropriate because of difficulty to gain access a large number of corporates and 
because of the nature of the sensitivity of research topic to some corporates that 
involves cyber security and intellectual property. 
According to a recent report by the Office for National Statistics (2016) the number of 
business births in London in 2015 totalled 101,000. The sample size (n=384) was 
determined using Krejcie 
percent margin of error. Moreover, Sommestad et al. (2015) state that a response rate 
of 30% is considered acceptable. The overall response rate in this research was 36% 
which is considered adequate.  
In addition, in this research, the required sample size for the multivariate analysis 
technique has been met. This is based on Hair et al (2016b) recommendation that a 
sample size should exceed 100, and an ideal case would have 10 times the maximum 
number arrowheads pointing at a latent variable. The appropriate sample size for a 
multivariate analysis is calculated as follows: 
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10 * 11 (latent variable) = 110 (ideal sample size for a multivariate analysis) 
The sampling plan to distribute the questionnaire started with an invitation email that 
was sent to the identified corporate accelerators, asking them to participate in the 
study by distributing the invitation email to entrepreneurs in their accelerator 
program. The email described the research aim and objectives and included the ethical 
approval.  
In addition, definitions were included at the start of the questionnaire to clarify the 
meaning of important terms such as Trade Secrets, Cyber Security Threats and 
Protective Cyber Security Actions. Moreover, examples of some trade secrets and 
security threats were listed to minimize any ambiguity of these terms within the 
questionnaire. 
According to Mesly (2015) to obtain a reprehensive sample, there are three criteria that 
need to be met. The sample should be random, representative and meet the minimum 
number for the analysis method. The sample for this research is random, because 
emails were sent to all accelerators; the sample is representative, because only specific 
subjects (i.e. entrepreneurs in corporate accelerators) were targeted. Finally, the 
number of participants is above the minimum number required by the analysis method 
used in this research (i.e. PLS-SEM).  
5.6. Instrument Development  
Selecting the appropriate research design depends on the research questions. In this 
research, the questions address cause-and-effect relationships; therefore, a research 
instrument is developed on this basis to collect the research data. 
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All the construct measures were adopted from previous research in the field of cyber 
security behaviour (Table 5.1). In addition, appropriate modification has been made to 
ensure that the items are relevant to the research context. Moreover, the designed 
survey instrument used a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 7 (strongly agree), to indicate the level of agreement for each single statement. 
Figure 5.4 illustrates the research measurement that is based on a matric scale to 
Moreover, the use of a minimum scale of a seven-point Likert scale is recommended 
by Hair et al (2016a) when adopting an established measurement scale.  
 
Figure 5.4: The research measurement scale 
 
Table 5.1: The research instruments  
 Constructs Code Items Source 
1 Psychological 
Ownership 
POC1. 
This is my venture and my trade 
secrets. 
Dyne & Pierce, 
2004; 
Anderson & 
Agarwal, 2010 POC2. 
I feel a high degree of personal 
ownership for my venture’s trade 
secrets. 
POC3. 
I sense that these are my trade 
secrets. 
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2 Reward 
REW1 
Not performing protective cyber 
security actions toward trade secrets 
saves me time. 
Boss et al., 
2015; Myyry et 
al., 2009 
REW2 
Not performing protective cyber 
security actions toward trade secrets 
saves me money. 
REW3 
Not performing protective cyber 
security actions toward trade secrets 
keeps me from being confused. 
REW4 
Not performing protective cyber 
security actions toward trade secrets 
requires less effort of me. 
Dang-Pham & 
Pittayachawan 
(2015) 
REW5 
Not performing protective cyber 
security actions toward trade secrets 
makes me feel less stressful. 
3 Vulnerability 
 
 
VUL1. 
My venture’s trade secrets are 
vulnerable to cyber security threats. 
Posey et al. 
(2015); 
Workman et 
al. (2008) VUL2. 
It is likely that a cyber security 
attacks will occur against my 
venture’s trade secrets. 
VUL3. 
My venture’s trade secrets are at risk 
to cyber security threats. 
Posey et al. 
(2015); Witte 
et al. (1996) 
VUL4. 
My venture’s trade secrets are 
defenceless against cyber security 
threats. 
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4 Severity 
 
 
SEV1. 
Cyber threats to the security of my 
venture’s trade secrets are severe. 
Workman et 
al. (2008); 
Posey et al. 
(2015) SEV2. 
In terms of cyber threats, attacks on 
my venture’s trade secrets are 
severe. 
SEV3. 
I believe that cyber threats to the 
security of my venture’s trade 
secrets are serious. 
Witte et al. 
(1996); Posey 
et al. (2015) 
SEV4. 
I believe that cyber threats to the 
security of my venture’s trade 
secrets are significant. 
5 Response 
Efficacy REF1. 
Efforts to keep my venture’s trade 
secrets safe from cyber threats are 
effective. 
Posey et al. 
(2015); 
Workman et 
al. (2008); 
Rippetoe and 
Rogers (1987); 
Milne et al.’s 
(2000) 
REF2. 
The available measures that can be 
taken to protect my venture’s trade 
secrets from security threats are 
effective. 
REF3. 
The preventive measures available to 
me to stop people from getting my 
venture’s trade secrets are adequate. 
REF4. 
If I perform the preventive cyber 
security measures available to me, 
my venture’s trade secrets are less 
likely to be exposed to a cyber threat. 
100 
 
6 Self-Efficacy 
 
 
SEF1. 
For me, taking cyber security 
precautions to protect my venture’s 
trade secrets is easy. 
Posey et al. 
(2015); 
Workman et 
al. (2008) 
SEF2. 
I have the necessary skills to protect 
my venture’s trade secrets from 
cyber threats. 
SEF3. 
My skills in stopping cyber threats 
against my venture’s trade secrets 
are adequate. 
7 Response 
Cost 
 
COS1. 
The benefits of performing protective 
cyber security actions toward my 
venture’s trade secrets outweigh the 
costs (R). 
Boss et al., 
2015; Woon et 
al., 2005 
COS2. 
I would be discouraged from 
performing protective cyber security 
actions toward my venture’s trade 
secrets in the future because it 
would take too much time. 
COS3. 
The time taken to perform protective 
cyber security actions toward my 
venture’s trade secrets in the future 
would cause me too many problems. 
COS4. 
Taking protective cyber security 
actions would require considerable 
investment of effort as well as time. 
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8 Behavioural 
Intentions INT1. 
I am likely to take protective cyber 
security action to protect my 
venture’s trade secrets. 
Anderson & 
Agarwal, 2010; 
Taylor & Todd 
1995 
INT2. 
It is possible that I will take 
protective cyber security action to 
protect my venture’s trade secrets. 
INT3. 
I am certain that I will take protective 
cyber security action to protect my 
venture’s trade secrets. 
9 Attachment 
 ATC1. 
I usually have conversations about 
the protection of my venture’s trade 
secrets with team members. 
Ifinedo (2014); 
Lee et al. 
(2004) 
 
ATC2. 
I respect my team members’ views 
and opinions about the protection of 
our venture’s trade secrets. 
ATC3. 
I communicate the importance of 
protecting the venture’s trade 
secrets to team members. 
10 Commitment  
CMT1 
I strongly believe that the protection 
of my venture’s trade secrets can 
help the venture to succeed. 
Ifinedo (2014); 
Herath & Rao 
(2009), Lee et 
al., (2004) 
 
CMT2 
I am committed to protecting my 
venture 's trade secrets. 
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CMT3 
I am willing to invest energy and 
effort in making the protection of my 
venture’s trade secrets a success. 
CMT4 
I am willing to put in a great deal of 
effort to help my venture succeed. 
11 Involvement  
IVT1. 
I value the opportunity to participate 
in informal meetings related to my 
venture’s information security. 
Ifinedo (2014); 
Lee et al. 
(2004) 
 
IVT2. 
I work on building personal 
relationships with team members in 
my venture in relation to trade secret 
concerns. 
IVT3. 
I actively involve myself in activities 
related to my venture’s growth. 
12 Personal 
norms  
 
PEO1. 
It is a serious matter if I don’t 
perform the protective cyber security 
actions to protect my venture’s trade 
secrets. 
Ifinedo (2014); 
Li et al. (2010) 
 
PEO2. 
It is unacceptable not to perform ALL 
the protective cyber security actions 
to protect my venture’s trade 
secrets. 
PEO3. 
To me, performing the protective 
cyber security actions to protect my 
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venture’s trade secrets is NOT a 
trivial offence. 
PEO4. 
To me, it is unacceptable to ignore 
the protection of my venture’s trade 
secrets.  
 
When developing a measurement scale, it is important to reduce the measurement 
error of the research instrument.  According to Hair et al. (2014), validity and reliability 
are the two main aspects of a measurement scale that need to be addressed.  
Therefore, reliability and validity will be evaluated in the later part of this research.  
5.7. Pre-Test 
The questionnaire was pre-tested by five researchers from different fields that have 
previous experience in conducting quantitative based research. The aim of the pre-test 
is to assess the clarity and wording of the survey instrument. The feedback received 
has been used to improve the survey instrument design.  
5.8. Pilot Study 
A pilot study aims  (i.e. 
reliability). Reliability refers to the ability to generate the same output of results as 
other researchers when using the same analysis (Saunders et al., 2012). 
-known reliability analysis for 
ranges from 0 to 1.0, where above the cut-off point of 0.7 is considered acceptable 
(Kline, 1999; Field, 2009).  
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The pilot study was conducted to evaluate the reliability of the measurement scale for 
the developed research model. In the pilot study, 30 postgraduate students studying 
MSc in Innovation and Entrepreneurship at the University of Warwick participated in 
the study. The reliability of the questionnaire instrument was analysed using SPSS 
software.  
The pilot data set screening showed missing data and clear patterned responses for 
unengaged respondents. Therefore, these inefficient responses were excluded and 
only twenty completed responses were used in the pilot study. The students sample 
was considered suitable for this research because the students represented an 
appropriate group of entrepreneurs who had previous experience of establishing their 
own business.  
Concepts (i.e. constructs) in this research are measured through multi-item scales that 
consist of multiple items. The internal consistency reliability of the constructs were 
 as coefficient alpha. Moreover, the range 
of the alpha coefficient ranges from zero to one. It is generally suggested that an alpha 
higher than 0.7 represents a good alpha value (Nunnally, 1978).  
 
Table 5.2 reliability analysis results  
Construct Cronbach's Alpha 
Psychological Ownership 0.903 
Reward 0.899 
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Vulnerability 0.816 
Severity 0.933 
Response Efficacy 0.756 
Self-Efficacy 0.762 
Response Cost 0.645  
Behavioural Intentions  0.949 
Attachment 0.867 
Commitment  0.932 
Involvement  0.866 
Personal norms  0.925 
 
All the constructs showed an acceptable level of internal consistency through 
reliability measures exceeding the 0.7 threshold, except for that of response cost. 
ponse cost is 0.645 which is above the point of 0.6. 
Although some researchers may consider 0.6 a low alpha, it is still acceptable for 
construct with small number of items (e.g.  three and four items) (Hair et al., 2016a; 
Hair et al., 2014). However, the item-to-total correlation for COS1 is 0.173, below the 
0.3 cut-off recommended by Field (2009).  
nsistent 
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response, then they should be removed from the scale. Therefore, a decision was made 
to remove COS1, and this resulted in increasing the response cost value to 0.737. 
ng the 
response cost item (i.e. COS1) all the constructs exceeded the 0.7 threshold, which 
shows an acceptable level of internal consistency. Therefore, this ensures that the 
measurement scale for the developed conceptual model presents reliable 
measurements for this researcher. 
5.9. Summary 
The goal of this chapter was to report on the design of the research methodology, 
which sought to achieve the research objectives and answer the research questions. 
The chapter started by determining the research approach and methods. Research 
approaches were then discussed, and an exploratory and causal research design 
approach was adopted based on a hypothetic-deductive logic.  
This approach is consistent with previous research in the cyber security behaviour 
field. This involved a questionnaire based data collection method. In addition, a 
sampling process was used to determine the research target sample. In addition, the 
research instrument was developed based on previous established measurement 
scales, and reliability was also tested to ensure internal consistency.  
The following chapters will focus on the analysis part of this research. The analysis 
includes descriptive and multivariate analysis of the collected empirical data.  
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Chapter 6 
6. Data Preparation   
6.1. Introduction 
Based on the research methodology in Chapter 4, an online questionnaire was 
distributed to participants in 24 corporate accelerators in London. The target sample 
was 384, and 140 responses were obtained for a response rate of 36%.  
In this chapter, the captured demographic characteristic from the collected data is 
presented. In addition, descriptive analysis is used to understand the data through 
frequency distribution examination. These are illustrated using graphics and charts to 
describe more easily the descriptive statistics and demographic information.  
In addition, this chapter aims to examine the collected data as an essential step for 
any multivariate analysis (Hair et al., 2014). This aims to prepare the data for analysis 
by identifying any issues related to the collected empirical data, such as missing data, 
outliers and data distribution. Furthermore, the chapter includes a validity analysis 
through an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) using SPSS. Finally, a final step for data 
examination is testing the assumptions of multivariate analysis and assessing the 
threat of common method bias.  
6.2. Demographic Characteristics 
The target sample of this research is entrepreneurs establishing their new ventures 
within corporate accelerators. Only entrepreneurs within corporate accelerators in 
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London participated in this research. However, since non-probability sampling method 
was used, the results cannot be considered representative of the total population. 
Nevertheless, the  demographic information was captured such as gender, 
age, education level and experience. In this section, the demographic characteristics 
 
6.2.1. Gender  
In terms of gender as a demographic characteristic in this research, the highest 
number of respondents were male entrepreneurs, at 67%, compared to female 
entrepreneurs at 33% (see Figure 6.1). This shows that about two-third of the 
respondents were male entrepreneurs. 
 
Figure 6.1: Demographic characteristic - Gender 
6.2.2. Age 
aged between 18 to 29. Moreover, 23% are considered middle age ranging from 30 to 
39 years old. Figure 6  groups.  
94 46
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Figure 6.2: Demographic characteristic  Age 
 
6.2.3. Education  
The majority of respondents, about 93%, had obtained only a bachelor degree. 
Moreover, only 6% hold a master degree and only one respondent with a doctorate 
degree.  Figure 6.3 illustrates the number of respondent in different education levels.  
 
Figure 6.3: Demographic characteristic  Education 
6.2.4. Venturing Experience 
In terms of experience in establishing new ventures, most of the respondents had less 
than six months of experience. The results also show that 74% respondents have less 
than one year of experience is starting a new venture.  Figure 6.4 illustrates the 
different years of experience in venturing for respondents in this research.  
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Figure 6.4: Demographic characteristic  Venturing experience 
6.2.5. Number of Established Ventures  
The number of ventures established by respondents was also captured via the 
questionnaire. The results show that more than 80% of respondents are establishing 
their first venture within a corporate accelerator. Figure 6.5 illustrates the number of 
established ventures by respondents in this research.  
 
Figure 6.5: Demographic characteristic  Number of established ventures 
6.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics are a quantitative analysis approach that helps to understand 
the collected data. The descriptive statistics for the constructs of this research 
consist of mean (i.e. arithmetic average) and standard deviation. Table 6.1 shows the 
descriptive statistics of this research.  
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics  
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 Constructs Code Items Mean S.D. 
1 Psychological 
Ownership POC1. 
This is my venture and my trade 
secrets. 5.85 1.18 
POC2. 
I feel a high degree of personal 
secrets. 
5.99 1.02 
POC3. 
I sense that these are my trade 
secrets. 5.82 1.04 
2 Reward 
REW1. 
Not performing protective cyber 
security actions toward trade secrets 
saves me time. 
3.30 1.69 
REW2. 
Not performing protective cyber 
security actions toward trade secrets 
saves me money. 
3.36 1.79 
REW3. 
Not performing protective cyber 
security actions toward trade secrets 
keeps me from being confused. 
3.20 1.54 
REW4. 
Not performing protective cyber 
security actions toward trade secrets 
requires less effort of me. 
3.83 1.80 
REW5. 
Not performing protective cyber 
security actions toward trade secrets 
makes me feel less stressful. 
3.07 1.61 
3 Vulnerability 
 
 
VUL1. 
My venture’s trade secrets are 
vulnerable to cyber security threats. 
4.99 1.41 
VUL2. 
It is likely that a cyber security 
attacks will occur against my 
venture’s trade secrets. 
4.99 1.32 
VUL3. 
My venture’s trade secrets are at risk 
to cyber security threats. 
4.73 1.44 
VUL4. 
My venture’s trade secrets are 
defenceless against cyber security 
threats. 
3.86 1.47 
4 Severity 
 
 
SEV1. 
Cyber threats to the security of my 
venture’s trade secrets are severe. 
4.49 1.61 
SEV2. 
In terms of cyber threats, attacks on 
my venture’s trade secrets are 
severe. 
4.68 1.52 
SEV3. 
I believe that cyber threats to the 
security of my venture’s trade 
secrets are serious. 
4.92 1.59 
SEV4. 
I believe that cyber threats to the 
security of my venture’s trade 
secrets are significant. 
4.95 1.50 
5 Response 
Efficacy REF1. 
Efforts to keep my venture’s trade 
secrets safe from cyber threats are 
effective. 
5.14 1.10 
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REF2. 
The available measures that can be 
taken to protect my venture’s trade 
secrets from security threats are 
effective. 
5.05 1.09 
REF3. 
The preventive measures available to 
me to stop people from getting my 
venture’s trade secrets are adequate. 
4.72 1.22 
REF4. 
If I perform the preventive cyber 
security measures available to me, 
my venture’s trade secrets are less 
likely to be exposed to a cyber threat. 
5.17 1.31 
6 Self-Efficacy 
 
 
SEF1. 
For me, taking cyber security 
precautions to protect my venture’s 
trade secrets is easy. 
3.74 1.45 
SEF2. 
I have the necessary skills to protect 
my venture’s trade secrets from 
cyber threats. 
3.69 1.63 
SEF3. 
My skills in stopping cyber threats 
against my venture’s trade secrets 
are adequate. 
3.67 1.51 
7 Response 
Cost 
 COS2. 
I would be discouraged from 
performing protective cyber security 
actions toward my venture’s trade 
secrets in the future because it 
would take too much time. 
3.33 1.58 
COS3. 
The time taken to perform protective 
cyber security actions toward my 
venture’s trade secrets in the future 
would cause me too many problems. 
3.22 1.40 
COS4. 
Taking protective cyber security 
actions would require considerable 
investment of effort as well as time. 
5.15 1.30 
8 Behavioural 
Intentions INT1. 
I am likely to take protective cyber 
security action to protect my 
venture’s trade secrets. 
5.76 0.97 
INT2. 
It is possible that I will take 
protective cyber security action to 
protect my venture’s trade secrets. 
5.94 0.91 
INT3. 
I am certain that I will take protective 
cyber security action to protect my 
venture’s trade secrets. 
5.63 1.22 
9 Attachment 
 ATC1. 
I usually have conversations about 
the protection of my venture’s trade 
secrets with team members. 
4.67 1.50 
ATC2. 
I respect my team members’ views 
and opinions about the protection of 
our venture’s trade secrets. 
5.59 1.05 
ATC3. 
I communicate the importance of 
protecting the venture’s trade 
secrets to team members. 
5.49 1.38 
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10 
Commitment  
CMT1. 
I strongly believe that the protection 
of my venture’s trade secrets can 
help the venture to succeed. 
5.63 1.19 
CMT2. 
I am committed to protecting my 
venture 's trade secrets. 
5.81 0.98 
CMT3. 
I am willing to invest energy and 
effort in making the protection of my 
venture’s trade secrets a success. 
5.75 0.98 
CMT4. 
I am willing to put in a great deal of 
effort to help my venture succeed. 
6.20 0.92 
11 Involvement  
IVT1. 
I value the opportunity to participate 
in informal meetings related to my 
venture’s information security. 
5.33 1.14 
IVT2. 
I work on building personal 
relationships with team members in 
my venture in relation to trade secret 
concerns. 
5.55 1.07 
IVT3. 
I actively involve myself in activities 
related to my venture’s growth. 
6.15 0.845 
12 Personal 
Norms  
 
PEO1. 
It is a serious matter if I don’t 
perform the protective cyber security 
actions to protect my venture’s trade 
secrets. 
5.38 1.26 
PEO2. 
It is unacceptable not to perform ALL 
the protective cyber security actions 
to protect my venture’s trade 
secrets. 
4.80 1.47 
PEO3. 
To me, performing the protective 
cyber security actions to protect my 
venture’s trade secrets is NOT a 
trivial offence. 
4.83 1.22 
PEO4. 
To me, it is unacceptable to ignore 
the protection of my venture’s trade 
secrets.  
5.52 1.21 
 
6.4. Data Preparation  
Data examination is an initial step before any data analysis to ensure that the results 
obtained from the multivariate analysis are valid and reliable (Hair et al., 2014). This 
involves the evaluation of the collected set of data before conducting the main data 
analysis. The data preparation aims to clean the dataset to be suitable for the 
multivariate analysis. This data preparation testing involves missing data identification, 
suspicious response patterns and outlier detection (see Figure 6.6). 
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Figure 6.6: Data Preparation 
6.4.1. Missing data 
In this study, the distributed questionnaire required respondents to answer all 
questions to ensure no missing data issues. However, the data set was screened 
for missing data and no missing data were identified. Thus, no issues of missing data 
were reported. 
6.4.2. Suspicious Responses 
The data set was also examined for any suspicious responses that show unengaged 
respondents during the activity of answering the questionnaire. The examination 
identified two cases that showed clear unengaged response. The first case showed a 
patterned response and the second case had a zero-standard deviation. Therefore, 
these two cases were removed from the data set. 
6.4.3. Detecting Outliers 
 
 The detection and 
evaluation of outliers in multivariate analysis is vital to be able to take a retention or 
deletion decision (Hire et al., 2014).  
In this research, an investigation was conducted to identify outliers in the dataset. 
Moreover, the Median Absolute Deviation (MAD) as a univariate detection method 
was used to identify outliers.  According to Hire et al (2014), univariate detection 
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2014, p.65). Moreover, since the research sample size is considered small, MAD was 
used for its robustness and immunity to sample size (Leys et al., 2013). Three threshold 
values (2, 2.5 or 3) are usually used for detecting outlying values in univariate statistics. 
Based on Leys et al (2013) recommendation, this research will use a ± 2.5 as a 
moderately conservative value. 
The univariate detection resulted in identifying 18 cases as potential outliers that 
exceed the threshold of ±2.5 on more than one item. According to Hair et al (2014) 
after the outliers have been identified in the dataset a decision to retain or delete 
them. This is achieved by examining the difference between  mean value and 
the 5% trimmed mean value to identify whether the outliers could affect the remaining 
part of the analysis. According to Pallant (2010), if the mean value of a variable and the 
5% trimmed mean value involved a huge difference, this shows an associated influence 
of the outlier. Therefore, a comparison between the  means and trimmed means 
has been made, and they did not show any huge differences (See Appendix B).  This 
shows that the detected outliers have no significant influence on the dataset and 
therefore a decision was made to retain them. Finally, this concludes the data 
examination and preparation part.  
6.5. Testing the Assumptions of Multivariate Analysis 
Before multivariate data can be used for analysis, several assumptions underlying 
multivariate analysis should be examined. In this section, statistical assumptions 
recommended by Hair et al. (2014) were examined. However, a multicollinearity test 
was not appropriate in this multivariate analysis, since all items are reflective items 
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(i.e. interchangeable items) and collinearity (i.e. high correlation between multiple 
items) is related to formative items (Hair et al., 2016b).  
6.6. Normality 
PLS-SEM does not require the data to be normally distributed, it should not be 
extremely nonnormal (Hire et al., 2016b). The data distribution has been examined 
using two measures: Skewness and Kurtosis. Moreover, the data have been examined 
in this study using the SPSS software.  
Skewness measures the balance of the distributed data; if the distribution of data is 
stretched toward the right or left tail. Kurtosis, on the other hand, measures the 
peakedness of the distributed data; if the distribution of data is narrow in the center 
or flat. Table 6.2 illustrates the normality analysis of the skewness and kurtosis 
measures  
Table 6.2: Skewness and Kurtosis Tests 
Items Skewness Kurtosis 
POC1 -1.312 1.966 
POC2 -1.332 3.192 
POC3 -0.903 0.495 
REW1 0.319 -1.053 
REW2 0.308 -1.098 
REW3 0.345 -0.797 
REW4 0.034 -1.195 
REW5 0.472 -0.828 
VUL1 -0.919 0.411 
VUL2 -0.970 0.826 
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VUL3 -0.721 -0.108 
VUL4 0.116 -0.601 
SEV1 -0.520 -0.597 
SEV2 -0.765 -0.288 
SEV3 -0.932 0.072 
SEV4 -0.727 -0.187 
REF1 -0.570 0.596 
REF2 -0.608 0.124 
REF3 -0.407 -0.628 
REF4 -1.025 1.031 
SEF1 0.393 -0.921 
SEF2 0.311 -1.001 
SEF3 0.249 -0.911 
COS2 0.505 -0.749 
COS3 0.314 -0.607 
COS4 -1.338 1.766 
INT1 -1.021 1.281 
INT2 -1.433 5.114 
INT3 -1.089 1.177 
INN1 -0.583 -0.107 
INN2 -0.523 -0.360 
INN3 -0.543 -0.295 
INN4 -0.201 -0.861 
RTK1 -0.312 -0.483 
RTK2 -0.921 0.589 
RTK3 -0.464 -0.446 
PRO1 -1.111 2.268 
PRO2 -0.441 0.084 
PRO3 -1.302 2.447 
ATC1 -0.622 -0.288 
ATC2 -1.093 1.853 
ATC3 -1.320 1.459 
CMT1 -1.066 1.461 
CMT2 -1.004 1.875 
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CMT3 -1.168 2.246 
CMT4 -1.071 0.588 
IVT1 -0.745 0.739 
IVT2 -0.707 0.528 
IVT3 -0.812 0.099 
PEO1 -1.127 1.321 
PEO2 -0.357 -0.572 
PEO3 -0.434 0.101 
PEO4 -1.387 2.973 
 
According to the guideline of Hair et al. (2016b), kurtosis and skewness values outside 
the range of ±1 indicate a non-normal data distribution. On the other hand, other 
researchers (Gravetter and Wallnau, 2014; Trochim and Donnelly, 2006; Field, 2009) 
argue that skewness and kurtosis values in the range between -2 and +2 are 
acceptable.  
Based on the kurtosis analysis, six items (POC2, INT2, PRO1, PRO3, CMT3 and PEO4) 
exceed the +2 threshold and indicate a positive skew that reflects a data shift to the 
left. Moreover, the skewness analysis showed that no values exceed the threshold ±2. 
Although the values of the data distribution analysis shown in Table 5.2 state that the 
data was not normally distributed, the values of the skewness and kurtosis values 
remain within an acceptable range. West et al. (1995) suggest that a skewness value > 
±2 and a kurtosis value > ±7 show symptoms of sever non-normality.   
According to Hair et al (2014) the size of a simple size has an impact on the normal 
distribution of the data. Additionally, a small sample size less than 200 could have 
effects of nonnormality on the data distribution. However, data distribution analysis 
showed no problematic issues of extreme non-normal distribution. Thus, a decision 
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was made to retain all construct items because they were no extreme effects of non-
normality on the distributed data. 
6.7. Common Method Bias  
According to Malhotra et al (2006), self-reported surveys are considered the most 
common data collection tool in information systems, psychology and organisational 
studies. However, data collection using a self-reported approach could be subject to 
common method bias (Podsakoff et al. 2003; Anderson and Agarwal, 2010). Thus, it 
was essential in this research to test the existence of common method bias.  
Common method bias is de
p.879). To test the possibility of common method bias in this study, two common 
method variance techniques were applied.  
The first technique, as suggested by Podsakoff et al. (2003) was to use -
factor test to evaluate the common method variance. This was conducted through an 
exploratory factor analysis for 11 factors. The result output showed that the first factor 
explains only 20.4% of the variance, which is below the threshold of 50%, suggesting 
there is no threat of significant bias. 
The second technique, as suggested by Lindell and Whitney (2001), was to use the 
marker variable technique. This was conducted using a marker variable that is not 
theoretically unrelated to the constructs of the model. The evaluation showed that the 
calculated variance accounted for only 4.84% that is below the threshold of 50%. These 
results indicate that there is no threat or concern regarding common method bias on 
collected data in this research.   
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6.8. Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) 
The previous sections of this chapter examined the data preparation to ensure that 
the collected data is suitable for multivariate analysis. This section, involves the 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) as multivariate statistical technique for validity. 
According to Hair et al. (2014) new research scales and even established scales 
adopted from previous research should be evaluated for validity. Factor analysis 
involves the correlation of a set of items to define highly intercorrelated items into a 
group (i.e. factor).  
EFA aims to analyse the underlying patterns of items and identify constructs 
consistent of variable groupings (Hair et al., 2016a).  However, it is necessary to have 
an appropriate sample in factor analysis to obtain effective results. According to Hair 
et al (2014) a sample size of 100 is an acceptable basis for conducting a factor analysis. 
Moreover, this research meets the minimum sample size requirement, with a study 
sample exceeding 100 observations (i.e. n=138). 
Before starting the factor analysis, the extraction and rotation methods should be 
decided upon. There are different rotations methods that simplify the illustration of 
the data structure. According to Hair et al (2014), there are no clear rules to choose a 
rotation method. Nevertheless, Varimax as an orthogonal rotation method is the most 
common rotation method used in factor analysis (Costello and Osborne, 2005). 
Moreover, there are several methods of factor extraction. Principle Component 
Analysis (PCA) is a frequently used method for factor extraction (Schmitt, 2011), but 
more importantly also, it is consistent with partial least squares (PLS) (Ifinedo, 2014). 
In addition, PCA is recommended in cases were data is not normally distributed 
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(Costello and Osborne, 2005). Therefore, PCA as a factor extraction method was found 
to be more appropriate for this research because of data distribution and its 
association with later analysis carried out using PLS-SEM.  
However, despite the above, Hair et al. (2014) note that if the research sittings involve 
more than 30 items and communalities above 0.60 for most items, than principle 
component analysis and other factor extraction methods yield similar results. In this 
research, the number of items is larger than 30, and communalities for all items exceed 
0.6; therefore, factor extraction methods will give similar results. In this study, there 
are more than 30 items with communality values above 0.6 exceeding the 0.5 cut-off 
(Hair et al, 2014).  
The factor analysis in this research was conducted using SPSS 24. The analysis was run 
using PCA as an extraction method and Varimax as a rotation method.  In addition, the 
number of factors that were defined are 12 factors since they were already known in 
this research through the number of constructs of the developed conceptual model. 
After assessing 43 items, only 33 items were included and after a couple of iterations, 
the final EFA loadings are shown in Table 6.3, which explains approximately 73.9% of 
the total variance. The significant loading threshold was based on Hair et al  (2014) 
guidelines for a factor loading of 0.50 or greater. In addition, only loadings above the 
cut-off value of 0.50 were shown in Table 6.3.   
The analysis showed five items with low loadings of below 0.5 (IVT3, REF4, CMT4, 
VUL4 and COS4) and one item with a cross loading exceeding 2.0 (PEO1). These items 
were drooped from further analysis. After the exclusion of these items, some CMT 
items showed cross-loading with INT. According to Hair et al (2014), when facing 
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problematic items, a deletion decision could be considered based on the overall 
contribution of the item and its communality value.  In addition, Hair et al (2014) note 
that interpreting factors involves subjective and objective judgment by the researcher. 
Therefore, a decision of deleting the CMT items was taken because INT had a higher 
contribution to this research.  
According to Hair et al (2014), cross-loading occurs when items are significantly 
loading on more than one factor and therefore assessed for possible deletion. 
However, the loading items of VUL and SEV are not considered as cross-loading, since 
items of both constructs loaded on the same factor.  Therefore, VUL and SEV items 
are associated with only one factor and a decision to retain the whole factor was taken.  
In addition, at the end of the factor analysis two constructs (i.e. IVT and COS) had only 
two item-factors. Although Hair et al (2014) recommended three items for a factor, 
still two item-factors are acceptable.  Also, the main benefit of summated scales is in 
overcoming measurement errors by not relying on a single item to measure a concept. 
Therefore, based on the above discussion, a decision was made to retain the two 
factors with two items.  
Table 6.3: Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Constructs Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Psychological 
Ownership 
POC1.    .839       
POC2.    .814       
POC3.    .819       
Reward 
REW1.  .781         
REW2.  .766         
REW3.  .754         
REW4.  .720         
REW5.  .747         
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Vulnerability 
 
 
VUL1. .661          
VUL2. .776          
VUL3. .823          
Severity 
 
 
SEV1. .795          
SEV2. .775          
SEV3. .741          
SEV4. .699          
Response 
Efficacy 
REF1.      .631     
REF2.      .883     
REF3.      .815     
Self-Efficacy 
 
 
SEF1.     .749      
SEF2.     .870      
SEF3.     .888      
Response 
Cost 
COS2.          .794 
COS3.          .820 
Security 
Behavioural 
Intentions 
INT1.   .698        
INT2.   .829        
INT3.   .780        
Attachment 
 
ATC1.       .804    
ATC2.       .652    
ATC3.       .734    
Involvement 
IVT1.         .774  
IVT2.         .808  
Personal 
norms 
 
PEO2.        .689   
PEO3.        .830   
PEO4.        .646   
 
Finally, assumptions in factor analysis were assessed to ensure they met the statistical 
requirements for an appropriate factor analysis. These were carried out by testing 
Kaiser-Mayer-Olkin 
(2014) a KMO value between 0.7 and 0.8 is considered a meritorious value. In addition, 
between items. 
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Thus, the results suggest that the items meet the statistical requirements for sufficient 
intercorrelation for an appropriate factor analysis.  
6.9. Summary 
This chapter examined the collected data as an essential step for multivariate analysis. 
This involved data screening for missing data, outliers and data distribution. In 
addition, assessment of statistical assumptions of multivariate techniques was 
conducted. Furthermore, validity analysis was conducted through an Exploratory 
Factor Analysis (EFA) using SPSS.  
Applying PCA with Varimax rotation for the exploratory factor analysis resulted in 10 
clear set of factor loadings. In addition, ducted and 
suggested that the data is appropriate for factor analysis.  
single-factor and common marker technique. Two tests assessing common method 
bias indicated no threat of significant bias in the research data.  
However, it is necessary to highlight some important aspects that resulted from factor 
loading. First, two constructs (i.e. VUL and SEV) loaded on one factor. This was not 
considered as a cross-loading, since the items of both constructs loaded significantly 
on only one factor. This could be because individuals perceive vulnerability and 
severity as one concept. However, the SEVandVUL factor loading showed that the 
combined two constructs are valid in terms of convergence and discrimination validity.  
Therefore, VUL and SEV are loading on one factor, and it was decided to retain the 
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factor and see in a later analysis if anything changes or if the items logically represent 
the construct.  
The second important aspect to highlight is that two constructs (i.e. INT and CMT) 
showed cross-loading of more than one item. Looking at both constructs and 
evaluating their communality in addition to their importance and contribution within 
this research, a deletion decision of the CMT construct was made.  
One possible explanation for this cross-loading could be that individuals perceive 
commitment and intention as a similar concept. Cohen and Levesque (1987) state that 
 choice (or goal) 
intention could be the reason that individuals might feel they are similar concepts.  
In the following chapter, PLS analysis is used to assess the measurement model and 
the structural model, and, thus test the research hypotheses. 
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Chapter 7 
7. Model Evaluation 
7.1. Introduction 
Having examined the collected data and conducted the exploratory factor analysis 
that yielded in a 10-factor model in Chapter 5, this chapter presents further advanced 
multivariate analysis using structural equation modeling (SEM). The analysis involved 
using partial least squares (PLS) method of structural equation modeling, employing a 
principle component-based approach.  
The core of this chapter begins with the assessment of the measurement model (also 
called outer model) followed up with the assessment of the structural model (also 
called inner model). The measurement model includes the constructs reliability and 
validity assessment.  Additionally, the structural model includes the hypotheses 
testing.  
To achieve the aim of this chapter, fist the PLS-SEM analysis method used is justified. 
A detailed discussion of why the PLS-SEM method was considered for this research is 
presented below. Afterwards, the initial assessment begins with the measurement 
model assessment than with the structural model assessment.  
7.2. Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) 
Linear regression is a first generation technique that has been applied by many 
researchers in different disciplines but suffers some limitations (Haenlein and Kaplan, 
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2004). SEM as a second-generation technique has been used to overcome first 
generation limitations. Structural equation modelling is a multivariate analysis 
technique that explains the relationship between multiple variables (Hair et al., 2016b; 
2014). In addition, SEM allows researchers to test theories and concepts (Hair et al., 
2012). Therefore, in this research SEM is used to test the research hypotheses for the 
developed conceptual model.  
SEM may be conducted using one of two methods: Covariance-Based SEM (CB-SEM) 
and Partial Least Squares SEM (PLS-SEM). According to Hair t al., (2016b) CB-SEM is 
usually used when the purpose of the analysis is to confirm theories. In contrast, PLS-
SEM is used in exploratory research when the purpose is to develop a theory. 
Moreover, PLS-SEM has recently been widely used in the field of information system 
research (Hair et al., 2017). 
PLS-SEM is a second-generation causal modelling statistical technique has been 
gaining increased popularity in recent years. According to Hair et al. (2016b) PLS-SEM 
is considered an efficient approach for small sample sizes and complex developed 
models (i.e. many constructs). Moreover, PLS-SEM is a well-suited approach for the 
type of research that involves exploratory models and theory development (Bulgurcu 
et al., 2010).   
The two SEM methods (i.e. CB-SEM and PLS-SEM) are based on different algorithms. 
The CB-SEM method is based only on common variance that requires model fit (i.e. 
goodness-of-fit). Therefore, it is only suitable for confirmatory research that is built on 
well-developed theories. In contrast, the PLS-SEM method is based on total variance 
and it is suitable for both confirmatory and exploratory research (Hair et al., 2017).   
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One of the main reasons for applying PLS-SEM is obtaining a mall sample size that can 
be regarded as the minimum sample size.  Moreover, using minimum sample sizes in 
PLS-SEM safeguards the analysis results and ensures robustness. This is because PLS-
SEM can achieve higher levels of statistical power with small sample sizes in 
comparison to CB-SEM (Hair et al., 2016b). On the other hand, a study by Boomsma 
and Hooglands (2001) states that CB-SEM requires large sample sizes to be able to 
achieve a robust parameter estimate. However, PLS-SEM is becoming a very 
commonly applied analysis method in the field of information systems (IS) (Hair et al., 
2017).  
Hair et al (2017) state the rules of thumb for choosing a SEM method. The main listed 
rules of applying PLS-SEM are: a complex research model (more than six constructs); 
a small sample size (n<200); and a non-normally distributed data. 
The discussion above states that PLS-SEM is a suitable method for this research. 
Therefore, PLS-SEM has been chosen as a multivariate analysis method for this 
research. The reasoning behind choosing PLS-SEM analysis method is its capability to 
accommodate the complexity of the conceptual model, which is composed of 10 
constructs, and because of its capability to function with small sample sizes less than 
200.  
The 10 times rule (Hair et al., 2016b) was adopted in this research to determine the 
minimum sample size required to conduct the PLS-SEM analysis. The maximum 
number of arrows that are pointing to a latent construct are 12. Therefore, the 10 times 
rule, 12 * 10 = 120 and the research observations collected (n=138) exceeded the 
minimum sample size to be suitable.   
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Moreover, guidelines by Hair et al (2017) for best practices in reporting PLS-SEM 
results in IS research is adopted in this research. In addition, (Ringle et al., 2015) was 
used in this research based on Hair et al (2017) recommendation that SmartPLS is a 
user-friendly software that is widely used for PLS-SEM analysis.   
7.3. The path model  
The PLS path model visualizes the research constructs, relationships and hypotheses. 
The elements of the PLS path modeling consist of two main elements: the 
measurement model and the structural model. The initial PLS path model created and 
estimated is displayed in Figure 7.1.  
 
Figure 7.1: The initial PLS path model  
To guide this evaluation and add structure to its analytical procedures, the guidelines 
for best PLS-SEM practice in information systems research by Hair et al. (2017) were 
employed. This process provided a systematic evaluation guideline for measurement 
models. Formally, the evaluation consists of the reflective measurement model and 
structural models. Therefore, through the following sections of this chapter, a detailed 
evaluation is carried out to assess the research PLS-SEM results.  
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7.4. Assessment of the Measurement Model 
To evaluate the two elements of the PLS path model (i.e. the outer and inner models), 
the assessment begins with the assessment. The aim 
by assessing convergent validity and discriminate validity, in addition to the evaluation 
of internal consistency reliability for the measurement scales. Thus, the following sub-
sections illustrate the assessment of the measurement model in detail. 
7.4.1. Internal consistency 
Reliability is determined through the assessment of the internal consistency reliability 
iability two types of internal 
consistency reliability are used to determine the level of reliability for the 
 
int
alpha has some limitations due to its sensitivity regarding the number of items. 
Therefore, it was more appropriate to apply an additional reliability measure method 
as recommended by Hair et al (2016b). Thus, composite reliability was used as a 
was assessed using composite reliability, and the constructs reliability assessment 
showed an acceptable level exceeding the threshold of 0.70 (Fornell and Larcker 1981) 
showed that all  above 0.6, which is an acceptable but with a 
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majority above 0.70. Table 7.1 i
composite reliability. 
Table 7.1: Internal consistency reliability  
Constructs Cronbach's Alpha Composite Reliability 
ATC 0.741 0.848 
COS 0.717 0.862 
INT 0.821 0.893 
IVT 0.638 0.845 
PEO 0.745 0.854 
POC 0.832 0.899 
REF 0.730 0.781 
REW 0.828 0.859 
SEF 0.678 0.861 
SEVandVUL 0.894 0.915 
 
 
above 0.70, except IVT and SEF that showed values above 0.60. Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that IVT and SEF each consist of only two items and according to 
Gliem and Gliem (2003) the increase of the alpha value is associated with the number 
of items. In addition, it is also important to note that composite reliability usually has 
process (Hair et al, 
2015).  
According to Hair et al (2016b) for exploratory research, such as this research, the 
values of the internal consistency reliability should be higher than 0.70. However, 
values between 0.60 and 0.70 are still considered acceptable for internal consistency 
reliability tests for all the model constructs yielded acceptable results that meet the 
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essential criteria for a reliable measurement scale. Therefore, the next step is to assess 
the validity of the PLS path model by examining the convergent and discriminate 
validity.   
7.4.2. Convergent Validity 
outer loadings are 
tested in addition to examining their average variance extracted (AVE) values.  
According to a rule of thumb for assessing outer loadings (Hair et al, 2017; Hire et al, 
2016b), the loading value should be above 0.70; however, values between 0.40 and 
0.70 can be considered acceptable if deleting the item does not increase composite 
reliability and AVE above the threshold values. In addition, AVE values should be all 
above the threshold of 0.50 (Hire et al, 2017; Fornell and Larcker 1981).   
One of the issues that occurred during the convergent evaluation was a low AVE 
(0.139) for SEF. In addition, SEF1 had a negative loading value of -0.444 in the outer 
loading test. If this negative value appeared during the EFA evaluation it would have 
been assumed that the item was reverse-scored, however this was not the case. 
According to Hair et al (2017) a low value below 0.40 should be deleted from the 
to 0.756, which is above the threshold.  
The convergent evaluation should have a low AVE value below the threshold for SEF 
(0.139). In addition, the evaluation should a negative value for the outer loading test 
for the SEF1 item (-0.444). If this negative value appeared during the EFA evaluation it 
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could have been a sign that the item was reverse-scored, however this was not the 
case here. According to Hair et al. (2017) a low loading value below 0.40 should be 
deleted from the construct. Therefore, after deleting SEF1 
showed an increase to 0.756 that is above the threshold. In addition, all items of the 
construct items showed a loading value above 0.70 except REF3, REW1, REW5, VUL1 
and VUL4 that had a loading value between 0.40 and 0.70 with the majority above 
0.60. These loading values were considered acceptable, since deleting them had no 
significant impact on the reliability of the constructs and AVE values. Table 7.2 
illustrates the outer loadings for the model constructs.   
Table 7.2: The PLS path model outer loadings  
 ATC COS INT IVT PEO POC REF REW SEF 
SEVan
dVUL 
ATC1 0.761          
ATC2 0.742          
ATC3 0.909          
COS2  0.957         
COS3  0.776         
INT1   0.837        
INT2   0.843        
INT3   0.893        
IVT1    0.887       
IVT2    0.823       
PEO2     0.831      
PEO3     0.769      
PEO4     0.838      
POC1      0.917     
POC2      0.840     
POC3      0.834     
REF1       0.962    
REF2       0.725    
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REF3       0.479    
REW1        0.615   
REW2        0.723   
REW3        0.847   
REW4        0.659   
REW5        0.843   
SEF1         0.874  
SEF3         0.865  
SEV1          0.760 
SEV2          0.837 
SEV3          0.857 
SEV4          0.839 
VUL1          0.687 
VUL2          0.659 
VUL3          0.795 
 
In addition, the convergent validity assessed using AVE showed that all values of all 
the constructs are above the cut-off of 0.50. This means that the constructs explain 
more than 50% of the variance of its items. Table 7.3 illustrates the AVEs of the 
constructs.  Overall, the convergent assessment results illustrate a strong convergent 
validity.  
Table 7.3  
Constructs Average Variance Extracted (AVE) 
ATC 0.652 
COS 0.759 
INT 0.736 
IVT 0.732 
PEO 0.661 
POC 0.747 
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REF 0.560 
REW 0.553 
SEF 0.756 
SEVandVUL 0.608 
 
7.4.3. Discriminate Validity  
other constructs by empirical sta
measurement model in terms of discriminate validity, three criteria are applied: the 
Fornell-Larcker criterion, cross-loading and the Heterotrait-Monotrait ratio of 
correlations (HTMT).  
The first test examines the cross-loadings of the measurement items. In this test, 
discriminant validity 
specific construct is greater than any of its cross-loadings on other constructs.  The 
cross-loading results (see Appendix C) show that the outer loadings for all items 
exceed their cross-lodgings. These results demonstrate high discriminant validity for 
the tested model.  
The second test to evaluate discriminate validity is the Fornell-Larcker criterion. The 
rule of thumb 
being greater than the constructs value of variance associated between the construct 
and other constructs in the model. Table 7.4 illustrates that all the square roots of 
every constru an the correlation. 
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Table 7.4: Fornell-Larcker criterion analysis 
 ATC COS INT IVT PEO POC REF REW SEF 
SEVan
dVUL 
ATC 0.807          
COS -0.129 0.871         
INT 0.333 -0.284 0.858        
IVT 0.378 -0.147 0.314 0.856       
PEO 0.368 -0.190 0.440 0.309 0.813      
POC 0.169 -0.140 0.355 0.179 0.295 0.864     
REF 0.159 -0.043 0.279 -0.010 0.087 0.127 0.749    
REW -0.226 0.373 -0.174 -0.071 -0.243 -0.119 -0.172 0.743   
SEF -0.145 0.083 0.030 0.033 0.034 0.000 0.019 0.041 0.870  
SEVan
dVUL 
0.379 -0.054 0.429 0.157 0.325 0.347 0.218 -0.015 -0.117 0.780 
 
The third test for discriminant validity involves the examination of HTMT ratio 
correlations. According to Hair et al. (2017) HTMT values should be less than the cut-
off of 0.85. Table 7.5 shows that all HTMT values are below 0.85. Furthermore, running 
a bootstrap confidence interval assessment showed that both confidence intervals (i.e. 
90% and 10%) for each construct does not include the value 1 (see Appendix D). Based 
for this model. Hence, the above analysis ensure that the discriminate validity of the 
constructs has been established for this model.  
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Table 7.5: HTMT criterion analysis 
 ATC COS INT IVT PEO POC REF REW SEF 
SEVan
dVUL 
ATC 
          
COS 0.173 
         
INT 0.395 0.335 
        
IVT 0.563 0.211 0.431 
       
PEO 0.498 0.236 0.554 0.444 
      
POC 0.196 0.150 0.415 0.250 0.364 
     
REF 0.168 0.121 0.235 0.161 0.111 0.139 
    
REW 0.288 0.496 0.173 0.135 0.316 0.155 0.198 
   
SEF 0.198 0.108 0.099 0.133 0.134 0.097 0.106 0.100 
  
SEVan
dVUL 
0.447 0.118 0.454 0.194 0.382 0.393 0.225 0.100 0.174 
 
 
The measurement model evaluation showed that the measures represent the 
conceptual model constructs, and therefore ensure adequacy. Furthermore, following 
the PLS-SEM assessment, the second step of the assessment process is followed up 
with the structural model assessment.  
7.5. Assessment of the Structural Model 
After ensuring the adequacy of the measurement model, the structural model is 
evaluated as the second part of PLS analysis. The aim of the structural model 
evaluation is to examine the of the 
relationships between the model constructs (Hair et al, 2016b). The criteria used to 
assess the structural model are: the coefficient of determination (𝑅2), predictive 
relevance (𝑄2) effect size and 𝑓2 effect size. 
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One of the main differences between CB-SEM and PLS-SEM, is that the later does not 
need to be confirmed with goodness-of-fit (GoF) metrics, it is only confirmed with 
reliability and validity metrics (Hire et al., 2017). This is based PLS-SEM is based on 
conversances and therefore does not require a model fit measure. However, Hair et al 
(2016b) note that current researchers are developing model fit measures in PLS-SEM, 
but they are still in a very early stage of development. Hence, a decision was made not 
to assess the PLS path model using a GoF metric.  
7.5.1. Path coefficients  
The examination of the path coefficient ( ) starts by running the SmartPLS 3.0 to 
obtain the estimates of the structural model relationships. The significance of the 
coefficient is measured through computing the t-values and the p values for the 
-values should be above a defined critical value to 
estimate the significance of the coefficients.   
For interpreting the significance of the path coefficients, the critical value may be 
determined based on using a one-tailed or two-tailed tests. Ultimately, the difference 
between the two types of tests (i.e. one or two tails) is based on the hypotheses ability 
to predict the direction of the relationship (i.e. positive or negative). A one-tailed test 
is used when the hypothesised directional relationship is determined, and is either 
positive of negative. In contrast, a two-tailed test is used when the direction of the 
relationship is not determined (Hair et al., 2016a; Hair et al., 2016b).  Table 7.6 illustrates 
the critical values for one and two tailed tests (Hair et al., 2016a, p.395).  
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Table 7.6: One-tailed and two tailed tests adopted from (Hair et al., 2016a; Hair et al., 2016b) 
Level of 
confidence 
(1  α) 
Significance Level (
α) 
Two-tailed critical 
value 
One-tailed critical 
value 
90% 10% 1.645 1.28 
95% 5% 1.96 1.645 
99% 1% 2.575 2.33 
 
According to Hair et al. (2016b), researchers mostly choose a significance level of 5%, 
while a 1% significance level is still considered by conservative researchers in some 
fields of research. Additionally, in studies that have an exploratory nature, 10% 
significance level is acceptable.   
In this research, all the hypotheses have directional relationships, and are defined as 
positive. Moreover, this research is considered an exploratory, given the research 
objectives and research context. Hence, a one-tailed test is used to evaluate the 
significance level of the research hypotheses.   
Bootstrapping in PLS-SEM is used to assess the significance level of the path 
coefficients.  The bootstrapping metrics for SmartPLS 3.0 settings were based on the 
best practices recommended by Hair et al. (2017). These included setting the number 
of bootstrap samples to 5,000 and setting the size of the bootstrap samples to the 
number of observations in the research.  Table 7.7 illustrates the path coefficients 
obtained from the analysis. 
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Table 7.7: The path coefficient results  
 Path Path Coefficient ( ) 
ATC  INT 0.052 
COS  INT -0.189 
IVT  INT 0.142 
PEO  INT 0.214 
POC  INT 0.130 
REF  INT 0.181 
REW  INT 0.018 
SEF  INT 0.064 
SEVandVUL  INT 0.230 
 
7.5.2. Coefficient of determination (𝑅2)  
The square of the correlation coefficient results in the coefficient of determination 
(𝑅2) that is commonly used to in evaluating the structural model (Hair et al., 2016b). 
Falk and Miller (1992) recommended that the value of 𝑅2 should not be less than 0.10 
as a minimum accepted value. Moreover, Chin (1998) suggests that 𝑅2 value of 0.67, 
0.33 and 0.19 in PLS-SEM for a dependent variable can be respectively substantial, 
moderate and week. In addition, R2 ranges from 0.00 to 1.00. and explains the level of 
variation of one construct by the other. In this research, the R2 value for the 
behavioural intention construct is 0.40, describing a moderate effect.   
7.5.3. 𝑓2 effect size  
The third metric for assessing the structural model is the 𝑓2 effect size. According to 
Sullivan and Fein (2012), although the p value can indicate the existence of an effect, 
141 
 
this does not indicate the size of the effect. Therefore, the 𝑓2 effect size metric is 
essential for an adequate analysis.  
Hair et (2017) recommended Chin (1998) guidelines that state that the 𝑓2 value for 
0.02, 0.15 and 0.35 respectively indicate a small, medium and large effect size. 
Moreover, less than the value of 0.02 for f2 shows no effect size. Table 7.8 shows the 
𝑓2 effect size with three with no effect (ATC, REW and SEF) while the other represent 
a small effect.  
Table 7.8: 𝑓2 effect size 
Construct INT Effect size 
ATC 0.003 No effect size 
COS 0.050 Small effect size 
IVT 0.027 Small effect size 
PEO 0.056 Small effect size 
POC 0.023 Small effect size 
REF 0.050 Small effect size 
REW 0.000 No effect size 
SEF 0.007 No effect size 
SEVandVUL 0.063 Small effect size 
 
7.5.4. Predictive relevance (𝑄2)  
Predictive relevance 𝑄2 is used to assess the predictive capability of a structural model 
in PLS through the blindfolding procedure (Hair et al., 201b). Table 7.9 shows that the 
𝑄2 
et al, 2016b). This indicates that the structural model has predictive relevance for INT 
as a dependent construct.  
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Table 7.9:  𝑄2 effect size 
 Construct SSO SSE Q² (=1-SSE/SSO) 
ATC 414.000 414.000  
COS 276.000 276.000  
INT 414.000 313.875 0.242 
IVT 276.000 276.000  
PEO 414.000 414.000  
POC 414.000 414.000  
REF 414.000 414.000  
REW 690.000 690.000  
SEF 276.000 276.000  
SEVandVUL 966.000 966.000  
 
7.6. Hypothesis Testing 
The results of the multivariate data analysis show that the final path model consists of 
10 reflectively measured constructs: Behavioral Intentions (INT); Perceived Severity 
and Perceived Vulnerability (SEVandVUL); Reward (REW); Response Efficacy (REF); 
Self-Efficacy Response(SEF) Cost (COS) Psychological Ownership (POC) Attachment 
(ATC) Involvement (IVT) and Personal Norms (POE). Table 7.10 presents the results of 
the hypotheses testing that includes the path coefficient ( ), t values and p values. All 
research hypotheses were found to be positively significant p < 0.05 (t= 1.645) except 
H3, H5, H7 and H8.  Moreover, all insignificant hypotheses have a low path coefficient 
(<100). The evaluation of the research hypotheses will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
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Table 7.10: Results of the hypotheses testing  
Hypothesis 
Hypothesise
d Path 
Path 
Coefficient 
( ) 
T Values P Values Significance 
H1 SEVandVUL 
 INT 
0.230 2.656 0.004 Supported 
H2 
H3 REW  INT 0.018 0.166 0.434 
Not 
Supported 
H4 REF  INT 0.181 2.299 0.011 Supported 
H5 SEF  INT 0.064 0.802 0.211 
Not 
Supported 
H6 COS  INT -0.189 2.405 0.008 Supported 
H7 POC  INT 0.130 1.480 0.070 
Not 
Supported 
H8 ATC  INT 0.052 0.542 0.294 
Not 
Supported 
H9 CMT INT 
 
Dropped from the study 
H10 IVT  INT 0.142 1.765 0.039 Supported 
H11 PEO  INT 0.214 2.541 0.006 Supported 
 
7.7. Summary  
The research conceptual model has been analysed using partial least squares (PLS) by 
applying SmartPLS 3.0 (Ringle et al, 2005). The research used the PLS-SEM method 
rather than the CB-SEM method, because of its ability to analysis complex models and 
small sample sizes (Hair et al, 2016b). Furthermore, the PLS-SEM method is more 
suitable for exploratory research (Hair et al, 2017).  
The evaluation of the PLS path model was based on recommendations by Hair et al 
(2017) for applying PLS-SEM in the field of IS research. The results of the PLS path 
model analysis demonstrate that the research conceptual model meets the rigorous 
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criteria expected for IS research (Hair et al, 2017). The empirical results of the 
measurement and structural model analysis are summarised in Table 7.11 and are 
illustrated in the final research model in Figure 7.2. In the next chapter, the evaluation 
of the results is presented and finally, the research conclusions are drawn. 
Table 7.11: Summary for the measurement and structural models 
Construct Items 
Internal Consistency 
Reliability 
Convergent 
Validity 
Discriminant Validity 
s Alpha 
Composite 
Reliability 
Outer 
Loadings 
AVE 
cross-
loading 
Fornell-
Larcker 
criterio
n 
HTMT 
>0.60 >0.70 >0.70 >0.50 
Low 
cross-
loadings 
<0.85 CI 1 
POC 
POC1 
0.832 0.899 
0.917 
0.747 Yes 0.864 Yes POC2 0.840 
POC3 0.834 
ATC 
ATC1 
0.741 0.848 
0.761 
0.652 Yes 0.807 Yes ATC2 0.742 
ATC3 0.909 
COS 
COS2 
0.717 0.862 
0.957 
0.759 Yes 0.871 Yes 
COS3 0.776 
INT 
INT1 
0.821 0.893 
0.837 
0.736 
 
Yes 0.858 Yes INT2 0.843 
INT3 0.893 
IVT 
IVT1 
0.638 0.845 
0.887 
0.732 Yes 0.856 Yes 
IVT2 0.823 
PEO 
PEO2 
0.745 0.854 
0.831 
0.661 
 
Yes 
0.813 
 
Yes PEO3 0.769 
PEO4 0.838 
REF 
REF1 
0.730 0.781 
0.962 
0.560 
 
Yes 0.749 Yes REF2 0.725 
REF3 0.479 
REW 
REW1 
0.828 0.859 
0.615 
0.553 Yes 
0.743 
 
 
Yes 
REW2 0.723 
REW3 0.847 
REW4 0.659 
REW5 0.843 
SEF 
SEF1 
0.678 0.861 
0.874 
0.756 Yes 0.870 Yes 
SEF3 0.865 
SEV&SEV 
SEV1 
0.894 0.915 
0.760 
0.608 Yes 0.780 Yes 
SEV2 0.837 
SEV3 0.857 
SEV4 0.839 
VUL1 0.687 
VUL2 0.659 
VUL3 0.795 
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Figure 7.2: The final research model 
Note: * significant at P<0.10 level; ** significant at P<0.05 level; *** significant at P<0.01 level 
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Chapter 8 
8. Discussion & Conclusion 
8.1. Introduction 
Today, cyber security is becoming one of the biggest concerns to survival in the digital 
economy. This is true in well secured business units within a corporate and also in new 
business units. Moreover, open innovation has made it more difficult for corporates to 
secure their cyber boundaries. It was already difficult for corporates to protect and 
secure their information assets when they had closed doors, with open innovation 
opening the doors for external ideas making cyber security a bigger challenge. Hence, 
this leads to an extended surface of cyber threats that could 
competitiveness.  
Furthermore, Rowe (2016) states that trade secrets in the digital economy are 
This 
makes trade secrets a potentially valuable intangible asset, and creates a need for more 
effective technology mechanisms to perform better protection for trade secrets.  
However, cyber security is not only a technology aspect, nor a management aspect, 
but a human issue. This requires addressing human behaviours in corporate venturing 
beyond just the engagement of people with technology and police compliance to 
improve the protective cyber security actions performed by entrepreneurs. 
Cyber security exists in large corporates and in many cases, incorporating the state of 
the art in cyber security technologies. However, the issue is that the cyber security 
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aspects for such different type of users such as entrepreneurs in a new dynamic 
environment, such as a corporate accelerator within a corporation, is considered as a 
new challenge that entitles a different set of cyber risks.  
But the question is how can entrepreneurs creating a new venture within a corporate 
venturing unit be influenced to perform positive cyber security protective actions? 
This requires an understanding of the cognitive, social and psychological aspects that 
could influence entrepreneurs in performing protective cyber security behaviours.   
To support the protection of trade secrets within corporate accelerators, there is a 
need to understand the factors that drive entrepreneurs to protect trade secrets. In 
addition, it is essential to be able to design the appropriate security countermeasures 
to enhance the protection and mitigate the risks.  
This research was conducted in the cyber security behaviour domain, and more 
specifically on the human factor aspect of cyber security for trade secret protection. 
The aim of this research was to explore the impact of protecting trade secrets as a 
competitive advantage for new ventures within a corporate venturing context. 
Furthermore, this research targeted entrepreneurs as the main subject of study, who 
are establishing new ventures within corporate accelerators.  
The systematic literature review in Chapter 3 showed that there is a lack of research in 
the cyber security behaviour domain in respect of intellectual property protection, and 
more specifically, trade secret protection. In addition, the reviewed literature showed 
no studies targeting entrepreneurs as the main subject of research. Furthermore, most 
of the literature focused on traditional organizational environments, with only a few 
studies focusing on non-work environments such as homes.  
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As illustrated in Figure 8.1, the focus of this research was based on the protection of 
the core dimensions of trade secrets: information, intellectual property and secrets. 
Building on this focus, a conceptual model was developed in Chapter 4 to investigate 
the trade secret protection in respect of confidentiality, ownership and secrecy. The 
theoretical foundation of the conceptual model was built using the theories of 
protection motivation, psychological ownership and social bonding. 
 
Figure 8.1 core dimensions, protection aspects and applied model theories 
Having completed the evaluation of the conceptual model in Chapter 7, this chapter 
takes a further step by illustrating and discussing the key research findings. This 
includes evaluating the conceptual model in addition to the hypothesis testing results.  
More specifically, this chapter aims to discuss the key research findings based on the 
analysis of the measurement and structural model. The discussion is organised around 
the protection aspects of trade secrets that structured the development of the 
conceptual model. Additionally, this includes discussing the hypothesis testing and the 
secrets. 
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Finally, this chapter ends the thesis by presenting the research conclusions. This 
includes describing how the research objectives have been meet in this research. Also, 
the chapter reports the contributions made to the research discipline and the practical 
limitations of the research.  
8.2. Key Findings 
The key findings of this research are discussed on the bases of the trade secret 
protection aspects of confidentiality, ownership and secrecy. Moreover, these three 
protection aspects have driven the development of the conceptual model by 
integrating protection motivation, psychological ownership and social bonding, as 
discussed in Chapter 4.  
The key findings discussion is based on the hypothesis testing of the final research 
model, illustrated in Figure 7.2. This starts by discussing the key findings associated 
with the results of exploring the confidentiality protection of trade secrets. Next, the 
discussion moves to discussing the findings obtained from exploring the ownership 
protection of trade secrets as. Finally, the discussion ends by discussing the findings 
from exploring the secrecy protection of trade secrets.  
8.2.1. Discussion of Results Related to Confidentiality Protection  
8.2.1.1. Protection Motivation 
The conceptual model integrated two appraisals of the protection motivation theory: 
threat appraisal and coping appraisal. The threat and coping appraisals aim to explore 
the factors that drive entrepreneurs to perform protective security actions to protect 
the confidentiality of trade secrets.   
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The threat evaluation part consists of three constructs that form the threat appraisal: 
severity, vulnerability and rewards. On the other hand, the coping appraisal consists 
of three constructs: response efficacy, self-efficacy and costs.  
It is important to note that the analysis of validity in the exploratory factor analysis 
resulted in both the severity and vulnerability items in the threat appraisal to load on 
the same factor. According to Witte (1992) threat is perceived as two components: 
severity and vulnerability. In addition, a meta-analysis by Witte and Allen (2000) 
showed that some studies using PMT have demonstrated trough factor analysis, 
whereby severity and vulnerability are combined into a single factor called threat. 
Nevertheless, the combined SEVandVUL items loading showed that the combined two 
threat constructs are valid in terms of convergence and discrimination validity. It could 
thus be interpreted that entrepreneurs perceived severity and vulnerability as one 
concept.   
The research results show that threat has a significant positive relationship with 
230 P<0.004), 
which supports H1 and H2. This shows that entrepreneurs that perceive that they are 
vulnerable to cyber threats, are more likely to perform protective security actions in 
response to cyber threats. 
The research results show that response efficacy to have a significant positive 
=0.181 P<0.011), which supports H4. This shows that entrepreneurs with positive 
perception of response efficacy are more likely to have a coping response in the 
protection of trade secrets.  
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The research results show that response costs to have a significant positive 
=0.189 P<0.008), which supports H6. This shows that entrepreneurs that perceive costs 
associated with a security responses as insignificant are more likely to engage in the 
protection of trade secrets.  
The threat construct (i.e. SEVandVUL) showed a stronger association to the security 
behavioural intentions than did the coping factors (i.e. response efficacy and costs).  
On the other hand, self-efficacy and rewards did not show any significant value, and 
therefore are not supported.  
The findings showed that entrepreneurs faced with a cyber threat first assess the 
threat, then assess the effectiveness of performing a protective security response and 
the associated costs to performing that protective security action. The findings also 
suggests that entrepreneurs perceive cyber threat as one concept of threat. This 
means that entrepreneurs do not differentiate between the magnitude of a threat and 
the probability of its occurrence when faced with a cyber threat. This shows that 
entrepreneurs evaluate threat differently from how employees evaluate threat, based 
on more than on element of threat.    
On the other hand, the findings suggest that positive coping response depend on 
entrepreneurs believes that taking protective security actions will be effective. In 
addition, coping also depends on the costs of taking these protective actions that they 
do not overweigh the benefits of performing a protective coping behaviour. Thus, 
response cost suggests that entrepreneurs will not take protective security actions 
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required to protect trade secrets if it is associated with high cost (e.g. time, money, 
complexity, inconvenience and effort).  
One explanation could be that entrepreneurs creating a new venture focus on building 
their business value propositions which requires a lot of resources (e.g. time, effort and 
money). Therefore, they might result in less attention given to performing protective 
security actions to protect trade secrets.   
Moreover, a possible reasoning is that response cost is perceived as an overhead in 
terms of time consumption. Generally, entrepreneurs would have about three months 
to work on building and validating their product/service in a corporate accelerator. 
Therefore, if entrepreneurs perceive the cost to be high, this might decrease the 
likelihood of them performing security protective actions to protect their trade 
secrets.  
The findings confirm the significant relationship between threat (i.e. severity and 
vulnerability) and cyber security behavioural intention. They also confirm the 
significant relationship between response efficacy and response costs with cyber 
security behavioural intention. Thus, the findings suggest that when entrepreneurs 
perceive that they are vulnerable to cyber threats, are more likely to perform 
protective security actions in response to cyber threats, as long as the entrepreneurs 
perceive the response effective and the costs associated with the security responses 
are insignificant. 
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8.2.2. Discussion of Results Related to Ownership Protection  
8.2.2.1. Psychological Ownership 
Based on the concept of psychological ownership, the research conceptual model was 
developed with the idea that entrepreneurs who are creating new ventures and hold 
strong feelings of psychological ownership about trade secrets are likely to perform 
protective security actions to protect these trade secrets.  The aim of using 
psychological ownership is to investigate its impact on influencing entrepreneurs that 
own trade secrets to perform protective cyber security actions to protect the 
ownership of trade secrets during the establishment of a new venture.  
This research differs from previous research of psychological ownership because of its 
emphasis on possession of trade secrets as a unique driver of performing protective 
security actions. In addition, this research looks at the possession of intangible objects 
(i.e. trade secrets) that are based on the absence of legal ownership.  
The research results show that psychological ownership has no significant positive 
=0.130 P<0.070), which does not support H7. According to Nuttin (1987), individuals 
with a sense of ownership toward an object are more likely to perform a positive 
attitude towards that object. Thus, the significant result of psychological ownership 
does not show that entrepreneurs are wailing to protect the ownership of trade secrets 
when they have a possession felling that they own these trade secrets. Therefore, 
psychological ownership is not viewed as a protection construct that provides an 
understanding of ownership protection and cyber security behaviour.  
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The research did not confirm the value of psychological ownership for protecting the 
ownership of trade secrets by entrepreneurs with feelings of possession towards trade 
secrets in a dynamic environment. Generally, the research findings are important, 
because they show that psychological ownership for trade secrets has no positive 
  
8.2.3. Discussion of Results Related to Secrecy Protection 
8.2.3.1. Social Bonding 
The conceptual model included the integration of social bond elements: involvement, 
attachment, commitment and personal norms. The social bonding elements aim to 
explore the factors that have a positive effect on entrepreneurs to perform protective 
security actions to protect the secrecy of trade secrets.   
It is important to note that the validity analysis in the exploratory factor analysis 
resulted in the commitment to construct cross-loading with behavioural intentions. 
Therefore, a decision was made to drop the commitment construct from further model 
analysis. The reason for the cross loading of commitment and intentions could be that 
entrepreneurs perceive commitment and intentions as one concept. This is because 
commitment is described as an essential part of intentions (Cohen and Levesque, 
1987). 
Usually in previous cyber security behaviour research, social bonding was used to 
describe how individuals with strong social ties would not attempt to an action that 
would cause a security risk by complying with cyber security policies. However, in this 
study, social bonding was used to explore social ties in influencing entrepreneurs to 
perform actions to protect the secrecy of trade secrets form a security risk. Therefore, 
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the use of social bonding is to influence cyber security actions to increase the secrecy 
protection of trade secrets.   
The research results show that involvement has a significant positive relationship with 
 behavioural intentions to protect trade secrets ( 142 P<0.039), 
which supports H10. This shows that entrepreneurs tend to be more bonded with team 
secrets.  
The research results show that personal norms have a significant positive relationship 
214 P<0.006), 
which supports H11. This shows that entrepreneurs with appropriate personal values 
are more likely to engage in the protection of trade secrets. In addition, personal 
beliefs towards protection of trade secrets have a larger effect than involvement.  
Therefore, the research findings confirm that entrepreneurs who possess strong bonds 
with team members will more likely perform protective security actions to protect the 
secrecy of trade secrets. Additionally, the research findings also confirm that 
entrepreneurs who have strong personal beliefs towards protecting trade secrets are 
more likely perform protective security actions to protect the secrecy of trade secrets. 
Thus, the research findings revealed that social bonding in terms of involvement and 
personal norms has a significant effect on entrepreneurs to protect the secrecy of 
trade secrets.  
8.3. Meeting Research Objectives 
In accomplishing any research, one of the most important aspects is meeting the 
research objectives. The research objectives for this thesis were defined in Chapter 1. 
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This section below describes how the research objectives were achieved to answer the 
research questions.  
• Research Objective No. 1 
To extend the existing body of knowledge, a systematic literature review was 
conducted in the field of cyber security behaviour to obtain insights and build an 
understanding of behavioural concepts and theories. This review adopted a rigorous 
structured approach to conducting the literature search process and analysis. This 
review included relevant publications in top academic journals in the field of cyber 
security behaviour. The output of the literature review resulted in valuable findings 
and insights. This included a comprehensive overview of the cyber security behaviour 
literature for the last decade. In addition, the chapter produced a concept matrix for 
the key cyber security theories in the literature. Furthermore, a concept matrix was 
produced to illustrate the analysis of the cyber security behaviour elements. Also, a 
concept map was developed to visualise these cyber security behaviour elements.  
 
• Research Objective No. 2 
This objective is to develop the research conceptual model for investigating the 
protection of trade secrets in a cyber security context. The concept that structured the 
conceptualisation of the research model was based on taking advantage of trade 
dimensions to define their protection aspects. This involved developing a 
conceptual model that focused on confidentiality, ownership and secrecy protection. 
The conceptual model was theoretically constructed based on three theories: 
protection motivation, psychological ownership and social bonding. In addition, the 
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underlying constructs of the conceptual model were identified and discussed.  Also, 
the hypotheses representing the relationships between the model constructs were 
developed. 
• Research Objective No. 3 
To be able to achieve the remaining research objectives, a research design was 
developed for collecting the empirical research data. The research adopted a 
quantitative research method based on a deductive reasoning approach. The data 
collection method was based on an online questionnaire. In addition, a sampling 
process was conducted to obtain a reprehensive sample. A nonprobability sampling 
select an appropriate sample size. 
• Research Objective No. 4 
The research instrument was developed to support the research hypotheses testing. 
The instruments were adopted and developed based on previously valeted scales in 
the field of cyber security behaviour. This was followed up with a pre-test involving a 
group of researchers to make sure that the wording of the survey instrument was clear. 
In addition, a reliability analysis was conducted to investigate internal consistency of 
 and an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was conducted 
using SPSS for validation.  
• Research Objective No. 5 
To perform a multivariate analysis, an assessment was conducted to prepare the 
quantitative data for analysis. This involved the identification of any issues related to 
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the collected empirical data, such as missing data, outliers and data distribution. In 
addition, the assumptions of multivariate analysis were evaluated and common 
method bias was tested. 
• Research Objective No. 6 
The captured demographic information from the collected data were analysed. 
Descriptive statistics were used to understand the descriptive nature of the collected 
data through a frequency distribution examination. This included and illustration of 
graphics and charts to easily describe the descriptive statistics and demographic 
characteristic.  
• Research Objective No. 7 
The validity and reliability analysis of the measurement model was conducted. This 
included the assessment of the measurement model in terms of convergent validity 
and discriminate validity, in addition to the evaluation of internal consistency 
reliability for the measurement scales. The SmartPLS application was used for the PLS-
SEM analysis. 
 
• Research Objective No. 8 
The evaluation of the structural model was conducted through PLS-SEM analysis. The 
analysis involved the examination of the model
significance of the hypothesized relationships between the model constructs. A 
number of criteria were used to assess the structural model: the coefficient of 
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determination (𝑅2), predictive relevance (𝑄2) effect size, 𝑓2 effect size and 𝑞2effect 
size.  
• Research Objective No. 9 
The final research model for cyber security protection of trade secrets was defined. 
The factors that showed significant impact on the cyber security behaviour were 
identified. This was shown at the end of chapter 7 (see Figure 7.2.)  
• Research Objective No. 10 
Based on achieving the previous nine objectives, this objective was also achieved 
within this chapter. This involved presenting the key research findings and draw the 
research conclusions and present future research.  
8.4. Research Contributions 
This research makes several important contributions to the cyber security behaviour 
research domain by exploring new cyber security behaviour elements. In addition, this 
research has taken a first step toward a greater understanding of an essential cyber 
contributions are described below: 
1- Conducted an up to date systematic literature review in cyber security 
behaviour: 
This research conducted an up to date systematic literature review in cyber security 
behaviour. The review adopted a structured approach to identify the relevant literature 
and also the guidelines on rigorous literature. The analysis of this review presented 
new findings and insights that resulted in the development of a concept matrix 
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illustrating the major cyber security behavior theories. In addition, based on the review 
output, a concept map and matrix were developed that illustrated the cyber security 
behavior elements. 
2- Targeted entrepreneurs as new subjects of study in the cyber security 
behavioural domain:  
This research is the first to study cyber security behaviour for entrepreneurs based on 
the identified related studies from the systematic literature review. Although a 
considerable growing body of research has been made in the cyber security behaviour 
research fills part of the knowledge gap in understanding the behaviour of 
entrepreneurs in the context of cyber security.  
3- Investigated a dynamic environment as a new context in the cyber security 
behavioural domain:  
From a context perspective, previous studies have limited their focus to cyber security 
in traditional work environments that have well defined and mature information 
security countermeasures. Therefore, they do not  explore other new work 
environments that are more dynamic and do not have well defined and established 
cyber security countermeasures. This research explores a new context that is 
considered as an agile dynamic environment for innovation and creating new ventures. 
4- Investigated trade secrets as a new intangible target in the cyber security 
behavioural domain:  
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From a target perspective, previous studies focused on tangible and intangible items 
as main targets of cyber security behaviour.  However, in regards to studies focusing 
on intangibility as a behaviour target, most of these studies address security 
compliance behaviours of polices. In contrast, fewer studies gave attention to 
intangible assets such as information. This research focuses on trade secrets as a 
behavioural target for cyber security behaviour.   
5- Developed a new comprehensive approach to explore cyber security 
protection of trade secrets:  
This research developed a novel approach of exploring the intangible nature of trade 
secret protection in the context of cyber security. The foundation of this approach is 
based on the three dimensions of trade secrets: information, intellectual property and 
secrets.  The protection of these dimensions was through three protection lenses: 
confidentiality of information, ownership of intellectual property and the secrecy of 
commercial secrets. Thus, this research takes a new approach to exploring the cyber 
security behaviour protection of trade secrets.  
6- Developed a new conceptual model for trade secret protection in the cyber 
security behavioural domain: 
This research developed a conceptual model that extends the existing academic 
literature in the field of cyber security behaviour research. Although several 
behavioural theories and models have been applied in previous studies to the cyber 
security context (Johnston et al., 2015; Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Boss et al., 2015; 
Ifinedo, 2012; Herath & Rao, 2009; Posey et al., 2015; Safa et al., 2015), this research 
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extends the extent work in three new important behaviour elements, as illustrated in 
Figure 8.3. 
 
Figure 8.2:  Illustration of new cyber security behaviour elements 
8.5. Research Limitations 
Like any research, this research has a number of limitations and issues that are 
acknowledge in this section. The limitations of this research are as follows: 
• Time limitation was the main issue in this research, where following procedures, 
gaining access to participants for data collection required a huge amount of time.  
• Only top journals in cyber security behaviour were used in the systematic literature 
review, which might have not covered some relevant literature from other journals 
or conferences.  
• Only key terms of information were used, so some relevant publications in the 
research field could be missing from the identified publications. 
• Because of the complexity and diversity of the theories identified in the literature 
review, only a few were discussed. The research has a very small size of participants 
(138). This small sample size resulted in not being able to generalize the results.  
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• The data research was collected only from corporate accelerators in London, which 
also limited the number of participants.  
• Direct access to entrepreneurs was not provided by corporate accelerators, which 
also limited the number of participants.  
• The main collected data of this research is gathered by a self-reporting instrument, 
which  might  
8.6. Future Research 
Future research could consider exploring other concepts that are theoretically relevant 
to the protection of trade secrets. Similarly, although we examined protection 
motivation through threat and coping appraisal, future research should investigate 
other elements of protection motivation such as fear-appeal. In addition, investigating 
different moderation effects (e.g. age, education and work experience) on trade secret 
protection to und
Additionally, other agile dynamic environment could be considered in future research 
such as innovation labs.  
In regards to research design, this research used a single data collection method to 
gather and evaluate data, which is based on a quantitative approach. Future research, 
could consider using other data collection approaches. Moreover, using mixed 
methods by adding a qualitative data collection method could give a wider 
understanding for more in-depth research for similar context. 
Another issue of interest for future research concerns the coping element of costs by 
investigating and identifying the types of costs that could impact the coping part of 
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performing protective cyber security actions to protect trade secrets. A further issue 
concerns the ways that entrepreneurs weigh the costs in comparison to the ways they 
weigh benefits.  
In regards to response rate and sample size, future research could try new ways to 
improve response rate and obtain a larger sample for generalisation. One possible 
approach is to target one company that has a number of accelerators in different 
geographical locations and try to obtain permission to have access communication 
with participants.  Another approach would be through government agencies that 
support these types of accelerators to obtain official approval to support the research.  
In regards to the literature review, further research interest could be in a broader 
systematic literature review to develop a more in-depth and detailed concept map of 
cyber security behaviour elements.  This research was limited to a specific scope of 
research; therefore, other literature reviews could be built upon the results in this 
research, to develop a more comprehensive literature review that would include not 
only top journals in the research field but also top conference papers as well. In 
addition, a recommended future literature review could present a more in-depth 
analysis of the different theories related to cyber security behaviour. 
8.7. Summary 
Schneier, 2000. P.255), people 
are an essential core part of cyber security. While most research focuses on the 
technology and management aspects of cyber security, people are considered to be 
the most important aspect of them all. According to a statement by Emma W, the 
Leadin The way to make security that works is to 
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rk for people, 
based on the belief that people are the strongest link in the security chain.  
The research results found statistically significant relationships for threat and coping 
appraisals and social bonding in relation to cyber security behavioural intentions to 
protect trade secrets. The findings provide insights for corporates managing corporate 
venturing units and attempt to develop and implement cyber security mechanisms to 
protect trade secrets among entrepreneurs whom may be faced with cyber threats 
during the venturing process. The empirical findings suggest that SEVandVUL, REF, 
COS, IVT and POE 
intentions to perform protective security actions to protect trade secrets in a 
corporate accelerator. The research provides a new perspective in understanding cyber 
security behaviour to protect trade secrets. In addition, it provides a theoretical 
support and contribution to applying new protection avenue in the domain of cyber 
security behaviour.   
The findings obtained in this research can guide corporates and entrepreneurs whose 
objectives are to protect trade secrets in corporate accelerators. First, the research 
findings confirm that trade secret protection can be viewed through three protection 
aspects and that it is important to encourage a positive behavioural intention toward 
performing protective cyber security actions. In this regard, perceiving trade secret 
protection as an effective activity can be achieved through confidentiality, ownership 
and secrecy protection.  
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To conclude, this research provides empirical evidence that the cyber security 
behaviour can influence the protection of trade secrets through three protection 
aspects to provide a more comprehensive protection of trade secrets. The contribution 
of this research is summarised in Figure 8.4, which presents an overview of the 
significant factors influencing the cyber security protection of trade secrets in agile 
dynamic environments.   
 
Figure 8.3: Overview the significant factors of the cyber security for trade secret protection 
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Appendix A: Questionnaire 
You are being invited to participate in a research study.  The purpose of this research 
study is to investigate the impact of cyber security behaviour on protecting trade 
secrets in new ventures within a corporate accelerator, and will take you 
approximately 10 to 15 minutes to complete. Your participation in this study is 
entirely voluntary, and you can withdraw at any time.   
Demographic Information     
The demographic information in this section will only be used in aggregate form, and 
will not be used to identify individual respondents. Please select only one item in 
each category.  
Gender 
 Male 
 Female 
 Other..  ____________________ 
 Prefer not to say 
 
Age 
 18 to 29 
 30 to 39 
 40 to 49 
 50 to 59 
 60 and over 
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Education  
 High school 
 Diploma 
 Bachelor 
 Master 
 Doctorate 
 Other..  ____________________ 
Experience (in starting and managing a new venture) 
 < 6 months  
 > 6 to < 12 months  
 > 1 to < 2 years  
 > 2 to < 3 years  
 More than 3 years 
 No previous experience 
Established Ventures (the number of new ventures that you have started) 
 None 
 One 
 Two 
 Three 
 More than three 
 
Important Definitions 
Trade secrets: refers to your start-
including any type of information that is not disclosed to the public and gives your 
start-up a competitive advantage in the marketplace.      
Examples of trade secrets:     
▪ Industrial design (e.g. iPhone 8)   
▪ Software algorithm (e.g. pricing algorithms)   
▪ Chemical formula (e.g. Coca-Cola)   
▪ Blueprints or prototypes   
▪ Customer lists       
Cyber security threats: include any type of attacks (e.g. theft, hack, leakage, 
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Performing protective cyber security actions: means taking one or more cyber 
security countermeasures to reduce the risk of cyber security attacks on your 
    
Examples of cyber security protective actions:     
▪  
▪ Signing confidentiality (nondisclosure) agreements.   
▪ Installing antivirus software and firewalls.   
▪ Encrypting electronic documents or information.     
Thinking of your future actions, indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree 
with the following statements regarding your likelihood of taking protective cyber 
security actions to protect  from an attack.  
1-Psychological 
Ownership 
       
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neutral Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
This is my venture and 
my trade secrets. 
              
I feel a high degree of 
personal ownership for 
secrets. 
              
I sense that these are 
my trade secrets. 
              
 
2- Reward 
       
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neutral Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
Not performing 
protective cyber 
security actions toward 
trade secrets saves me 
time. 
              
Not performing 
protective cyber 
security actions toward 
trade secrets saves me 
money. 
              
Not performing 
protective cyber 
              
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security actions toward 
trade secrets keeps me 
from being confused. 
Not performing 
protective cyber 
security actions toward 
trade secrets requires 
less effort of me. 
              
Not performing 
protective cyber 
security actions toward 
trade secrets makes me 
feel less stressful. 
              
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3- Vulnerability 
       
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neutral Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
secrets are vulnerable to 
cyber security threats. 
              
It is likely that a cyber 
security attacks will 
occur against my 
ets. 
              
secrets are at risk to 
cyber security threats. 
              
secrets are vulnerable to 
cyber security threats. 
              
 
4- Severity 
       
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neutral Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
Cyber threats to the 
trade secrets are severe. 
              
In terms of cyber 
threats, attacks on my 
are severe. 
              
I believe that cyber 
threats to the security 
secrets are serious. 
              
I believe that cyber 
threats to the security 
secrets are significant. 
              
 
5- Response Efficacy 
       
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neutral Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
Efforts to keep my 
safe from cyber threats 
are effective. 
              
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The available measures 
that can be taken to 
trade secrets from 
security threats are 
effective. 
              
The preventive 
measures available to 
me to stop people from 
trade secrets are 
adequate. 
              
If I perform the 
preventive cyber 
security measures 
available to me, my 
are less likely to be 
exposed to a cyber 
threat. 
              
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6- Self-Efficacy 
       
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neutral Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
For me, taking cyber 
security precautions to 
trade secrets is easy. 
              
I have the necessary 
skills to protect my 
from cyber threats. 
              
My skills in stopping 
cyber threats against 
secrets are adequate. 
              
For me, taking cyber 
security precautions to 
trade secrets is easy. 
              
I have the necessary 
skills to protect my 
from cyber threats. 
              
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7- Response Cost 
       
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neutral Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
The benefits of 
performing protective 
cyber security actions 
trade secrets outweigh 
the costs (R). 
              
I would be discouraged 
from performing 
protective cyber 
security actions toward 
secrets in the future 
because it would take 
too much time. 
              
The time taken to 
perform protective 
cyber security actions 
trade secrets in the 
future would cause me 
too many problems. 
              
Taking protective cyber 
security actions would 
require considerable 
investment of effort as 
well as time. 
              
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8- Behavioural 
Intentions 
       
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neutral Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
I am likely to take 
protective cyber 
security action to 
trade secrets. 
              
It is possible that I will 
take protective cyber 
security action to 
trade secrets. 
              
I am certain that I will 
take protective cyber 
security action to 
trade secrets. 
              
 
9- Attachment 
       
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neutral Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
I usually have 
conversations about the 
protection of my 
with team members. 
              
I respect my team 
opinions about the 
protection of our 
 
              
I communicate the 
importance of 
trade secrets to team 
members. 
              
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10- Commitment 
       
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neutral Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
I strongly believe that 
the protection of my 
can help the venture to 
succeed. 
              
I am committed to 
protecting my venture 's 
trade secrets. 
              
I am willing to invest 
energy and effort in 
making the protection 
secrets a success. 
              
I am willing to put in a 
great deal of effort to 
help my venture 
succeed. 
              
 
192 
 
11- Involvement  
       
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neutral Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
I value the opportunity 
to participate in 
informal meetings 
information security. 
              
I work on building 
personal relationships 
with team members in 
my venture in relation 
to trade secret 
concerns. 
              
I actively involve myself 
in activities related to 
 
              
 
 
12- Personal norms  
       
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neutral Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
It is a serious matter if I 
protective cyber 
security actions to 
trade secrets. 
              
It is unacceptable not to 
perform ALL the 
protective cyber 
security actions to 
trade secrets. 
              
To me, performing the 
protective cyber 
security actions to 
trade secrets is NOT a 
trivial offence. 
              
To me, it is 
unacceptable to ignore 
the protection of my 
 
              
 
193 
 
 
Appendix B: Mean and Trimmed Mean 
 Constructs Code Items Mean 
5% 
Trimmed 
Mean 
1 Psychological 
Ownership POC1. This is my start-up and my trade secrets. 5.85 5.97 
POC2. 
I feel a high degree of personal ownership for my 
start-  
5.99 6.08 
POC3. I sense that these are my trade secrets. 5.82 5.82 
2 Reward 
REW1. 
Not performing protective security actions toward 
trade secrets saves me time. 
3.30 3.26 
REW2. 
Not performing protective security actions toward 
trade secrets saves me money. 
3.36 3.29 
REW3. 
Not performing protective security actions toward 
trade secrets keeps me from being confused. 
3.20 3.15 
REW4. 
Not performing protective security actions toward 
trade secrets requires less effort of me. 
3.83 3.81 
REW5. 
Not performing protective security actions toward 
trade secrets makes me feel less stressful. 
3.07 3.02 
3 Vulnerability 
 
 
VUL1. 
My start-
information security threats. 
4.99 5.07 
VUL2. 
It is likely that an information security attack will 
occur against my start-  
4.99 5.06 
VUL3. 
My start-
security threats. 
4.73 4.79 
VUL4. 
My start- gainst 
information security threats. 
3.86 3.85 
4 Severity 
 
 
SEV1. 
Threats to the security of my start-
are severe. 
4.49 4.54 
SEV2. 
In terms of information security threats, attacks on 
my start-  
4.68 4.75 
SEV3. 
I believe that threats to the security of my start-
trade secrets are serious. 
4.92 5.02 
SEV4. 
I believe that threats to the security of my start-
trade secrets are significant. 
4.95 5.02 
5 Response 
Efficacy REF1. 
Efforts to keep my start-
information security threats are effective. 
5.14 5.18 
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REF2. 
The available measures that can be taken to protect 
my start-
effective. 
5.05 5.08 
REF3. 
The preventive measures available to me to stop 
people from getting my start-
adequate. 
4.72 4.76 
REF4. 
If I perform the preventive measures available to me, 
my start-
exposed to a security threat. 
5.17 5.26 
6 Self-Efficacy 
 
 
SEF1. 
For me, taking information security precautions to 
protect my start-  
3.74 3.68 
SEF2. 
I have the necessary skills to protect my start-
trade secrets from information security threats. 
3.69 3.65 
SEF3. 
My skills in stopping information security threats 
against my start-  
3.67 3.65 
7 Response 
Cost 
 
COS2. 
I would be discouraged from performing protective 
security actions toward my start-
the future because it would take too much time. 
3.33 3.27 
COS3. 
The time taken to perform protective security actions 
toward my start-
cause me too many problems. 
3.22 3.19 
COS4. 
Taking protective security actions would require 
considerable investment of effort as well as time. 
5.15 5.17 
8 Security 
Behavioural 
Intentions 
INT1. 
I am likely to take protective security action to 
protect my start-  
5.76 5.82 
INT2. 
It is possible that I will take protective security action 
to protect my start-  
5.94 6.02 
INT3. 
I am certain that I will take protective security action 
to protect my start-  
5.63 5.73 
9 Attachment 
 ATC1. 
I usually have conversations about the protection of 
my start-  
4.67 4.72 
ATC2. 
about the protection of our start-  
5.59 5.67 
ATC3. 
I communicate the importance of protecting the 
start- m members. 
5.49 5.61 
 
10 
Commitment  
CMT1. 
I strongly believe that the protection of my start-
trade secrets can help the start-up to succeed. 
5.63 5.73 
CMT2. 
I am committed to protecting my start-up's trade 
secrets. 
5.81 5.88 
CMT3. 
I am willing to invest energy and effort in making the 
protection of my start-  
5.75 5.82 
CMT4. 
I am willing to put in a great deal of effort to help my 
start-up succeed. 
6.20 6.28 
11 Involvement  
IVT1. 
I value the opportunity to participate in informal 
meetings related to my start-
security. 
5.33 5.40 
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IVT2. 
I work on building personal relationships with team 
members in my start-up in relation to trade secret 
concerns. 
5.55 5.60 
IVT3. 
I actively involve myself in activities related to my 
start-  
6.15 6.22 
12 Personal 
Norms  
 
PEO1. 
security actions to protect my start-  
5.38 5.48 
PEO2. 
It is unacceptable not to perform ALL the protective 
security actions to protect my start-  
4.80 4.85 
PEO3. 
To me, performing the protective security actions to 
protect my start-
offence. 
4.83 4.87 
PEO4. 
To me, it is unacceptable to ignore the protection of 
my start-  
5.52 5.64 
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Appendix C: Cross-loadings  
 ATC COS INT IVT PEO POC REF REW SEF 
SEVan
dVUL 
ATC1 0.761 -0.023 0.210 0.155 0.350 0.045 0.138 -0.177 -0.151 0.312 
ATC2 0.742 -0.153 0.189 0.425 0.290 0.132 0.058 -0.197 -0.054 0.214 
ATC3 0.909 -0.130 0.360 0.344 0.286 0.199 0.165 -0.187 -0.136 0.366 
COS2 -0.161 0.957 -0.308 -0.146 -0.228 -0.172 -0.074 0.367 0.088 -0.100 
COS3 -0.018 0.776 -0.142 -0.100 -0.047 -0.027 0.037 0.266 0.046 0.063 
INT1 0.296 -0.353 0.837 0.315 0.359 0.306 0.137 -0.156 -0.041 0.312 
INT2 0.208 -0.192 0.843 0.233 0.328 0.247 0.288 -0.097 0.139 0.347 
INT3 0.344 -0.192 0.893 0.262 0.437 0.354 0.290 -0.188 -0.010 0.436 
IVT1 0.269 -0.109 0.294 0.887 0.240 0.164 0.059 -0.039 0.079 0.138 
IVT2 0.392 -0.146 0.240 0.823 0.297 0.141 -0.090 -0.088 -0.034 0.130 
PEO2 0.242 -0.171 0.366 0.276 0.831 0.284 0.037 -0.205 0.144 0.308 
PEO3 0.195 -0.143 0.304 0.151 0.769 0.190 0.081 -0.136 -0.064 0.136 
PEO4 0.437 -0.149 0.394 0.309 0.838 0.239 0.094 -0.241 -0.011 0.326 
POC1 0.163 -0.155 0.367 0.164 0.320 0.917 0.122 -0.123 -0.072 0.336 
POC2 0.144 -0.016 0.295 0.111 0.188 0.840 0.111 -0.081 0.042 0.265 
POC3 0.126 -0.205 0.236 0.200 0.243 0.834 0.094 -0.100 0.059 0.297 
REF1 0.171 -0.008 0.311 -0.005 0.118 0.155 0.962 -0.160 0.014 0.239 
REF2 0.052 -0.112 0.104 -0.014 -0.016 0.020 0.725 -0.138 0.017 0.098 
REF3 0.103 -0.087 0.028 -0.026 -0.050 -0.033 0.479 -0.104 0.053 0.002 
REW1 -0.090 0.316 0.012 -0.018 -0.134 0.132 -0.102 0.615 0.078 0.085 
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REW2 -0.150 0.286 -0.127 -0.115 -0.167 0.000 -0.086 0.723 -0.022 0.019 
REW3 -0.229 0.318 -0.144 -0.046 -0.230 -0.164 -0.211 0.847 -0.008 0.001 
REW4 -0.249 0.321 -0.034 -0.124 -0.279 -0.001 -0.083 0.659 0.025 0.025 
REW5 -0.142 0.289 -0.157 -0.003 -0.163 -0.113 -0.123 0.843 0.120 -0.049 
SEF1 -0.106 0.080 0.027 0.073 0.042 0.035 -0.044 0.001 0.874 -0.150 
SEF3 -0.147 0.064 0.026 -0.018 0.016 -0.037 0.079 0.071 0.865 -0.052 
SEV1 0.326 -0.004 0.177 0.146 0.128 0.286 0.138 0.061 -0.110 0.760 
SEV2 0.359 -0.010 0.361 0.205 0.247 0.337 0.205 0.030 -0.080 0.837 
SEV3 0.344 0.008 0.401 0.149 0.299 0.285 0.201 0.038 -0.057 0.857 
SEV4 0.305 -0.052 0.451 0.138 0.248 0.260 0.331 -0.036 -0.128 0.839 
VUL1 0.170 -0.070 0.314 0.051 0.262 0.319 0.019 -0.021 -0.123 0.687 
VUL2 0.217 -0.120 0.160 0.005 0.236 0.140 0.079 -0.024 -0.024 0.659 
VUL3 0.337 -0.091 0.285 0.100 0.320 0.233 0.087 -0.125 -0.100 0.795 
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Appendix D: Confidence Intervals Bias 
Corrected 
  Original 
Sample (O) 
Sample 
Mean (M) 
Bias 10.0% 90.0% 
COS -> ATC c 0.216 0.043 0.079 0.234 
INT -> ATC 0.395 0.403 0.008 0.251 0.528 
INT -> COS 0.335 0.356 0.020 0.195 0.478 
IVT -> ATC 0.563 0.571 0.008 0.405 0.714 
IVT -> COS 0.211 0.236 0.025 0.088 0.364 
IVT -> INT 0.431 0.433 0.001 0.273 0.584 
PEO -> ATC 0.498 0.501 0.003 0.355 0.619 
PEO -> COS 0.236 0.272 0.036 0.126 0.343 
PEO -> INT 0.554 0.557 0.003 0.403 0.683 
PEO -> IVT 0.444 0.456 0.012 0.286 0.609 
POC -> ATC 0.196 0.230 0.034 0.096 0.292 
POC -> 
COS 
0.150 0.222 0.072 0.060 0.167 
POC -> INT 0.415 0.409 -0.006 0.259 0.571 
POC -> IVT 0.250 0.261 0.011 0.119 0.399 
POC -> PEO 0.364 0.367 0.003 0.214 0.514 
REF -> ATC 0.168 0.228 0.060 0.075 0.203 
REF -> COS 0.121 0.190 0.070 0.034 0.132 
REF -> INT 0.235 0.274 0.039 0.118 0.318 
REF -> IVT 0.161 0.204 0.044 0.069 0.213 
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REF -> PEO 0.111 0.191 0.080 0.049 0.108 
REF -> POC 0.139 0.177 0.038 0.066 0.201 
REW -> ATC 0.288 0.307 0.018 0.182 0.380 
REW -> 
COS 
0.496 0.498 0.002 0.371 0.610 
REW -> INT 0.173 0.214 0.041 0.096 0.224 
REW -> IVT 0.135 0.207 0.071 0.062 0.145 
REW -> 
PEO 
0.316 0.331 0.015 0.195 0.432 
REW -> 
POC 
0.155 0.196 0.040 0.082 0.180 
REW -> REF 0.198 0.242 0.044 0.107 0.274 
SEF -> ATC 0.198 0.235 0.037 0.087 0.305 
SEF -> COS 0.108 0.165 0.057 0.034 0.153 
SEF -> INT 0.099 0.169 0.069 0.027 0.099 
SEF -> IVT 0.133 0.191 0.057 0.041 0.179 
SEF -> PEO 0.134 0.197 0.063 0.038 0.145 
SEF -> POC 0.097 0.158 0.061 0.024 0.098 
SEF -> REF 0.106 0.182 0.076 0.032 0.111 
SEF -> REW 0.100 0.179 0.079 0.039 0.089 
SEVandVU
L -> ATC 
0.447 0.453 0.006 0.320 0.563 
SEVandVU
L -> COS 
0.118 0.175 0.057 0.056 0.124 
SEVandVU
L -> INT 
0.454 0.459 0.005 0.311 0.573 
SEVandVU
L -> IVT 
0.194 0.250 0.057 0.101 0.280 
SEVandVU
L -> PEO 
0.382 0.395 0.013 0.253 0.503 
SEVandVU
L -> POC 
0.393 0.395 0.002 0.268 0.508 
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SEVandVU
L -> REF 
0.225 0.258 0.033 0.136 0.280 
SEVandVU
L -> REW 
0.100 0.171 0.071 0.074 0.074 
SEVandVU
L -> SEF 
0.174 0.213 0.040 0.096 0.231 
 
